China-Japan tango treads on
regional toes By Jean-Marc F
Blanchard
For currently troubled
Sino-Japanese relations to be put on a sounder
footing, policymakers in both countries must
understand that "their" tango includes more
countries than themselves.
Tokyo and
Beijing also need to appreciate that talks are
insufficient and may even be counterproductive,
and that only through exploring more wide-ranging
and creative options will they deal with their
problems with history.
Much policy
thinking about Sino-Japanese tensions narrowly
focuses on solely the two East Asian giants. Yet,
the China-Japan dyad is nested within or overlaps
with other regions, including Northeast Asia,
Southeast Asia, and South Asia.
What
happens in these regions invariably spills over
into the
China-Japan dyad and
vice-versa. For example, Japan's efforts to
bolster political ties with Southeast Asia and
naval ties with India are threatening to China,
while China's political, economic, and military
backing for the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (North Korea) is, at a minimum, troublesome
and, at a maximum, alarming to Japan.
China's naval frictions with the US in
China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or spats
over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands with Japan bring
the US and Japan closer together which, in turn,
increases China's insecurities. This gives China
more reason to reject a US presence in its EEZ and
to push harder on the Diaoyu Islands.
The
key point for Chinese and Japanese decision
makers, if they want to stabilize and improve
bilateral ties, is that they need to be sensitive
to the consequences of what they do beyond their
immediate relationship.
It is commonplace
to suggest additional high-level meetings,
bureaucratic dialogues, and people-to-people
exchanges to deal with bilateral distrust, hostile
nationalist sentiments, and a lack of goodwill.
However, it is hard not to be skeptical about the
value of such proposals.
There have been
dozens of meetings, dialogues on energy, Africa,
economics, fisheries, and the East China Sea,
joint history studies, military visits, and
extensive cultural and educational exchanges
involving thousands if not tens of thousands.
Nonetheless, public opinion surveys have not
improved, nationalist sentiments have not
dissipated, and, aside from the 2008 agreement on
the East China Sea, there has been a dearth of
progress on major issues.
One can ask what
harm there is in more talk, dialogue, and
exchange? The harm is that the focus on building
"understanding" through talks, dialogues, and
exchanges detracts from the pursuit of standstill,
force reduction, or economic accords that might
reduce heat and minimize the risk of accidents and
conflict.
A second downside to relying on
meetings, dialogues, and exchanges is that they
build expectations for progress which, when unmet,
can result in more animosity, cynicism, and
distrust. The recommendation, then, is for China
and Japan to de-emphasize talking and to move to
specific ways in which they can reduce the risk of
accidents, show concrete results to their
constituents, and realize agreements that bind the
two countries further and demonstrate the value of
cooperation.
There can be no denying that
China suffered greatly from Japan's actions in the
1930s and 1940s. Chinese elites and the Chinese
people are dismayed (disgusted in some cases) by
Japanese who deny atrocities such as the Nanjing
Massacre or who think Japan need make no apologies
regarding the comfort women issue. As Chinese and
Western commentators have noted, Japan would
benefit from greater sensitivity and
self-reflection on these matters.
Informed
Japanese, though, cannot comprehend why Chinese
continue to make such a big deal of history given
that neither a majority of Japanese elites nor the
Japanese public deny what was done. Additionally,
not only has Japan been remorseful, but, in their
view, Japan has given numerous apologies and made
various amends.
Moreover, they fail to
grasp why China can slight statements by Chinese
academics, officials, or soldiers questioning
Japan's sovereignty over Okinawa or calling for
war over the Diaoyu Islands as extremist or
unofficial while routinely deeming statements by
Japanese extremists as evidence of a militaristic
Japanese culture or official policy.
Finally, many Japanese do not understand
why China, which on, one hand, is trying to
improve understanding, is, on the other hand,
continuing to feed its public a steady diet of
Chinese film, television, and other media about
Japanese aggression in the 1930s and 1940s. In
short, the realm of history is one where Beijing
and Tokyo both need to take measures as well as
investigate creative solutions.
The
China-Japan dyad is a complicated one and the
nature of their frictions - territorial and
maritime quarrels, security competition, and
regional rivalries - present daunting challenges
to those aiming to stabilize and warm the
relationship.
What makes things more
alarming is the view held by some that there is no
possibility of conflict over issues such as the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands because they are
uninhabited rocks while Sino-Japanese economic or
national interests are much greater. In fact,
however, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are not just
uninhabited rocks, but islands involving history,
nationalism, energy, domestic politics, and
prestige.
These and other interests have
been compelling China and Japan to take
increasingly aggressive actions that risk serious
accidents. It is critical that China and Japan
move back from this possibility. They can only do
so if they learn to think holistically about their
relationship, to move beyond talking, and to
addressing their history problem creatively.
Jean-Marc F Blanchard
(professor.jmfb@gmail.com) is professor and
assistant dean for International Cooperation and
Exchange with the School of International and
Public Affairs at Shanghai Jiaotong
University.
Head
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