Sudan and China have enjoyed cordial
relations for decades, developing a fruitful
economic and political partnership dating back to
their mutual estrangement from the West in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. But Sudan's 2011
partition has presented China with a new set of
challenges.
The ongoing failure of Sudan
and South Sudan to resolve tense standoffs over
oil ownership, border demarcation, and the status
of the disputed Abyei region constitutes a
delicate dilemma for China. Namely, Beijing will
be challenged to advance its interests in the
Sudans while upholding its foreign policy
principle of non-intervention in other states'
affairs.
Since the 2011 partition of the
country, China's dual objective has been to
maintain its alliance with Sudan while
establishing a cooperative partnership with South
Sudan, which controls 75% of all Sudanese oil. The
crisis along the Sudanese border is forcing
China to at least consider
adopting a policy of shuttle diplomacy that it has
not previously embraced, threatening China's
historically non-interventionist bent.
Historical context In 1989, as
the Tiananmen Square crackdown in China and the
Bashir-Turabi coup in Sudan increasingly alienated
both Beijing and Khartoum from Western powers,
Sudan began to look east. This dynamic paved the
way for a strong China-Sudan partnership. Beijing
provided the National Islamic Front-run regime,
led by current president Omar al-Bashir, with
low-interest loans and weapons transfers, while
Sudan opened its vast oil reserves to China. By
1996, the state-owned China National Petroleum
Company (CNPC), along with Malaysian and Indian
oil companies, had taken control of most of
Sudan's oil. In the past two decades, China has
invested over $10 billion in Sudan.
Today,
China is Sudan's top trading partner, purchasing
70% of Sudanese oil exports in 2010. When Sudanese
oil exports reached their peak, 6% of China's
total crude oil consumption came from Sudan. In
addition to maintaining the flow of money to
Khartoum while Western companies have withdrawn
from the country, China's veto power has provided
the Sudanese regime with impunity at the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC). Beijing's threat
to veto all resolutions targeting Sudan has
empowered Bashir's regime to pursue its aggressive
policies in Darfur without the threat of economic
sanctions being imposed by the UNSC.
The
financial, diplomatic, and military support that
Beijing has lent the Sudanese regime during its
conflicts with periphery factions predictably
infuriated the South Sudanese. Nonetheless,
following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) that concluded Sudan's second civil war,
China accepted southern independence as an
inevitable outcome.
China's leaders
understood that securing a partnership with the
southerners would be essential for ensuring access
to the majority of Sudanese oil. Indeed, when
98.5% of South Sudan's voters favored independence
during the January 2011 referendum, and South
Sudan gained official independence in July,
Beijing immediately engaged the southerners
diplomatically. China was one of the first states
to establish a general consulate in Juba, and
South Sudanese politicians - including current
South Sudanese president Salva Kiir Mayardit -
were invited to China, where they were promised
robust Chinese investment.
But it became
clear almost immediately following South Sudan's
independence that the sensitive issues relating to
oil ownership, border demarcation, and the status
of Abyei - all left unresolved under the CPA -
would prove highly problematic for the North-South
bilateral relationship.
The majority of
Sudanese oil fell under Juba's control, yet the
means to refine and export it remained under
Khartoum's, meaning cooperation would be
necessary. However, the two sides have failed to
reach an agreement on these sensitive matters. In
January 2012, South Sudan shut down its oil
production after it accused Sudan of stealing its
oil exports en route to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.
In April, hostilities reached their peak
when the Sudans engaged in a military
confrontation over disputed oil reserves along the
border of Southern Kordofan state in the North and
Unity state in the South. Together, these reserves
account for about 60% of all known Sudanese oil
deposits. On April 10, South Sudan launched an
offensive to seize control of the oil hub in
Heglig, Sudan - a target of vast geostrategic
importance, given the 60,000 barrels a day of oil
that it exports. South Sudan maintained its
control over this border town for 10 days until
Sudan's warplanes bombed the area and dislodged
South Sudanese troops and their Sudanese proxies.
