Page 2 of
4 SINOGRAPH China's new leaders on a
tightrope By Francesco
Sisci
Things started to change towards the
end of 2011, at the time Hillary Clinton visited
Myanmar. This was also the starting point for a
Chinese political paradigm shift; it became even
more apparent with the announcement by Obama in
Australia in November of America's new strategy.
On that occasion, the American president
announced that the number of troops deployed in
Darwin, Australia, would increase by 2500,
underlining his new idea of Asia's centrality for
the United States.
This gesture became all
the more important because the United States had
announced its intention of reducing military spending
and because, during the
Arab Spring uprising in the Middle East, in Libya
and Syria, America had made no commitment to
permanently relocate troops or military
facilities.
The subtext couldn't have been
clearer: America intended to concentrate its
military and strategic efforts on China, not on
the Middle East or Russia, America's one-time foe,
but on its future foe, Beijing.
America
also viewed this as a rallying cry for the Asian
countries. They would no longer be abandoned to
China's growing regional pre-eminence. America
would always provide support and would encourage
the members of any great anti-Chinese alliance to
band together.
For China this was like a
bucket of icy water in its face. Beijing believed
that America's woes, caused by the financial
crisis, would have prompted the United States to
eschew major international issues, that Washington
was convinced of its inability to focus resources
on Asia, and that in any case, the infinite wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan would draw America
exclusively towards the Middle East and Central
Asia, preventing it from marshalling resources to
focus on Beijing.
And neither had Beijing
calculated that when given the alternative of
choosing between the United States and China, the
countries which are geographically close to China
would have chosen the US in order to restore
balance, for the simple reason that centuries of
Chinese hegemony were still fresh in their minds.
Already during the summit between Hu and
Obama in Beijing in November 2009, there were
those who contended that it was necessary to be
more flexible and to take into account the
American president's domestic needs.
After
Myanmar, this thesis, which had been espoused by a
minority, also convinced the majority. Amongst
other things, it was the Myanmar visit which
inspired State Councilor Dai Bingguo's visit to
India in mid-January 2012.
Relations
with India Relations with India have always
been a bugbear for China's entire strategic
alchemy. In fact, India is the only country with
demographic strength that allows it to act as a
strategic counterbalance to China's economic and
trade policy.
At least theoretically, only
India can deploy as many soldiers as the Chinese
army, and only India can offer the West the great
prospect of a production base and consumer growth
that it would lose unless it was able to replace
China (in the event that China was afflicted by
some major crisis). For decades, India has seen
China as its great rival, due to the fact that
Beijing manipulates Pakistan in order to curb New
Delhi's growth in the region and throughout Asia.
Setting out from a very similar starting point to
India's, China has been able to grow at enormous
speed over the last 30 years, whilst India
commenced growth later and its level of expansion
has never reached China's.
Against this
backdrop of perceived encirclement, in December
2011 Beijing realized that if it were able to
blunt India's weapon this would be a great
success, to some extent offsetting Myanmar's
surrender to the United States. Success in India
could also be set alongside the fact that a new
form of coexistence with Japan was already
starting to take shape.
In fact, the visit
by state councilor Dai Bingguo to India on the
50th anniversary of a brief, bloody border war in
the Himalayas between the two countries, was an
accomplishment that exceeded expectations.
Dai's visit marked the beginning of a
radical change and laid the groundwork for
improved relations between the two Asian giants,
rather than for a form of integration which had
been the stuff of fantasy a few years previously,
when the term "Chindia" was coined and became a
buzzword. To say the least, putting relations
between the two countries on a new footing removed
the danger that relations might take a dangerous
turn for the worse.
Dai spoke about the
beginning of a golden period in relations between
the two countries, striking the right notes both
with his words and with his behavior. On 16
January he wrote in the Indian daily "Hindu":
"While working hard to develop itself, China is
fully committed to developing long-term friendship
and cooperation with India. It is our genuine hope
that India will enjoy prosperity and its people,
happiness. There does not exist such a thing as
China's attempt to 'attack India' or 'suppress
India's development.' China will remain committed
to the path of peaceful development." [1]
The agreement on the border dispute
between the two countries is witness to, and the
outcome of this successful visit. Though no final
agreement has been signed, the visit represented
an important step forward in the process designed
to lay down ground-rules for averting the outbreak
of fighting in what is the world's longest
contested border.
The two countries have
put in place a consultation mechanism to settle
the LAC (Line of Actual Control), agreeing on
political parameters and on guidelines for
precisely demarcating their border in future.
