On December 6, Mongolia's
cabinet ministers attended a meeting with the
members of the National Security Council where
they were informed of the council's views
regarding the management of US$1.5 billion brought
in by a recent sale of the government's first
international bond.
All talk in town on
that day was about this foray into global capital
markets, the "responsible" use of the proceeds,
and their timely and full repayment. Also on
December 6, the country was absorbing news that in
the 2012 Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
released the day before by Transparency
International, Mongolia
moved up from 120th place in
previous rankings to 94th place. These were two
major headlines of the day.
And what, on
that same day, does Mr Jeffrey Reeves choose to
highlight as "two recent developments in Mongolia
[that] provide insight into the country's
political and economic development"? (See Mongolia
steps in the wrong direction, Asia Times
Online, December 8, 2012). A court case against a
former president that is hardly a recent
development, and - seriously? - the removal of a
Lenin statue in Ulaanbaatar, a "worrying"
development, according to Reeves, but really a
non-development.
The author deems these
two "instances" to be "important indicators of
Mongolia's national development". But he fails to
offer a grounded critique of the country's
development-related policies; instead it seems to
be a simplistic indictment of Mongolia that
brushes aside the many real problems confronting
this country.
To start with the statue,
how its removal is related to national development
is a mystery to me but one could look at it this
way: Lenin, founding father of the communist
system, lost out to Chinggis Khaan, founding
father of the nation. Except for a few posts
confounding Russia and Lenin, no "emotional
response" to the event has been apparent.
Mr Reeves' article notes that crime was
"almost nonexistent under the communist system".
Tens of thousands of innocent people summarily
executed, not a crime? Besides, as is known,
having crime go unreported or under-reported was
not uncommon under communism.
The
country's social gains and "impressive economic
growth" alluded to in the article were all
underwritten by the Soviets and the COMECON (the
economic organization of the Soviet bloc). The
country was sent reeling when this funding
disappeared with the demise of the old system in
Russia and elsewhere. Contrary to what the piece
seems to suggest, nobody in the early 1990s set
out to willingly destroy the previous
achievements, nor would everything have been
preserved had the country stayed true to Lenin.
Regarding literacy: with a mere 98% literacy rate
Mongolia would surely want to catch up to North
Korea's impressive 100%, but not by sacrificing
its democratic gains.
Mr Reeves portrays
Mongolia as a "state devoid of political
accountability and rule of law". If elections are
any indication, political accountability is
exercised in Mongolia. Just this past summer, the
people voted out the party in power and voted in a
new government. In local elections this fall,
incumbents lost in the majority of localities, the
first such occurrence in 90 years. And the ongoing
reform of law enforcement and the judiciary just
may result in a strengthened rule of law, after
long years of neglect.
It so happens that
the "ineffective government" engaged in "window
dressing", "unwilling to accept responsibility for
the country's growing social needs", is only 100
days old. The jury is still out on its
ineffectiveness or irresponsibility, or disrespect
for the rule of law.
Corruption has
developed into a serious illness in Mongolia, as
rightly noted in the article. In the 2000s, graft
was entrenched. The country's improved CPI is, of
course, about perception, but perception must be
based on tangible things, the former's president's
case being the last of them.
The
tightening of the legislation, including the
passage of a conflict of interest law, may have
been a more significant factor. And it will be a
more enduring one in that it creates institutional
and legal barriers preventing ventures into
unscrupulous behavior.
It is true that
successive governments have been, for far too
long, "not interested in dealing effectively with
corruption". The question is, will its
anti-corruption efforts, led by the country's new
minister of justice, be sustained and yield
results in the face of unprecedented mining
revenues that could and, probably, will serve as a
temptation for many? And might these efforts
succumb to the supposedly "endemic" nature of
corruption in Mongolia? The answer is, it is an
either/or proposition: it is either corruption or
development.
The immediate and long-term
problems facing the country do not stop here. I
could not agree more with Mr Reeves that
successive Mongolian governments have indeed
neglected "the country's growing social needs".
Its much touted double-digit growth has failed to
translate into a reduction of poverty. While the
rich were busy getting richer, some on public or
aid money, the poor were getting poorer, and the
ranks of the unemployed kept growing. Government
ineffectiveness is also to be blamed for delayed
investments in infrastructure, including power
generation. No wonder the populace aspired for a
change.
