SINOGRAPH Xi has to get the party
started By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - The Chinese feel strongly about
China, but are indifferent to the party. Yet state
and party are united, and the absence of popular
responsibility towards keeping the party as
government could see the country forfeited.
Political participation is the key to the
stalemate.
During the next plenary session
of the Chinese parliament, the National People’s
Congress, Beijing will overhaul its administrative
system, with the total number of ministries set to
be reduced to about 26 from 40 at present. This is
a new step in reforming the administration, and
follows a similar cut in 15th Party Congress in
1997 when the number of ministries fell from 70 to
40.
There is continuity in this
administrative and political reform. This latest
step is Xi Jinping's first political statement,
but it is also be
part of Hu Jintao's
political legacy - he will remain in the role of
president until next March. Furthermore, in this
period of political overlap between the two
leaders, the Communist Party is also said to be
launching a vast and comprehensive anti-corruption
campaign. The administrative reform is meant to
provide greater efficiency to the state machinery,
while the anti-corruption campaign is meant to
regain the trust and loyalty of the common people,
many of whom are disgruntled by the inefficiency
and the widespread graft in the state.
Improving the efficiency of the state
administration should also reduce the
possibilities and occasions for corruption, while
the graft crackdown should increase the efficiency
of the administration. These two are hence to one
purpose and should bolster the present leadership.
However, there is another extremely
important element in this complex political
situation: common Chinese people do not have
strong feelings, positive or negative, toward
their political system. They do not have
guishugan - a sense of belonging to the
Chinese political system. Many approve of the
leadership, and they may also feel strongly
patriotic or even communist, but there is little
feeling for the ruling Communist Party and open
criticism of the system ruling the country. It is
an open issue, everybody is critical of the
present political system, which is being reformed.
In any case, most Chinese people feel the
political system does not belong to them - it is a
tool and instrument at best, but it is alien to
them. This is unlike some democratic countries,
America and the UK being paramount examples, where
people feel a part of the country and the
political system running it. This raises the
question, to whom does the political system
running China belong? Who are the stockholders of
the Chinese political system?
In the
mid-1990s, as China was reforming its ministries
and administration, Beijing also took the bold
step of launching widespread housing reforms.
Tenants in apartments belonging to the state or
state-owned enterprises were offered a chance to
buy their lodgings. People who formerly owned
nothing except perhaps a bicycle suddenly owned a
house. These people moved immediately to the
middle class and had a real stake in the welfare
of the country.
The state got rid of many
useless and burdensome houses, gained the little
cash common people could afford to pay for their
lodgings, and most importantly, the common people
who became middle class now had a little capital,
their houses, that could be lost in an upheaval or
revolution.
Since then, the figure has
grown to over 80% of people owning their houses or
own lots of land in the countryside. That is, 80%
of the people have something to lose in a sudden
revolution. In this way, China has created a
rock-solid base of self-interest in social
stability and against massive upheavals.
However, these people still see nothing in
favor of the current political system. They do not
want the state turned upside down, but they have
no interest in preserving any political leader in
charge of the country. They have no sense of
belonging to this political system. This does not
translate into indifference to the political power
struggle at the top, but a state of constant panic
about the drawbacks of the power struggle. If
things go wrong with the political power struggle,
most people feel threatened by what could happen.
People who have gained from the present situation,
who made money, often feel their wealth may be put
in jeopardy by political turns in Beijing or in
their local city.
The sense of belonging
translates into a sense of responsibility. Few
Chinese feel responsible for the country. They may
not want a revolution, but will they step up to
improve things? If they do, in many cases they are
rejected because politics does not belong to them
and their concerns are routed through specific
channels. Yet most simply are unconcerned by the
big picture and worried only about keeping their
own small or large wealth.
This lack of
interest could be a positive for the ruling
Communist Party in the short run. However, it can
translate into indifference to the fate of the
party when the party and the political system are
under pressure from internal or external forces.
Without the common people, the Chinese ruling
system is more lonely.
Reportedly, 17 out
of the 20 richest men in Chongqing had their
wealth seized by now-deposed and disgraced
Chongqing party leader Bo Xilai. However,
businessmen who might have been close to Bo Xilai
may feel that their wealth is more in jeopardy
following his ouster. The wealthy do not have a
sense of protection from the state and the
political system, and in fact their riches are de
facto in the hands of and under the ultimate
control of local or national leaders.
The
only people who feel they have a stake in a
political system are the ones who are closely
connected to its political structure, ie, the
sons, daughters, and siblings of party officials.
Bo allegedly felt strongly for the country and the
party, as if it was something that belonged to
him, as heir of his father and the their comrades.
Major and minor aristocracy may feel they
have a stake in the preservation of a system
guaranteeing the privileges of their parents and
thus their own. Heirs of Long March veterans feel
the country and the political system belongs to
them and to their fathers. They have a strong
sense of belonging to the political system. In
fact, this system affords them direct influence
and indirect privileges in the preservation of the
system. They have the connections, network, and
access to resources that are de facto denied to
the underprivileged class.
The same cannot
be said for people born outside of the official
class. Everything is more difficult for them, and
therefore these people have an inherent interest
(although it may not be expressed as such) in
toppling the system that casts them aside. They do
not have any sense of belonging to the system,
they have no sense of responsibility for it, and
thus, they are inherently a revolutionary force
against this political system. As these people are
the majority of the Chinese population, this is in
fact a challenge and a threat to the present
political system.
The strategy adopted in
the late 1990s was to expand the base of people
with an interest in the social stability of the
country, and this was achieved by giving people
houses. Therefore, the plan was to make common
people stakeholders in the present social and
political stability. A similar strategy should be
adopted now to regain the trust, sense of
belonging, and feeling of responsibility of the
common people to the present political system.
At present, at the local and state level,
local and party officials and their families have
influence over local and national decisions, or
they feel as though they do. Of course, the
Chinese system is not only in the hands of the red
aristocrats and the top or lesser officials. The
party has been very attentive in recruiting new
people, new talents who will serve the interests
of the state. This has expanded the base of people
who feel a sense of belonging to the state;
however we are far from the 80% ratio reached with
housing reform.
How can people gain a
sense of belonging to the political system? In
developed countries, this is achieved through
public political debate and elections. People
follow the debates and campaigns, and then decide
to like this or that candidate. Yet, whomever they
choose, people feel attached to the political
system through expressing their choices, and thus
they may feel a sense of belonging to the system
and responsibility for it.
Many things are
different in China, and certainly one should be
careful about blindly adopting alien methods, but
something may go very wrong if 80% of Chinese
people don't feel connected to their political
system.
Francesco Sisci is a
columnist for the Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore and
can be reached at fsisci@gmail.com
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