As these tensions came to a head, South
Sudanese President Kiir was on a diplomatic trip
to China. Kiir reportedly complained to Chinese
officials that their close ally in Khartoum had
"declared war" against South Sudan by bombing
Heglig several days earlier. Finding its own oil
interests caught in the crosshairs of a tense
North-South standoff, China echoed the United
States, urging both sides to resolve their
territorial disputes through dialogue and to avoid
military force. Kiir left China some three days
before he was scheduled to depart, suggesting that
he had found China's response inadequate.
While Sudanese leaders have met with their
southern counterparts on numerous occasions
following the episode last April, both sides have
failed to implement the terms of a peace agreement
signed in September meant to resolve the conflict.
In January of this year, Sudanese and South
Sudanese officials met in the Ethiopian capital to
negotiate a 14-mile demilitarized zone. Yet the
scope of this zone and Sudan's accusations that
Juba sponsors armed rebels in Sudan's South
Kordofan and Blue Nile states - a charge denied by
South Sudanese officials, who claimed that these
rebels were a domestic issue for Sudan -
undermined the prospects for conflict resolution.
War and peace cost-benefit
analysis Most analysts concur that although
neither side wants war, both capitals seem to
believe that by delaying the signing of a
diplomatic resolution, they have room to advance
their long-term interests. The weakened positions
of both Sudans drive their mutual interest in
avoiding any full-scale war. Sudan is militarily
superior, yet Khartoum's capacity to score a
military victory is jeopardized by pro-Juba
proxies in its southern regions.
Moreover,
as the partition of Sudan has dramatically
decreased the oil supply under Khartoum's control,
the state has much less revenue and a war would
only worsen the country's dire economic
conditions.
Similarly, South Sudan is one
of the world's least developed countries. Over
half of its citizens live below the poverty line.
Its infant mortality and maternal mortality rates
rank near the top of the world, while its
27-percent literacy rate ranks near the bottom.
War would only exacerbate these conditions, and
with oil sales constituting 98% of Juba's budget,
southern leaders know that they must begin
exporting oil to meet their people's needs. This
cannot be accomplished with Sudan bombing their
oil fields.
Still, both sides rightly
consider the demarcation of oil fields to be a
vital national interest. Some analysts also
contend that Juba is benefiting from the tense
standoff, with the threat from Khartoum uniting a
South Sudan still grappling with the challenges of
state-building and simmering ethnic conflicts.
But as the political risks associated with
greater investment in the oil-rich region grow
higher, the one party that has nothing to gain
from the status quo is China. The question is what
cards China has to play.
South Sudan's
leaders understand that Chinese firms are well
placed to serve the country's dire need for
hospitals, telecommunications, schools, and
infrastructure, Thus, China is well positioned to
attach strings to development projects to push
South Sudan toward concessions. As Khartoum
depends on China for oil exports, loans,
infrastructure projects, arms for the Darfur
conflict, and its veto powers in the UN Security
Council, Beijing is in a strong position to
pressure the Bashir regime toward concessions.
However, the Chinese may calculate that
diplomatic efforts are likely to prove futile as
certain factors driving the Sudans' standoff
remain outside Beijing's sphere of influence. The
recent kidnapping of several Chinese workers in
Darfur and the rise of militant Islamic extremism
throughout the region highlight additional
political risks.
If Beijing concludes that
the costs of doing business in the region outweigh
the potential benefits, China may back off and
focus on longer-term interests in the Sudans. If
this scenario unfolds, China may turn its
attention to other states, such as Iraq and
Venezuela, for oil until the Sudans resolve their
standoff on their own.
Regardless, the
tense crisis between the Sudans is compelling
China to at least question how well
"non-interference" advances Beijing's geostrategic
interests. If Beijing does successfully engage in
shuttle diplomacy between Khartoum and Juba, it
may be indicative of a new China that views its
responsibilities as a rising super power
differently.
Giorgio Cafiero is
a independent foreign policy analyst and
contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus.
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