The self-described "government of
change" now in charge will have to deliver. Its
biggest task will be to manage the country's
inevitable transition from an agriculture-based
economy to a mining-based one while avoiding all
the associated social, environmental, and
political pitfalls. Will Mongolia be all about
mining, or will it build a more diversified
economy, a more equitable and sustainable society,
and become a more respected partner
internationally? The answers will depend to a
great degree on the decisions taken today.
To conclude: While Mr Reeves' interest in
Mongolia is greatly appreciated, the last thing
this country needs is to be dragged backward. Over
two decades ago it bid goodbye to Lenin and never
looked back. Mongolia has moved on, learned to
value the freedoms of a democracy and is now busy
figuring out its future trajectory, amid a host of
challenges.
Jeffrey Reeves
(reevesj@apcss.org) responds:
Ms
Tuya's critique of my PacNet piece is made against
a straw man, not the piece itself.
My
original piece raised two points. First, I argued
that the corruption case against former president
Enkhbayar demonstrates the politicization,
weakness, and selective use of the rule of law and
anti-corruption investigations in Mongolia. These
issues are front and center in the debate over
Mongolia's political development. Enkhbayar was,
after all, sentenced to two-and-a-half years in
prison on December 7, 2012.
Ms Tuya claims
that the jury is still out on [the new
government's] ineffectiveness or irresponsibility,
or disrespect for the rule of law. While I take
her point regarding the new government, my
criticism is of the politicians and political
institutions that have been in place for more than
two decades. If the Enkhbayar case is any
indication of the new government's priorities, I
cannot say I have much hope the future will be
different.
While Ms Tuya does provide
Mongolia's move from 120th to 94th place in the
CPI as evidence of improving corruption, the
Transparency International (TI) changed its
methodology in 2012 and warned of the
impossibility of year-on-year comparisons. The CPI
has to be read in this context, particularly as
there is little evidence of a seismic change in
Mongolia's endemic corruption that would otherwise
explain the change in ranking.
My second
point relied on the symbolism of a statue of
Lenin. In drawing attention to the Lenin statue, I
sought to examine the Mongolian government's
approach to post-Cold War social development, not
critique Ulaanbaatar's city planning.
My
argument here was that no Mongolian government
since the country's transition to democracy and a
liberal economy has been able to match the social
development milestones the country achieved under
communism. Nowhere did I argue that anyone "set
out to willingly destroy the previous
achievements". Instead, I argue that no meaningful
effort has been made to reproduce them, despite
Mongolia's impressive economic growth. This
includes the country's oft-lauded Human
Development Fund, which both the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund have criticized as
being a political tool for incumbents to buy
support.
I am not alone in seeing this as
a failure in government responsibility. A December
10 report on Mongolia from UN Special Rapporteur
on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights Magdalena
Sepulveda confirms this view. In her report, Ms
Sepulveda specifically notes that the Mongolian
government has not done enough to translate the
country's newfound affluence into improved social
institutions such as education, health, and
housing. If Ms Tuya truly believes poverty is one
of Mongolia's greatest development challenges, a
point I happen to agree with, she must also agree
that such findings are extremely disturbing.
Ms Tuya raises the management of
Mongolia's first international bond as a sign of
Mongolia's progress. While this is an
accomplishment, there is a larger story here. One
week after its initial sale, the bond plunged
US$7-8 amid news that the MPRP [Mongolian People's
Revolutionary Party, now the Mongolian People's
Party] ordered all its members holding ministerial
posts to resign (thereby threatening the Justice
Coalition). The cause? The MPRP was protesting
Enkhbayar's imprisonment. I'm not the only one who
thinks his incarceration is an important issue.
I concede to Ms Tuya's point that
Mongolians have a cosmopolitan view of the world
(a point I never challenged). Yet I disagree that
this world view is limited to support for
democracy and a liberal economic system. The
Mongolians I know also look at states like China,
South Korea, Japan, and Singapore - states where
the government takes a central role in providing
social services - as potential political and
economic models.
As a final point, my
referral to "crime" in the original piece was
clear in its reference to street crime. I was,
after all, comparing Mongolia during the Cold War
to Mongolia post-Cold War, noting the situation
now is worse than before.
Nyamosor
Tuya (n.tuyana@gmail.com) is a former Foreign
Minister of Mongolia and a former democracy
activist.Dr Jeffrey Reeves is
Associate Professor at the College of Security
Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies in Honolulu.
PacNet
commentaries and responses represent the views of
the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are
always welcomed.
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