EAST CHINA SEA
DISPUTE Beijing more sensitive to war
tremors By Brendan O'Reilly
Long-standing historical and geopolitical
tensions between Japan and China are coming to a
head over a group of islands in the East China
Sea. The struggle for sovereignty over the Diaoyu
Islands (called Senkaku Islands in Japan) is
heating up at a dangerous time for both countries.
While Japan faces crucial elections, massive
protests against Japan erupted in dozens of
Chinese cities. In some places, anger was vented
against Japanese products and brands. Protesters
overturned Japanese-brand cars, set fire to
buildings, and smashed Japanese-made electronics.
The popular mood in China is for war.
Although the territorial dispute goes back
at least several decades, recent moves by both
nations have markedly increased
the friction between the
second and third largest economies in the world.
There exists a very real possibility for armed
confrontation. The potential for armed conflict
may be increasing due to heightened economic
worries and political uncertainties in both
countries.
Recent days have seen a
dramatic escalation of the maritime dispute. The
Japanese cabinet approved plans to purchase three
of the five contested islands from their private
Japanese owner. The Chinese government almost
instantly condemned this move. Premier Wen Jiabao
promised to "absolutely make no concession" on the
issue of sovereignty over the islands. [1]
More tellingly, the Chinese government is
now backing up tough words with military muscle.
The Chinese Defense Ministry will "reserve the
right to take necessary measures" [2] to secure
Chinese sovereignty over the islands. China has
sent six "ocean surveillance" ships to the
disputed waters for the purpose of "law
enforcement". The Japanese government summoned the
Chinese ambassador in Tokyo and condemned the
quasi-naval deployment as an "unprecedented" move
in the several-decades old quarrel.
Yu
Zhirong, a high-ranking official in the Chinese
State Oceanic Administration, upped the ante in a
recent interview, saying: "We will have to chase
off Japan Coast Guard vessels from Chinese
territorial waters. We are not fearful of risking
a minor conflict." [3] While the leadership in
both nations might not fear a small symbolic
confrontation, the repercussions of such a move
would be felt around the world. No one can
guarantee that any conflict in the East China Sea
would remain "minor". Japan's close security ties
with the United States would likely drag America
into any clash.
The United States has been
closely monitoring the situation in the East China
Sea. American ambassador to China Gary Locke
recently stressed America neutrality in the
current disputes. In reference to the standoffs
between China and her neighbors, Locke stated: "We
take absolutely no position on who is right, and
we do believe that both sides need to try to
resolve this."[4]
These comments have been
interpreted in Chinese media as a significant
shift of US policy. So far, the Chinese government
has insisted resolving various territorial
disputes through bilateral mechanisms, knowing
full well China's geopolitical advantage in
addressing disagreements on a one-to-one basis. On
the other hand, Washington has been vocal in
supporting multilateral mechanisms, where the
Chinese advantage would be significantly diluted.
Whether intentional or otherwise, Locke's call for
"both sides" to work on settling the territorial
disputes has been chalked up as a diplomatic win
in China.
US Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta, speaking in Tokyo, has also weighed in on
the developing crisis: "I am concerned that when
these countries engage in provocations of one kind
or another over these various islands, that it
raises the possibility that a misjudgment on one
side or the other could result in violence, and
could result in conflict. And that conflict would
then have the potential of expanding."[5]
The potential for an "expanding" conflict
is very worrying indeed for the United States.
American resources are already stretched thin. The
United States is facing a growing crisis in the
Middle East over an anti-Islam video, not to
mention the ongoing war in Afghanistan and
military operations in Somalia, Yemen, and
Pakistan. Some hawkish elements within the Chinese
leadership may want to use the current standoff to
test America's security commitment to Japan and
the broader American strategic pivot to Asia.
