Page 2 of 2 China's embrace leaves US in cold
By Fu-kuo Liu
generally on developing regional strategic frameworks through infrastructure
linkages, cross-border trade and investment, and upgrading competitiveness of
regional countries.
In order to become a prosperous, integrated, and harmonious subregion, GMS
member states have adopted a strategy to enhance connectivity, improve
competitiveness and promote a sense of community. Their joint efforts have been
put forward in nine priority sectors - agriculture, energy, environment, human
resource development, investment, telecommunications, tourism, trade and
transport - and three priority geographical areas - the
North-South Economic Corridor, a East-West Economic Corridor, and a Southern
Economic Corridor.
The entire region understands the implication of China’s success in advancing
into Southeast Asia and Central Asia by different economic means. It is
important to note that China has managed well not only through bilateral
economic cooperation but also by initiating or participating in multilateral
economic mechanisms.
By the same token, the region has also observed the rapid decline of US
influence in all related policy areas. Especially on various joint statements
announced by regional countries on occasions of regional multilateral forums,
China postures itself with more confidence and a much firmer position in
initiating new cooperative proposals and leading the ways of regional
cooperation.
In effect, regional economic and political interdependence between China and
ASEAN countries is blossoming, though the degree of ASEAN dependence on China
is accelerating, especially for those members of GMS. Through various
development projects of GMS, China is quickly developing solid connections and
networking with its partners.
How substantial is China's influence over its GMS partners? What would be the
rationale for China's enthusiasm for sub-regional cooperation? How can one
understand the right direction of China's policy intention? The overall policy
strategy, which China has taken for the past decade, emphasizes reshaping a
peaceful image and helpful attitude of accommodation toward its neighbors. Thus
the settlement of border disputes with its neighbors came up as the top
priority on Beijing's foreign policy agenda.
On economic cooperation and foreign aid, as China's economy booms, the central
government launches "cross-border economic zone" initiatives toward its
southern neighbors and encourages provincial governments to utilize all
possible resources to deepen interaction and communication with its neighbors.
Currently, all related economic initiatives toward Southeast Asia can be
summarized into three general forms: China-ASEAN Free Trade Area on the
strategic level, cross-border economic corridors, and the Beibu Gulf Rim
economic sphere based on sea transport networking among coastal countries of
the South China Sea. In a nutshell, what Chinese sub-regional initiatives have
brought forward is paving the way for China-ASEAN cooperation. With such
high-profile national investment in facilitating cross-border relations, ASEAN
countries have already heightened the degree of dependency upon China’s
economic and political development.
While many observers are worrying about not paying enough attention to catching
up to China’s new efforts in the region, they have discovered that the United
States does not have much to do apart from existing bilateral security
cooperation.
Although China's continuous advance into the region does not necessarily mean
that the United States' substantial role has been replaced, experts in the
region have commonly concurred that US influence is seriously declining. To say
the least, US policy toward Asia is not keeping pace with the new dynamics of
regional economic integration that has been spearheaded by China’s economic
advancement in the region.
What Asian countries need for substantial economic cooperation initiatives does
not seem to be reflected in Washington's Asian policy orientation now. In the
region’s important juncture of historical development, we may begin witnessing
a new structure of regional cooperation shaping up in Asia without a strong US
presence.
In the past few years, China's policy toward Southeast Asia has noticeably been
thriving. The preparation for CAFTA to take effect is progressing steadily.
Through several sub-regional economic cooperation mechanisms, the relationship
between China and ASEAN is much closer than readily observed. The environmental
and social impact of the GMS development projects is, however, creating a
backlash in regional communities, and this may serve as a great challenge to
China, as demand for the implementation of those projects increases.
The general direction of the Vientiane Plan of Action for GMS Development for
2008-2012 indicates that in addition to accelerating substantial progress of
nine sectors, much of GMS resources will be injected to strengthen the
institutional framework and mechanism to push cooperation forward.
Meanwhile, China is also very keen on initiating new sub-regional economic
cooperation, such as with the "two corridors and one ring" plan. Although the
cross-border economic cooperation initiatives mostly benefit the border
provinces, it represents China's endeavors to explore economic, diplomatic, and
security interests in the region. Based on Beijing's grand strategy, the new
sub-regional economic cooperation implies more than its provincial economic
development zone. China is trying to utilize its strategic location to extend
its influence in economic development for broader market access in Southeast
Asia.
The fundamental idea of the Beibu Gulf Rim economic cooperation and the like
reflects China’s geopolitical and geo-economic deliberation via economic rather
than political means. CAFTA opens up bilateral framework for cooperation on the
strategic level. The GMS and other sub-regional frameworks facilitate the
progress of bilateral cooperation from the grassroots level.
More importantly, the region of the GMS for years has been China's geopolitical
constituency. What China expects to gain is through the process of economic
cooperation: first, trying to convey a deliberate message to the region that
the rise of China will be peaceful; second, bringing about economic development
in its southern provinces; and third, making Kunming a regional operations
center for trade and transport. In sum, China’s active role in the GMS projects
its strategic vision of a strengthening relationship with ASEAN.
Notes
1. "GMS Flagship Initiative: North-South Economic Corridor," Asian Development
Bank, June 26, 2005.
2. "Country Report on China's Participation in Greater Mekong Subregion
Cooperation," National Development And Reform Commission,PRC, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,PRC, Ministry of Finance, PRC, 2008-03-28.
3. "China-Vietnam 'two corridors and one ring" with great potential," Nan Boa
Woan, March 22, 2005.
Fu-Kuo Liu, PhD, is a research fellow, Institute of International
Relations, National Chengchi University. He was 2006-2007 visiting fellow at
the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, the Brookings. His research
works focuses on regional security, the United States policy in Asia and
regionalism in Asia.
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