Egypt gains balance and leverage in
China By Chris Zambelis
Occurring amid a groundswell of
revolutionary activism in the Arab world, the fall
of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in February
2011 heralded a new era for Egypt. Under Mubarak's
authoritarian rule, Egypt embodied the paradigm of
stability pursued by its longtime ally the United
States in the Middle East. Mubarak's ouster,
however, has redefined Egypt's geopolitics.
Previously suppressed political movements
led by the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliate
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) as well as an
assortment of other Islamist currents now are
chartering a new path for the country with a
recalibration of Egyptian foreign policy assuming
a top priority.
As a result, the decision
by President Muhammed Morsi to travel to Beijing
from August 28 - 30 on his inaugural state visit outside
of the Middle East
illustrates the central place China occupies in
Egyptian strategy.
President Morsi is a
leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood and
Egypt's first democratically elected civilian
leader after over six decades of military rule.
Morsi was accompanied to China by a delegation of
high-level ministers and dozens of businessmen.
Discussions were held to expand economic and trade
ties between Egypt and China and to enhance the
state of bilateral Sino-Egyptian relations.
Morsi's itinerary also included meetings
with his Chinese counterpart President Hu Jintao,
Premier Wen Jiabao, China's future leader Vice
President Xi Jinping and other ranking Chinese
officials to further cement what he described as
the "strategic" relationship shared by Egypt and
China.
Hailed as historic talks, these
conversations also covered the rapidly evolving
developments in the Middle East, including the
crisis in Syria and other pertinent matters.
Egypt recalibrates The
importance of broadening the parameters of Egypt's
relationship with China was reflected early on in
Morsi's electoral platform. Just as important, the
place of China in a Morsi-led Egypt must be seen
in the larger context of the FJP's goal to
diversify Egypt's foreign relations portfolio away
from its strong orientation toward the United
States.
Morsi repeatedly has expressed his
intent to reassess the mechanics of Egypt-US
relations to better reflect Egyptian national
interests and the demands of the Egyptian public.
This includes cultivating closer strategic-level
interactions with China and other countries and
regions that were largely neglected in previous
years so as to maximize Egypt's standing in the
international arena. Significantly, Morsi chose to
visit Beijing over Washington to mark his first
state visit outside of the Middle East. Morsi
highlighted what he referred to as Egypt's former
role as a leader and its goal to recapture the
diplomatic prestige it once commanded on the world
stage. He also pointed to China's experience as a
developing country that has catapulted itself
successfully to the status of a global power as a
model for Egypt to emulate: "We saw how - back in
the early eighties - China imposed itself firmly
on the international community, becoming a
permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council . ... This deserves appreciation and
consideration with an eye to learning from China's
successes. [1]
Echoing a popular refrain
in Sino-Egyptian public diplomacy, Morsi likened
Egypt's ancient heritage with that of China's as a
common bond that both countries share: "Egypt also
boasts a great and old civilization and has a long
history comparable to the Chinese civilization and
glorious history". Morsi also described China as
"a good brother, friend and partner" of Egypt and
thanked China for its longtime friendship and
support.
Both sides highlighted their
achievements as leaders of the developing world
and their shared principles of advocating for
national sovereignty, independence and
non-interference in the affairs of other nations.
Hu reciprocated with his own expressions of
goodwill and respect toward the Egyptian people
and their aspirations to choose a political system
and path of development that best suits them. Xi
added that Egypt and China should commit to
coordinate their efforts on issues of regional and
international concern, adding that "[China] will
always regard Egypt as a key, trustworthy
cooperative partner".
Many observers
downplay the role of foreign affairs in provoking
the outburst of popular unrest that prompted the
fall of Mubarak and other longstanding dictators
in the Middle East. There is copious evidence that
opposition to Egyptian foreign policy as it
relates to a range of issues, including Egypt's
close ties with the United States and Israel,
helped galvanize public opinion along with
domestic social, political and economic
grievances.
