Page 2 of
2 SINOGRAPH Hu's legacy - the good, bad and
ugly By Francesco
Sisci
China's current development model can
only be sustained by large amounts of energy.
China's per capita energy reserve is very low and
its energy supply relies heavily on imports. As a
result, if China can't maintain stable and
diversified energy sources, it will be at mercy of
other countries and its long-term plans will be
compromised.
Over the past decade, though
China has been actively seeking to expand its
overseas markets and develop new energy
technologies, it has failed to build either a
stable energy supply network or the necessary
military prowess to safeguard such a network,
while the development of new energy technologies
remains rudimentary.
Grave Problem
8: Moral lapses and the collapse of
ideology. The
government has failed to
build an effective and convincing value system
that can be accepted by the majority of its
people.
If a society is unable to prevent
moral standards from degenerating, and if its
members are unrestrained by any moral principle
and have no sense of shame and see nothing but
profit as their goal in life, it will soon descend
to the level of the jungle. In the past decade,
while the economy has developed rapidly, the state
of morality has declined. In a time when old moral
standards have collapsed, and the ideology
developed during the revolutionary era has become
bankrupt, a modern moral system suitable for a new
market economy and commercial civilization has
failed to fill in the gap.
As a result,
there are no guiding principles for the society.
The damage done to the people's spirit and the
effects of the crisis of faith are gradual and
subtle. This trend has hardly been reversed in the
past decade.
Grave Problem
9: "Firefighting" and
"stability-maintenance" style diplomacy lacks
vision, strategic thinking and specific measures.
The state has failed to take advantage of
the opportunities that have come with the shift in
the international order. China has landed itself
in a passive position. In the past decade, even
though China has gained in power when it comes to
deciding international affairs and putting forth a
set of principles and targets as regards the world
order, the state has failed to transform this
potential into deeds.
The reason is that
China's diplomacy has only principles and goals,
and lacks strategic planning and an agenda-setting
capacity, or indeed the willpower to carry them
out. In terms of diplomatic principles, the state
is unable to adjust its diplomacy according to
changes in the international situation and China's
own strength. Instead it limits itself to the
philosophy of Deng Xiaoping, of "hiding our
capacities and biding our time". As a result of
this, China's diplomacy has failed to reflect its
increased clout, which is demonstrated by the use
of "firefighting" and "stability-maintenance"
style diplomacy in handling international affairs.
This has worsened China's international situation
and undermined the confidence of the Chinese
people.
Grave Problem 10:
Insufficient efforts in pushing political reform
and promoting democracy.
There is a long
way to go before the ideal of returning power to
the people comes about. This is the biggest and
the most challenging problem. From the experience
of modernization in other countries it is evident
that the problem can't be solved once for all. It
should be done methodically and with caution.
However, the state should at least make some
gesture to show that the Party is sincere in its
efforts to give people some hope, instead of
dithering when faced with difficulties.
In
the past decade, despite the Hu-Wen
administration's emphasis on democracy, freedom,
rule of the law and political reform, little
progress has been made regarding democratization.
In fact, the solution to all these problems lies
with the reform of the political system, and how
profound political reform will be. So the
government should be courageous and take a bold
step to realize China's political reform and
democracy.
Deng Yuwen's 10 points above
effectively state the program for the next
government, and it can be implemented only by
starting from the achievements of Hu's tenure.
This has started with a strange and still
unexplained event - the public disappearance for
almost two weeks of the next president to be, Xi
Jinping. No explanation for this was offered and
we shall not try to offer one now.
The
only thing perhaps to be said is that like its
predecessors, the Chinese leadership will
concentrate powers that in the United States, the
world's first power, are for the most part divided
between the president, legislature, supreme court,
federal reserve, newspapers, and even business
associations.
In China, a country with
half-imperial Leninist seeds as well as the seeds
of capitalism, for each of these powers, items, or
interest groups a representative holds a place in
the central political office, the Standing
Committee of the Politburo, which is renewed every
five years This time the appointment is even more
important because it will set the direction for 10
years, two terms of congress, and the power should
go to the new leadership.