The issues addressed are certainly
important. Nevertheless, the bones of contention
remain, including the LAC.
There are still
disputed areas, including vast areas which are not
demarcated by barbed wire or in any other way, in
which patrols from both countries operate, often
monitoring each other. Each side is convinced that
they are patrolling on their own national
territory.
The problem transcends each
sides' official claims in that neither can agree
even on who is currently in control of a given
area, a very rare state of affairs in disputed
territories during peacetime.
Periodically, troops from both sides meet
at a local level and accuse the other side of
alleged "incursions". This practice bestows on the
military a high degree of control over the
situation and over progress towards peace. It
means that both sides rely on the goodwill and the
initiatives taken by local commanders who are able
to influence the pace of negotiations at any given
time.
Dai and his counterpart, the Indian
National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon,
however, managed to reach agreement this time on a
mechanism designed to involve the central
government in these sporadic local meetings.
In addition to limiting the likelihood of
incidents, this novelty ought also to slowly
crystallize a final agreement on the Line of
Actual Control. In turn, this line could become
the realistic basis for demarcating the border
between the two countries on the map, thereby
bringing the dispute to an end.
This
solution however is still a long way off.
Demarcating a border could in fact expose both
sides to the risk of an outburst of nationalism.
An agreement ought to be approved by the Indian
parliament, but the nationalist parties could
reject it by reason of the fact that it grants
China part of "India's sacred territory".
Should this happen, the matter would
immediately be taken up by Chinese nationalists
who would accuse their government of making
excessive concessions to the Indians. A vicious
circle, in which each side would become
irredeemably hostage to its own public opinion,
would very soon take shape.
For the time
being, no diplomats from either country are
seriously engaged in any attempt to establish a
binding timetable for resolving the dispute. On
the contrary, it seems destined to become a
long-running, protracted disagreement.
Indian public opinion, which is
characterized by strong anti-Chinese feeling due
to defeat in the war 50 years ago, will have to be
prepared to create the right atmosphere to allow
for significant headway to be made on both sides.
In this respect, Dai's visit has been a
step in the right direction and appears as the
precursor for a foreign relations strategy which
is much more carefully thought out than in the
past.
Sino-Japanese relations and Xi's
US visit On Christmas day, in Beijing, the
Chinese leaders met the new Japanese prime
minister, Yoshihiko Noda, and received reassurance
as to the situation in North Korea where the
"beloved leader" Kim Jong-il had just died.
This was certainly not sufficient to
restore good relations, which were still affected
by tension sparked by the dispute over the Senkaku
islands (in Japanese, Diayu dao in Chinese); the
islands are claimed by both countries But the
visit by Yoshihiko Noda had contributed to
defusing the situation as it was in both parties'
interests to keep a very close eye on highly
volatile North Korea, at the same time pressing
ahead with dialogue on economic matters.
In this latter sector the visit achieved
two highly significant results. The first one was
an exchange rate agreement involving the two
countries' currencies, an important step on the
path which is supposed to pave the way for the
yuan becoming a global reference currency.
The Japanese economy is the world's third
largest and China had already signed similar
agreements with other countries during the period
in which the problem of renminbi - dollar
conversion was acutely felt. At this point,
amongst other things, the euro area remains the
only important economic reality with which China
has not yet signed a specific currency agreement.
The two countries also agreed on a
revaluation of the dollar, a step which should
help the American economy, which is still on shaky
ground, by reducing Chinese and Japanese exports
to the United States, increasing American exports
and encouraging Chinese and Japanese direct
investment in the United States.
These two
meetings were configured as the basis for the
visit to Washington on 14 February of the Chinese
vice-president and the man who had already been
designated the future leader of China: Xi Jinping.
It was expected that Xi would have ushered in a
new era of Sino-American relations in view of the
fact that relations had continued to worsen after
the failure of the Copenhagen Climate-Change
Conference in 2009.
Beijing's idea was
that the prospect of the creation of a
Sino-American G2 could not be revived as it would
inevitably alarm most of China's neighbors; they
might have expected to run the risk of being
crushed in the two giants' embrace.
Out of
necessity the new bilateral relations should have
included and involved the other Asian countries,
primarily the major players such as Japan and
India. They should have been strategically,
politically and economically bound together with
very strong ties. Symbolic concessions such as aid
agreements or increased trade are not sufficient.
This is precisely the direction in which China's
two previous meetings with India and Japan were
heading.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
