Page 2 of
2 China
pushes back against Japan By
Peter Lee
Ministry of Commerce spokesman
Shen Danyang carefully made the distinction in a
statement to reporters on September 19 (in a
rather garbled translation):
Shen Danyang released three-point
statement, the Ministry of Commerce strongly
supports legitimate, rational, patriotic action,
firmly opposed to all illegal thwarted grab [of
the Diaoyutai Islands]; the legitimate rights
and interests of foreign-invested enterprises in
China are protected by law. China is a country
ruled by law, the legitimate rights and
interests of foreign-invested enterprises are
protected by Chinese laws. Third, I believe that
the vast majority of people can be calm,
rational, legal and orderly express their
demands. Foreign-invested enterprises, such as
suffered violations should seek help in a timely
manner to the relevant departments of the public
security departments, including the business
sector. [6]
For the historically
minded, this allows the Chinese government to
present the demonstrations as the spiritual heir
to the series of
protests against
Japanese aggression that occurred between 1908 and
1931.
And if the Japanese government
itself wants to reawaken memories of its detested
extraterritorial privileges in China under the
Qing and Kuomintang regimes, it is welcome to call
on the PRC government to moderate the behavior of
the demonstrators, and implore the Chinese courts
to improve their efforts to protect the persons
and property of Japanese citizens inside the PRC.
The Japanese newspaper Asahi Shinbum did
its best to rekindle the spirit of 2010, if not
1931, mischaracterizing the Ministry of Commerce's
statement of support for private boycotts as
"economic sanctions", as in "China suggests
economic sanctions over Senkakus". [7]
In
the same article, Asahi also tried to get some
geopolitical mileage by playing the rare-earths
card with an anxious description of an
announcement of restructuring in the Chinese
rare-earths industry, while admitting the changes
had long been expected, but then tried to have it
both ways:
China Central Television said
September 19 that the Ministry of Land and
Resources will slash the number of companies
licensed to mine rare-earth elements by 40%,
from 113 to 67.
That policy was
published six days earlier and the companies to
be affected were informed in August. In
addition, cutting the number of mining companies
is not expected to directly affect rare-earth
exports to Japan.
However, the state-run
broadcaster's report could be taken as a warning
of stronger measures against the Japanese
government for its purchase of three of the
Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea from a
private owner on September
11.
Actually, the Chinese government
has done a pretty good job of erecting a defense
against the accusation of rare-earth economic
warfare this time, as the lead from an article by
David Stanway for Reuters in July demonstrates:
China, the world's biggest producer
of rare-earth metals, is likely to turn an
importer of the vital industrial ingredients by
as early as 2014 as it boosts consumption in
domestic high-tech industries rather than just
shipping raw material overseas.
[8]
The "economic warfare" dog doesn't
appear to be hunting internationally, since
boycotts against Japanese companies inside China
will be just as harmful to the Chinese economy as
they are to Japan's.
Perhaps the most
remarkable canine element of the current
Senkaku/Diaoyu dustup, however, is the dog that
didn't bark. Or, to be more accurate, the two dogs
that didn't bark and the one that did ... but on
China's behalf.
One would have thought
that the PRC's tussle with Japan would have been
the perfect opportunity for Beijing's two major
South China Sea adversaries, the Philippines and
Vietnam, to put the boot in, to draw attention to
China's habitual high-handedness in island matters
and strengthen the argument for the US-led pivot.
That hasn't happened, perhaps because the United
States has taken itself out of the game by
limiting its involvement to exclusively military
scenarios against the Senkakus.
The
Philippine and Vietnamese governments have been
relatively silent on the issue, perhaps because of
some special Chinese attention.
