Page 2 of 2 China's poisonous
exports By Drew Thompson
consumers as well as manufacturers.
Without structural systems, including a strong
legal system, insurance companies, industry
associations and "consumer watchdogs" in place to
support the government, the system lacks a
powerful tool to ensure food and drug processors
adhere to good manufacturing practices after the
government inspector has left the premises.
US and Chinese response In
response to the contaminated wheat gluten crisis,
the US Food
and
Drug Administration (FDA) sent a team of
investigators to China in early May to work with
their Chinese counterparts at the Administration
of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine
to determine the source and extent of the problem.
The US FDA expressed appreciation for the
Chinese government's cooperation, pointing out
that the Chinese embassy issued travel visas for
the team the same day they received the passports.
[1] In addition to product recalls, the US
government has also responded by increased
inspections of pet food, vegetable protein
products and animal feed imported from China. [2]
In the case of the intentionally
adulterated pet feed ingredients that resulted in
the deaths of animals, the Chinese authorities
have treated it as a criminal case limited to two
manufacturers, rather than a more fundamental
problem with its food processing industry.
Consistent with criminal detentions for previous
contamination incidents, Chinese authorities
detained the factory owners who shipped the
adulterated products.
More broadly,
however, the Chinese government has expressed its
commitment to improve food safety and improve
policies. In response to corruption at the SFDA as
well as the relative ineffectiveness of the 10
government departments in eliminating food-related
incidents, the government is considering the
formation of a Food Safety Commission under the
State Council, which would unify oversight in one
body.
While
Chinese and US investigations have
focused on the specific wheat gluten case, the
incident has sparked recognition that both countries
need to work more closely to ensure the security
of the food chain. Reassuringly, discussions
toward that end are reportedly under
way. Dr David Acheson, assistant commissioner
for food protection at the FDA, stated in mid-May
that "there are preliminary discussions about
formalizing future cooperation with China on food
safety and food defense issues, and those
discussions will continue in the forthcoming
weeks".
Conclusions The Chinese
government recognizes that it will have to take
significant steps to improve food and drug safety.
Their efforts should help reduce future
embarrassing incidents that ultimately threaten to
tarnish the "Made in China" brand and reduce
Chinese manufacturers' competitiveness and market
share. Yet the government's approach to improving
food and drug safety must go beyond protestations
of concern and new legislation to have a
measurable, long-term affect.
"Increasing supervision"
of the food-processing sector is not necessarily
the most durable solution. Crackdowns and
campaigns do not solve underlying problems and prevent
crises from reoccurring. Small manufacturers
that are shut down in one campaign can
reopen in another neighborhood under another name,
in effect driving the problem underground.
Likewise, creating unrealistic financial
and administrative barriers for manufacturers to
enter the market legitimately can drive processors
into unregulated situations, making certification
and traceability extremely challenging.
Incentivizing processors to voluntarily comply
with clear and reasonable regulations will be
vital to ensure long-term food safety.
Developing non-governmental resources to
support safe manufacturing practices in China
should also be considered. In the United States,
NGOs play a vital role in both policymaking and
ensuring food and drug safety. For example, the
Grocery Manufacturers Association-Food Products
Association represents food processors in
dialogues with regulators and provides education
and training for processors to ensure that they
have the ability to adhere to regulations and good
manufacturing practices. Other organizations, such
as the Partnership for Food Safety Education, work
with companies and regulators to educate the
public about safe food handling.
Improving
production practices and traceability in China
should also be prioritized. Future enforcement of
regulations in the United States will likely
require accurate country of origin labeling that
processors and suppliers exporting to the United
States will have to adhere to. In addition, there
are existing production and tracing models, which
can be adapted for use in China, such as HACCP
(Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point).
Finally, increased quality and safety will
necessarily result in increased costs. A
consequence of the widespread reporting on the
effects of adulterated and counterfeit products
from China will be calls from buyers seeking
certification and testing from reliable
laboratories, placing the burden on the supplier
to prove the safety of its products. Responsible
buyers, however, must recognize that added costs
cannot be borne by the supplier alone and that
some increased costs will ultimately have to be
borne by the end user.
The US
government, for its part, can continue to engage
Chinese counterparts, providing technical support
and maintaining a dialogue on global health
governance issues within the structure of the two
countries' strategic dialogues.
To improve
food and drug safety, the United States can share
its experiences in food safety with the Chinese
government and encourage greater involvement of
Chinese non-governmental groups in the sector.
China and the United States can also jointly
develop and fund innovative initiatives, such as
training and awareness programs for small
processors in China that would build their
knowledge of international standards and increase
their willingness to voluntarily follow safe
production techniques, a role for which NGOs are
well suited.
The recent spate of incidents
has exposed how important it is for governments to
work with producers, exporters and importers to
develop systems to ensure food safety. The
melamine-spiked wheat gluten incident highlights
the importance of carrying out the concepts
embodied in the Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, which require the US FDA and
Customs and Border Protection to jointly develop
regulations pertaining to the registration of food
and animal feed facilities, the prior notification
of imported food shipments, the establishment and
maintenance of records, and the administrative
detention of suspect shipments.
Increasing the FDA's
and USDA's budgets to enable them to increase
detection capacity and efficiency would prove to
be a valuable investment. With its experience
inventorying North American food facilities and
collecting data on imported foods and handling
chains, the United States has valuable experience
to share with counterparts in China.
The adulterated-wheat-gluten incident should
underscore to officials in both countries that
they share mutual interests in building systems to
ensure safe food production and prevent
agroterrorism while still providing open markets
to each other's products.
Notes 1. US Food and Drug
Administration, "Transcript of FDA Press
Conference on Contaminated Animal Feed", May 10,
2007. 2. Ibid.
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