A wave of nationalism is sweeping the
entire Chinese world as Beijing takes concrete
steps to challenge Japanese control over the
islands. After the Japanese government decided to
purchase the islands, the Taiwan-based Republic of
China (ROC) withdrew its envoy from Tokyo in
protest. ROC Foreign Minister Timothy Yang harshly
condemned the Japanese policy, saying: "We
strongly demand that the Japanese government
revokes this move. Japan's unilateral and illegal
action cannot change the fact that the Republic of
China owns the Diaoyu islands." [6]
Beyond
the strongly worded diplomatic protests from both
sides of the Taiwan Strait, there is a surge of
popular anger directed at the Japanese throughout
Greater China. Several weeks ago, pro-Chinese
activists from Hong Kong landed on the disputed
islands. Calls for a Chinese boycott of Japanese
goods are gaining traction. More ominously, recent
anti-Japanese protests in several Chinese cities
have devolved into riots. Images of burning
Japanese cars (and their well-clad, tearful
owners) have spread across Chinese social media
even faster than the riots themselves. The flag of
the People's Republic of China is prominently
displayed in shops throughout the country, along
with anti-Japanese banners. The Japanese
government issued a safety warning for Japanese
citizens in China after several "serious"
instances of attack or harassment. [7]
Exacerbating the crisis is the fact
that Japan's newly appointed ambassador to China
died in Tokyo on Sunday. [8] Shinichi Nishimiya had
been assigned to the post only the week before.
Authorities have ruled out the possibility of
links between Nishimiya's untimely death and the
increasingly violent anti-Japanese demonstrations,
but his loss further complicates a strained
relationship.
The crisis in the East China
Sea will have major economic effects along with
the geopolitical repercussions. The bilateral
trade relationship between Japan and the People's
Republic of China is valued at more than US$340
billion. As calls for a boycott of "enemy goods"
increase on both sides, the effects of the ongoing
confrontation are being felt in the pocketbooks of
business in both nations. Why are both sides
risking an escalation at this juncture?
Both Beijing and Tokyo are riding the
tiger of strident nationalism. Japan is facing
serious internal political divisions, a nuclear
power controversy, and a lagging economy. Prime
Minister Yoshihiko Noda's decision to nationalize
the islands came after Tokyo governor Shintara
Ishiara called not only for the purchase the
islands, but also to develop them. It seems likely
that Prime Minister will leave the islands
undeveloped, in an effort to tread a middle path
between enraging the Chinese and angering Japanese
nationalists. This strategy appears to have been a
serious miscalculation.
For the past
several decades, the Chinese government has
largely avoided military confrontation. The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has instead
bolstered its legitimacy by providing economic
growth. Foreign disputes were put on the
backburner as the government focused on the
singular goal of increasing material prosperity.
Because the Communist Party did not have clear
internal divisions, and because the autocratic
nature of the Chinese system largely shielded the
party from direct accountability to the people,
the Chinese leadership has taken a decidedly
long-term strategy for enhancing China's
international power. A major crisis, such as the
1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization bombing of
the Chinese embassy in Serbia, did not lead to a
prolonged or drastic Chinese response, despite
intense popular anger.
This pattern may no
longer hold true. Divisions within the Communist
Party are surfacing in the wake of former
Chongqing municipality party chief Bo Xilai's
dramatic fall from grace. Furthermore, a recent
prolonged absence of heir apparent Xi Jinping from
the public eye fueled speculation of a violent
confrontation within the ranks of the Party. In
the event of a serious struggle for political
power in China, a ruling faction may seek to shore
up domestic support by initiating an armed
conflict with China's historical nemesis.
Western governments that pressure China to
democratize do so with supreme geopolitical
shortsightedness. If the government in mainland
China was currently a Western-style representative
democracy, popular pressure for a war against
Japan would be almost impossible to resist.
Adding to the political uncertainties are
worrying signs of a slowdown in China's economy.
Bad news has piled on in the last several months,
with major economic indicators pointing to a major
reduction in China's growth rate. Premier Wen
Jiabao recently tried to reassure China (and the
world) by addressing the economic woes: "I do not
agree with the argument that China's high growth
has come to an end after 30 years. There is still
much we can do." [9] Mr Wen went on to announce a
7.5% growth target for this year. In most major
economies, this would be a very impressive rate,
but for China this figure would represent the
slowest growth in 22 years.
By purchasing
the islands at this critical juncture, Japanese
Prime Minister Noda has forced the Chinese
government to react by raising the diplomatic,
economic, and military stakes of the conflict. For
China sees Tokyo's "nationalization" of the
disputed territory a unilateral move to change the
status quo, and thus a provocation. China is sure
to refrain from risky military adventurism only so
long as the Chinese economy continues to rapidly
grow and the Chinese leadership remains largely
united. In the event of a major economic crisis in
China, or a situation of political instability,
all bets are off.
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