Page 1 of 4 OBAMA, CHANGE AND CHINA, Part 1
The song stays the same
By Henry C K Liu
Foreign policy is fundamentally based on national interests that change only
slowly and infrequently, except under crisis situations. Still, even in normal
times, electoral changes of administration inevitably bring changes in style
and nuance in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy within a
context of continuity.
Yet the Barack Obama administration has come into power at a time of
unprecedented and severe global financial and economic crises that have
profound implications in US national interests and US position in a changing
geo-economic-political world order. Crisis conditions that are crying out for
change are enhancing the new president's ability to live up to his campaign
slogan of "Obama for Change" not just domestically but also in foreign
policy. The question is whether Obama's campaign for change can survive his
politics of change.
It is necessary to point out that Obama did not merely call for change for
change's sake, but for change that "we can believe in". The campaign slogan of
"Yes we can" is soaked with ideological energy. It presumably means change that
will reorder the systemic dysfunctionality that has built up in recent decades
and landed the world in its current sorrowful state. It declares a commitment
to more effective government to bring about a more equitable society at home
and a more just order internationally.
The popular desire for change was the prime reason for Obama's election
victory. Yet, unfortunately, a more equitable society at home and aboard within
a more just world order has not historically always aligned perfectly with US
national interests. Clearly, a redefinition of US national interests is
critical to the success of Obama's agenda of change.
US national interests
The definition of US national interests was sharply distorted by the 2001
terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the first year of the George W Bush
administration. Foreign policy under Bush had been framed by an over-the-top
militancy with two distinct characteristics: US unilateralism, based on
superpower exceptionalism, and a transformational diplomacy agenda promoted by
US neo-conservatism. This dubious militancy, as delineated in National Security
Council document "The National Security Strategy of the United States",
released on September 20, 2002, a year after the September 11 terrorist
attacks, has led to disastrous failures in US foreign policy on many fronts.
These failures in turn have created not only an erosion of US observation of
human rights overseas but also a decline of civil liberty in domestic policy.
On China policy, the NSC document spelled out "profound disagreements" between
China and the US: "Our commitment to the self-defense of Taiwan under the
Taiwan Relations Act is one. Human rights is another. We expect China to adhere
to its nonproliferation commitments." But it added that "We will work to narrow
differences where they exist, but not allow them to preclude cooperation where
we agree." This is essentially the same message that Hillary Clinton,
unsuccessful rival of candidate Obama and now secretary of state in the Obama
administration, delivered to China in her first official trip aboard.
US unilateralism based on superpower exceptionalism, instead of making the US
more secure, has become the midwife for a renewed surge of anti-superpower
political and economic nationalism everywhere. US domination of supranational
organizations, while simultaneously defying their protocol, has weakened
internationalism and legitimized nationalism. The Bush doctrine of expanding US
nuclear monopoly, of preemptive global wars against ideologically based
terrorism with an "either with us or against us" extremism, of posturing a
provocative policy of no compromise with states that allegedly support
terrorism and of adopting a policy of unilateral military attacks on
non-nuclear defenseless nations, poured gasoline on the smoldering fire of
defensive anti-US nationalism everywhere and gave all non-nuclear nations
strong incentive to go nuclear.
International economic relations, particularly resistance against unjust terms
of trade trapped under the current predatory international finance
architecture, are critical components of foreign policy for all countries in a
globalized world.
Since US-China trade has grown exponentially in the past three decades,
US-China economic relations have emerged as a key focus in the relations
between the two nations and the future shape of a changing world economic
order. US policy on China is increasingly affected by problems and potentials
in economic relations that loom increasingly larger among broader security
issues. Because the US is a leading global power, its foreign policy naturally
aims at serving broad global US interests. This aim often conflicts with
domestic special interests that can apply strong domestic political pressures
on foreign policy formulation.
US national security strategy
Four years later, in the March 2006 NSC document "The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America", president Bush started his
introductory letter with the sentence: "America is at war." The document began
with an overview of America's national security strategy: "It is the policy of
the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in
every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our
world. In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much
as the distribution of power among them."
Balance of power, the world order rule book that governed all foreign policy
since the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, was declared obsolete by the sole
remaining superpower, which claimed the awesome privilege of treating the world
as its ideological oyster to act as it pleased.