Most Egyptians deeply oppose
US foreign policy in the Middle East and Egypt's
perceived role in advancing what is widely seen as
an imperial order designed to subjugate and
control the Arab and Muslim worlds. [2]
The United States considers Egypt to be
among its most important allies in the Middle
East. The alliance between the United States and
Egypt has served as a cornerstone toward achieving
broader US aims in the Middle East. Turning a
blind eye to the autocracy, corruption and abuses
endured by Egyptians under the Mubarak regime, the
United States has furnished Cairo with diplomatic,
economic and military support over the years in
exchange for Egypt's pro-US orientation.
This reality was not lost on Morsi in
Beijing: "[Egypt] will progress and prosper with
the hard work and free will of its people, in a
climate quite different from anything it
previously witnessed after the repressive corrupt
regime has been removed."
With Egypt and
much of the broader Arab world in a state of
political turbulence, the United States continues
to watch the evolution of post-Mubarak era
politics with great trepidation. As Egypt
struggles to consolidate its democratic
transition, the foreign policy adopted by the FJP
will likely reflect the populist and nationalist
sentiments that more accurately reflect Egyptian
public opinion.
To live up to its
proclaimed democratic credentials, the FJP will
need to hold itself accountable to Egyptians on
matters involving Egypt-US relations. Similarly,
Egyptians are also against the nature of Egypt's
relationship with Israel, especially in the
context of its enduring occupation of Palestinian
land, as defined under the Camp David Accords. [3]
In contrast, many Egyptians tend to hold
positive or benign views of China. Egypt and China
issued a joint statement immediately following
Morsi's visit affirming their mutual support for
an independent Palestinian state and called for
Palestinian participation in the United Nations
and other international bodies.
While
Morsi is eager to write a new chapter of
Sino-Egyptian relations, it is important to keep
in mind that a tradition of strong relations
between Egypt and China dates back to the Cold
War. Egypt and China both played important roles
in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Egypt was also
the first Arab and African country to recognize
the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1956.
Egypt also has been a vocal supporter of
the "One China" principle regarding the respective
statuses of Taiwan and Tibet as defined by China
("Public Diplomacy in Sino-Egyptian Public
Relations," China Brief, May 18, 2007). In this
regard, Morsi's trip to China also was designed to
reassure Beijing of post-revolutionary Egypt's
intent to preserve the bilateral relationship that
has been cultivated over decades.
Economic imperatives Apart from
realigning Cairo's foreign policy orientation,
Morsi's visit to China was motivated, ultimately,
by economic imperatives. According to presidential
spokesman Yasser Ali, Morsi's trip to China was
intended to "attract Chinese investment"
(al-Arabiya [Dubai], August 27).
Now that
it has assumed office, the fledgling FJP-led
government is under pressure to quickly address
Egypt's severe economic predicament. Egyptian
society is beset with growing poverty,
high-unemployment, rising food costs, fuel
shortages and underdevelopment. Morsi also faces
the daunting task of reassuring foreign investors
that post-revolutionary Egypt is an attractive
destination for capital.
The unrest that
prompted the fall of the Mubarak regime and the
residual instability witnessed during the
transition period has deterred foreign investors
from investing in Egypt. Major economic sectors
such as tourism have also been brought to a
virtual standstill.
To ease Chinese
concerns, Morsi committed to providing investors
with the necessary support to navigate the current
climate in Egypt. Morsi also touted Egypt's ideal
position to serve as a gateway to Africa and the
Middle East for Chinese investment: "We want the
Silk Road to return as a direct link between Egypt
and China, as a radiant source of enlightenment
and success ... We want to offer to China and
Chinese investors logistics services needed to
take large Chinese investment across Egypt and
into Africa and North Africa."
While the
volume of bilateral trade between Egypt and China
continues to experience steady growth, Egypt
believes that the current state of trade relations
is nowhere near its potential. The volume of
Sino-Egyptian trade reached US$8.8 billion in
2011, an increase from $7 billion in 2010.