In this
semi-imperial or semi-Leninist system, there is,
however, a clear top and very bottom to the
pyramid - although unlike in a capitalist system,
there is no clear and transparent dialogue between
the various powers. There is absence of a clear
absolute leadership and also absence of rules for
a dialogue between the different powers structures
represented in the Standing Committee of the
Politburo. The various semi-imperial or
semi-Leninist or capitalist elements indicate that
China is undergoing great institutional
transformation.
So, beyond the confusion
of names in circulation today, the most important
element is what structural, administrative, and
political reforms will come from the Congress.
This will be the true crux of the meeting,
scheduled for mid-October. But in this, there will
be no concrete advances. Of course, there is the
important fact there will be "democratization",
but no one knows the actual content of that
democratization. The point is highly debated
within the Party, where there is a consensus that
the current system does not work and has to be
changed, but disagreement about how to change it.
One faction, embodied by former Chongqing
Party secretary Bo Xilai, wanted a kind of Maoist
restoration. He called for the politburo in
Beijing to have more power, and an economy that
supported state enterprises over private ones. The
growing role of private enterprises in China was
regarded by this faction as the breaking point of
the entire political system: private undertakings
could affect national policy, as happens in
capitalist countries.
But behind Bo's
facade of communist ideology, there was an attempt
to appropriate authority by a group of "red"
aristocrats, who felt they were heirs to power in
the country because of the simple fact that their
parents had conquered it by force. Bo has now been
ousted, but somehow his underlying idea remains,
which might be ok provided it does not fuel and
mix with ultranationalist elements. Moreover, the
restoration movement was interpreting a popular
desire to change the present system, reverting it
to some form of old Maoist model. This has been
stopped, yet even if the push for restoration does
not work and there is still a clear desire to
change and move towards more transparency.
Following this route, the current
leadership must work delicately to keep the party
united and steer it into the future. Those who
favor a restoration of Maoism today accuse Deng
Xiaoping, who was once sanctified, of ruining the
country, and they have come to argue that without
Deng's reforms, but with a continuation until
today of Mao's regime , China would be more rich
and powerful.
Adding to this debate, there
is great uncertainty about future members of the
Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). The first
question regards the current president, Hu Jintao.
It is not clear if he will vacate all of his
positions or maintain the crucial title of
chairman of the Central Military Commission, the
ultimate guarantor of Chinese power. After the
Congress of 2002, which brought Hu to power, the
former president Jiang Zemin retained the
leadership of the military for two years.
Hu, on the model of Jiang, could hold on
to power for a couple of years - or maybe more,
since in November Hu will be 70 years old, while
Jiang retired completely at 78. However, rumors
suggest that Hu could leave completely, which
would mark a clean break with the past.
Regarding other members, there is still
great confusion and conflicting theories. It seems
likely that Xi will take over the presidency of
the state, and Li Keqiang will be his number-two
in the party. But it is not certain that Li will
be the prime minister. He could get the presidency
of the parliament, the NPC (National People's
Congress). To learn the answer, we must wait until
March 2013, the next plenary session of the NPC.
It also seems to be a consensus that the
PSC will be reduced in number, from the current
nine members to seven. But even on this there is
no absolute certainty because every decision can
be overturned up until the last moment.
Among the other five expected to be
promoted, the news is strange and contradictory.
There is talk that is damaging to some, and
discussion of promoting Li Yuanchao, the current
head of the party organization, but no one knows
to what task.
The fate of Zhang Dejiang is
uncertain. Zhang is at present party secretary in
Chongqing, after being sent there to restore order
after the purge of Bo Xilai; similarly for Wang
Yang, secretary of the southern province of
Guangdong, who had a rival political model to
Bo's.
The major new element would be
represented if the PSC admitted Hu Chunhua, born
in 1963. Hu could be the president of China in
2022. No matter who manages to land directly on
top, Hu is the future. Currently party secretary
in Inner Mongolia, Hu lived in Tibet for "two
hundred months".
His promotion and his
career path indicate the current leadership thinks
it is essential to focus on the issue of ethnic
minorities and in particular of those in Tibet.
This is the problem of the long-term future, the
party seems to be saying.
Note: 1. The following is
taken from the translation by Eric Mu, published
on the website Danwei. The original was published
in the Journal of the Party School, Study Times,
and reprinted by the financial magazine Caijing.
Francesco Sisci is a columnist
for the Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore and can be
reached at fsisci@gmail.com
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