To smooth
over the disagreements with the Philippines, some
high-profile emollient was personally applied by
Vice-President Xi Jinping to the Philippine
interior secretary in Beijing on September 21. In
a practical and obliging vein - and in contrast to
the huffing and puffing over the Scarborough Shoal
- the Chinese government agreed to reschedule
repayment of a US$500 million loan for a canceled
rail project and discuss selling its stake in the
Philippine national power grid, and promised to go
easy on inspection of banana imports. [9]
Xi was also present at the China-ASEAN
trade expo in Guangxi. Vietnamese Prime Nguyen Tan
Minister Dung attended and for whatever economic
or geopolitical reason, China-bashing apparently
was not on the menu there either, as Voice of
Vietnam reported:
Mr Dung's participation in CAEXPO
and CABIS [China-ASEAN Business and Investment
Summit] showed Vietnam's keen interest in
promoting friendly neighborliness and
comprehensive cooperation with China and
encouraging its businesses to seek investment
opportunities in China and expand economic,
trade and investment cooperation with Chinese
border provinces. [10]
As for Taiwan,
it sowed confusion in the ranks of China-bashers
and, one expects, a certain dismay in the hearts
of Japan's diplomats by sending 40 fishing vessels
and 12 patrol boats into Senkaku waters to engage
in a water-cannon fight with the Japan Coast
Guard, thus muddying the heretofore pristine
narrative of Japanese maritime professionals vs
mainland Chinese aggressors. The Telegraph posted
video of the thrilling display. [11]
Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, for whom
the Senkakus has been a signature issue throughout
his career, was clearly behind the provocation. In
fact, it was alleged that the confrontation had
been carefully scripted among Taiwan, the PRC and
Japan to make sure things didn't get out of hand.
[12]
One can speculate as to whether
President Ma's main motivation was to provide aid
and comfort to his political supporters in Beijing
or he felt compelled to make a protest against
Japan for nationalizing the Senkakus and, in the
process, ignoring his political interests and
sensibilities.
In any case, at the end of
the day Japan found itself with a
less-than-slam-dunk case for the Senkakus in the
court of (non-Japanese) opinion, backed with
limited and conditional US support, receiving
little if any enthusiastic backing from its
neighbors, and taking it on the chin financially
from the anti-Japanese demonstrations inside
China.
With this context, it looks as if
the PRC regime decided after the 2010 debacle
that, next time the Senkaku issue surfaced, it was
going to be ready with an integrated strategy of
mass mobilization, economic sanctions, avoidance
of direct government-to-government economic and
military confrontation, a regional charm
offensive, and an expectation of US forbearance.
This appears to be a more plausible
scenario for the current Senkaku dynamic than the
dissident and China-bashing-fueled claim that the
PRC ginned up the dispute to distract attention
from domestic political unrest in the run-up to
the 18th Communist Party Congress and leadership
succession.
Allowing large crowds of
disgruntled Chinese citizens to flood on to the
streets - quite a few of them waving pictures of
Mao Zedong in an implied expression of solidarity
with purged "Red Mayor" Bo Xilai and a rebuke to
his current persecutors in the power structure,
and others willing to engage in criminal behavior
and mix it up with security forces in order to
make a spectacle of their atavistic nationalist
fervor - is not a recipe for political calm.
It is more likely that the regime decided
to roll the dice and enable widespread
demonstrations in pursuit of its geostrategic
strategy against Japan, and breathed a sigh of
relief when things didn't get completely out of
hand.
In other words, the viability of the
Chinese-mass-opinion weapon - which such outlets
as Global Times have been touting for the past few
years - albeit applied in carefully controlled
anti-Japanese doses, has been demonstrated to the
Japanese government and business community.
Therefore, it isn't too surprising that
Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Chikai Kawai has
gone to Beijing to try to ease the dispute. The
Chinese Foreign Ministry position is that Japan
has to "make strong efforts to improve
Sino-Japanese relations", though one has to wonder
what those efforts are supposed to involve.
Those "efforts" probably include a
Japanese undertaking to coordinate and consult
with China on regional affairs instead of
maintaining a united front with Washington on
matters related to the US pivot and trade blocs.
Whether a geopolitical and economic reset can be
negotiated, let alone survive the expected change
of national administration in Japan - and the
Senkakus can fade into deserved insignificance -
remains to be seen.
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