SPEAKING
FREELY The geography and politics of
Eurasian energy By Richard
Giragosian
Speaking Freely is an
Asia Times Online feature that allows writers to
have their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
WASHINGTON - There
have been many analyses of the geopolitics of
Eurasian energy. A fresh approach to the topic
emerges if we deconstruct the term "geopolitics"
into its two strands, thereby separating the
"geography" from the "politics" of the
geopolitical perspective. This approach reveals
that the two trajectories are contradictory with
respect to energy security or, more precisely,
energy insecurity in Eurasia.
The
geographical trajectory is seen in the complex and
competing calculus of energy-producing states,
energy-transit states, and
energy-consuming states.
All face the shared challenges and legacies of
geography: vast territories, vulnerable pipelines
and
centrifugal
tendencies. And within a new security landscape
post-September 11, 2001, there has also been a
profound shift in geography, with remote regions
gaining a newly enhanced and elevated strategic
significance. But this new strategic importance is
driven by geography, not energy.
It is
proximity, not pipelines, that presents the new
priority. And it is geography that projects the
influence and propels the impact of Eurasian
energy. But this geography is now two-dimensional:
no longer looking strictly westward but also
eastward. Eurasian energy is more than ever an
Asian, and no longer solely a Western, concern,
and Eurasia's energy states can be increasingly
seen as Asian powers.
China's energy
imperative Most traditional assessments of
China's energy strategy miss a fundamental point
and often start from a mistaken premise.
Specifically, unlike analyses warning of the "rise
of China", that country's energy policies are
actually rooted more in a position of weakness and
worry than one of overt aggression and ambition.
This weakness is demonstrated by a serious
imbalance between the location of China's energy
resources and its main centers of energy demand,
and reflected in the overwhelming vulnerability of
the country's access to external energy supplies.
This inherent weakness defines the core of Chinese
energy strategy and, most important, results in
two distinct needs: for greater energy imports and
for a modern infrastructure able to span great
distances. Again, geography is key.
Second, Chinese energy strategy is still
mainly defensive, rooted in the strategic fear
that the United States will seek to block or
contain China's pursuit of energy resources in an
attempt to weaken or destabilize the regime.
Further, China sees regional maritime security as
a pressing priority, compounded by its
vulnerability in the Strait of Malacca, which
accounts for the passage of four-fifths of all
Chinese oil imports. Thus, although China's energy
strategy is increasingly active and assertive, it
remains offset by an inherently defensive
approach. And again, geography is key.
But
there is more to Chinese energy strategy than
simply meeting rising energy demand. Although it
is logical that adequate energy supplies are
essential for continued economic growth, there is
an important corollary political consideration as
well.
This political dimension to energy
strategy is demonstrated by the reliance of the
Chinese state on economic growth to garner
political stability and regime legitimacy. In this
way, any threat to the delicate linkage between
secure energy supplies and sustained economic
growth is seen as a threat to the legitimacy and
security of the state. Thus China's energy policy
is one of political legitimacy as much as economic
growth.
From this perspective of strategic
security, energy is everything. Energy is crucial
for economic growth, which, in turn, is essential
for both political stability and geopolitical (and
military) power. Therefore, this pursuit of energy
security is actually a pursuit of both economic
and political security. Politics is also key.
A second political component is seen in
China's relations with Russia and other Eurasian
states. It is both the Chinese reaction to the
nearby US military presence and to US policies
emphasizing democracy promotion and regime change
that add another political dimension to energy in
Eurasia, rooted in a shared interpretation to the
"revolutions of fruits and flowers" in Central
Asia.
Moscow sees these developments not
as democratic victories of people power, but as
externally financed assaults on Russia's
traditional and even natural spheres of influence.
Beijing sees these developments as part of a
broader US strategy of encirclement, aimed at
curtailing China's expanding economic, political
and energy ties. And the authoritarian Eurasian
states themselves see the promotion of "regime
change" as direct threats to the survival of their
regimes. Here, again, politics is also key.
Russia reasserts power with energy
lever Turning to Russia, we can see a
steady reassertion of Russian power and influence
within the former Soviet space, or the "near
abroad" from Moscow's vantage point. Most
effectively, we see a Russian utilization of a
more sophisticated and subtle leverage based on
energy dependence, with overarching goals of
regaining its former "great power" status and
recovering its geopolitical relevance.
Energy has emerged as a tool for strategic
leverage, in effect replacing the traditional
Russian reliance on the "hard power" of its
military with a new "softer power" of energy.
This Russian use of energy as leverage
consists of three components, each of which is
also driven by geography. First, it has
supplemented, and in some cases even projected, an
effective reassertion of Russian power and
influence within the so-called "near abroad". Most
notably, this can be seen in the Russian dominance
over the energy sectors of much of the South
Caucasus and Central Asia.
Second, it has
featured the use of energy as a tool for
strengthening state power, empowering Russia's
status as a regional and as an Asian power, as
well as actually financing the Russian state. And
third, it has offered Moscow an attractive way to
restore its international position and regain its
geopolitical relevance, especially in Western
eyes.
There is also a broader strategic
dimension to Russian energy strategy, viewing
energy as an integral part of an overall
projection of power and position. In this way, it
is energy that most clearly marks a shift toward
Asia and away from Europe. Again, we see geography
playing a driving role.
But Russian energy
also faces a fundamental weakness. Despite the
tactical gains from the use of energy as leverage,
Russia's energy sector remains beset by four
serious shortcomings: it has no unused capacity;
its oil is relatively expensive to produce; it has
limited pipeline capacity; and it is still far
from being a global energy player. Therefore,
Russian energy strategy is predominantly driven by
weakness and need.
There is another
interesting aspect of the Russian view of energy
security. While the traditional Western, or US,
interpretation of ideal energy security is defined
by ensuring unimpeded access to energy supplies
from a diversified set of suppliers, the Russian
view is different. From the Russian perspective,
energy security is defined by "energy as security"
or, more specifically, energy as an element of
security policy.
The Eurasian paradox:
The centrality of legitimacy In the
broadest sense, however, Eurasian security and
stability remain dependent more on internal
challenges and local politics than on grand
geopolitics.
These predominant internal
challenges range from an overall deficit of
democracy, and the related predominance of
"strongmen over statesmen", to economic
mismanagement and widespread corruption. Each of
these challenges significantly impedes the reform
efforts of these states in transition, thereby
contributing to a significant loss in state power.
And the solution to each of these challenges is
also largely local and political, not
geopolitical, in nature.
These internal
constraints are also exacerbated by the reality of
Eurasian energy, however, as seen in the vital
role of energy wealth fueling networks of
corruption and fostering elite patronage. The
paradox lies in forging a balance between the need
for energy from Eurasia and the imperative for
crafting policies capable of confronting the
deepening corruption, socioeconomic disparities
and democratic deficits in Eurasia.
The
paradox also stems from the need to engage and
encourage energy security in regions still
landlocked in a political sense, hobbled by closed
political structures and coercive political
systems. The first lesson from this Eurasian
paradox is the centrality of legitimacy for
security and stability. And the second lesson is
that policies of engagement limited only to
military relations, counter-terror, or energy
contracts can do little to address the core
fragility of these Eurasian regions at risk.
Thus it is the dynamic imperatives of
Eurasian geography and politics that matter most.
It is no longer an era of grand geopolitics, but a
time for local politics. And the real path to
security in Eurasia lies within the Eurasian
states themselves.
Richard
Giragosian is a Washington-based analyst
specializing in international relations and
military security in the former Soviet Union, the
Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows writers to have their
say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