Significantly, both sides agreed to help boost
Egypt's share of the trade balance to China.
The balance of trade between Egypt and
China heavily favors Beijing: in 2011, China
exported $7.2 billion worth of goods to Egypt
while Egypt shipped $1.6 billion worth of items to
China. There is also a geopolitical component to
Egypt's pursuit of more Chinese investment. Egypt
relies on an annual aid package of $1.5 billion
from the United States, with about $1.3 billion
earmarked for the military. Egypt also has
requested $4.8 billion in low interest loans from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and is
negotiating with the United States for $1 billion
in debt relief.
An injection of Chinese
capital in the Egyptian economy during this
critical period can help strengthen Egypt's
economic position, thereby allowing it to
diversity its sources of hard currency and
revenue. An increase in Chinese investment also
can boost Egypt's negotiating leverage with the
United States and IMF as well as other potential
sources of finance.
By all accounts, the
outcome of Morsi's visit to China proved to be
fruitful for both sides. Egypt and China signed
seven major agreements paving the way for Chinese
investors to construct a power station in Upper
Egypt, a desalination facility and industrial
bakeries. Beijing also will invest to expand
Egypt's Internet infrastructure. The two sides
also discussed the possibility of constructing a
high-speed rail line connecting Cairo and
Alexandria.
Scheduled to coincide with
Morsi's visit, a two-day session of the
Egypt-China Economic and Business Forum in Beijing
was also organized. The session was presided over
by Egyptian Minister of Investment Osama Saleh and
included 80 Egyptian businessmen representing the
construction, infrastructure, tourism,
petrochemicals, textiles and pharmaceuticals
sectors along with the representatives of over 200
Chinese concerns.
Overall, the value of
the numerous investment deals and joint ventures
between Egyptian and Chinese firms concluded
during Morsi's visit is estimated to be $4.9
billion. Egypt and China also agreed to expand
cultural contacts and boost tourism in both
countries. Both sides also committed to cooperate
more closely in areas such as science and
technology, education and agriculture.
China currently represents Egypt's 25th
largest source of foreign investment. Both sides
committed to increasing China's presence in the
Egyptian economy.
Conclusion Morsi's visit to
Beijing yielded tangible results for both Egypt
and China. Just as important, Morsi's decision to
choose Beijing as his first state visit outside of
the Middle East as opposed to Washington reveals a
great deal about China's role in the Middle East
and the shifting geopolitical landscape in the
region.
Egypt remains closely tied to the
United States on many levels. At the same time,
the fall of the Mubarak regime and the opening of
Egypt's political space after decades of autocracy
have empowered political and social forces and
large segments of public opinion to make their
voices heard on issues related to Egyptian foreign
policy.
Considering the legacy of US-Egypt
relations and the expressed objectives of the
Morsi government to reinvent Egypt's foreign
policy, China is well positioned to reap
significant gains.
Notes: 1. The People's
Republic of China (PRC) assumed the position of
permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council from the Republic of China (ROC) in
1971. 2. According to a May 4 - 12, 2012, Egypt
Presidential Election Poll conducted by the Anwar
Sadat Chair for Peace Development at the
University of Maryland, 68% of Egyptians polled
held "very unfavorable" opinions of the United
States while 17% held "somewhat unfavorable"
opinions of the United States. A 2011 survey
conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project of
Egyptian public opinion also found a large
majority (79%) of Egyptians held unfavorable
opinions of the United States. 3. The May 2012
Egypt Presidential Election Poll cited above found
that 44% of Egyptians polled wish to see the Camp
David Accords cancelled while 10% would like to
see the terms of the treaty amended. The Pew
Global Attitudes Project survey cited above
arrived to similar conclusions with 54% polled
preferring to see the treaty annulled.
Chris Zambelis is an author and researcher with Helios Global, Inc, a risk management group based in the Washington, DC area. The opinions expressed here are the author's alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of Helios Global, Inc.
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