On China, the document "urges China to move to a market-based, flexible
exchange rate regime", and commits the US "to continue to work closely with
China to ensure it honors its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments and
protects intellectual property." It went on to state:
China
encapsulates Asia's dramatic economic successes, but China's transition remains
incomplete. In one generation, China has gone from poverty and isolation to
growing integration into the international economic system. China once opposed
global institutions; today it is a permanent member of the UNSC [United Nations
Security Council] and the WTO. As China becomes a global player, it must act as
a responsible stakeholder that fulfills its obligations and works with the
United States and others to advance the international system that has enabled
its success: enforcing the international rules that have helped China lift
itself out of a century of economic deprivation, embracing the economic and
political standards that go along with that system of rules, and contributing
to international stability and security by working with the United States and
other major powers.
China's leaders proclaim that they have made a decision to walk the
transformative path of peaceful development. If China keeps this commitment,
the United States will welcome the emergence of a China that is peaceful and
prosperous and that cooperates with us to address common challenges and mutual
interests. China can make an important contribution to global prosperity and
ensure its own prosperity for the longer term if it will rely more on domestic
demand and less on global trade imbalances to drive its economic growth. China
shares our exposure to the challenges of globalization and other transnational
concerns. Mutual interests can guide our cooperation on issues such as
terrorism, proliferation, and energy security. We will work to increase our
cooperation to combat disease pandemics and reverse environmental degradation.
The United States encourages China to continue down the road of reform and
openness, because in this way China's leaders can meet the legitimate needs and
aspirations of the Chinese people for liberty, stability, and prosperity. As
economic growth continues, China will face a growing demand from its own people
to follow the path of East Asia's many modern democracies, adding political
freedom to economic freedom. Continuing along this path will contribute to
regional and international security.
China's leaders must realize, however, that they cannot stay on this peaceful
path while holding on to old ways of thinking and acting that exacerbate
concerns throughout the region and the world. These old ways include:
Continuing China's military expansion in a non-transparent way;
Expanding trade, but acting as if they can somehow "lock up" energy supplies
around the world or seek to direct markets rather than opening them up - as if
they can follow a mercantilism borrowed from a discredited era; and
Supporting resource-rich countries without regard to the misrule at home or
misbehavior abroad of those regimes.
China and Taiwan must also resolve their differences peacefully, without
coercion and without unilateral action by either China or Taiwan.
Ultimately, China's leaders must see that they cannot let their population
increasingly experience the freedoms to buy, sell, and produce, while denying
them the rights to assemble, speak, and worship. Only by allowing the Chinese
people to enjoy these basic freedoms and universal rights can China honor its
own constitution and international commitments and reach its full potential.
Our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for
its people, while we hedge against other possibilities.
Thus US transformationalism foreign policy was directly applicable to China.
While there is some congruence of geopolitical views between China and the US,
the above passage illustrates how "profound disagreements" persist between the
two nations. China does not take kindly to US persistence in characterizing the
Chinese socialist system, its "fundamental character", as inherently evil and
unacceptable.
Worse yet, the US under Bush had declared that the geopolitical balance of
power, the basis of China's policy of improving relations with the US, has been
preempted by China's unacceptable fundamental character. That unacceptability
was only temporarily overlooked by the US because of the more unacceptable
character of Islamic radicalism. The US has not giving up balance-of-power
geopolitics; it only shifted from a balance of power between independent
sovereign states to a balance of power between conflicting ideologies. The
problem is that while Western liberals and neoliberals have a right to detest
non-Western religious and philosophical strands, they do not have any right to
demand that other nations follow US ideological preferences by claiming the
right to practice ideological imperialism. Opposition to extremism has been
used as a justification for the clash of civilizations. Yet extremist Christian
fundamentalism is everywhere in US politics and foreign policy.
China's move toward a socialist market economy was a pragmatic concession to
the global dominance of market fundamentalism. Since the summer of 2007, this
unregulated market system has experienced a severe crisis that requires massive
government intervention to save it from collapse. For a quarter century, until
1973, China's isolation from international organizations such as UN Security
Council or the WTO had been the direct result of a US containment policy to
keep China isolated. US arms sales to Taiwan have been and continue to be the
biggest obstacle to a peaceful end to China's unfinished civil war. Accusing
China of practicing mercantilism is laughable because mercantilism require a
trade surplus to be denominated in gold, not fiat dollars that the US can print
at will.
US foreign policy failure
Towards the end of the Bush administration, faced with undeniable foreign
policy setbacks caused by domestic neoconservative politics and a global
financial crisis caused by unregulated market fundamentalism, a belated general
consensus
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