Page 2 of 2 Tunlan mine blast exposes safety challenge
By Jianjun Tu
The heavy death tolls at Tunlan are also a direct result of the low
productivity of China's coal industry. Considered to be one of China's best
collieries, Tunlan is actually not exceptional in this regard and as many as
436 miners were crowding its tunnels when the blast occurred.
To counter individual accidents that were causing heavy fatalities, the Shanxi
government in 2005 put limits on the number of miners allowed to work at an
underground colliery in accordance with its design capacity. For a 0.09 million
tonne mine, the maximum number of allowable miners is 29. For a 0.9 million
tonne mine, the limit is set at 99, instead of 290, because of the expected
economy of scale [7]. Given Tunlan's design capacity of 5 million tonnes, 436
underground miners at one shift do not even meet the
expected minimum productivity standard implied by Shanxi government's 2005
regulation.
To make matters worse, both Tunlan's investment on safety equipment and
emergency training for its miners are insufficient. When the blast occurred,
Tunlan's methane alarm system did not set off a signal. While the accident at
Tunlan was a localized methane explosion, the number of miners that were
directly killed was not so high. Yet if the evacuation had been implemented
under an ideal scenario (for example, well-trained miners with adequate
protection), the final death toll would have been far less than the actual
level.
Unfortunately, many first-round survivors still had no clue what had happened
even after they were ordered to evacuate; some did not at first wear their
self-rescue equipment. For those who remembered such a procedure, several of
them were reported to have fainted when they rushed through the mine shaft. As
a result of such a messy evacuation, all 340 miners evacuated from the mine
showed symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning. Of 114 miners hospitalized, 11
died and 26 were found to be in critical conditions.
To further complicate the matter, the lack of qualified employees is endemic to
China's coal industry. Low incomes, highly undesirable work conditions and
negative exposure in the Chinese media make it extremely difficult for Chinese
collieries to attract and retain qualified employees, which creates a shortage
of the expertise required to raise mine safety standards.
According to the Safety Training Center of the SCCG, more than 80% of Tunlan's
trained safety inspectors, arguably the most important position for safety
operations, only received middle school education, and none of them has a
college or higher level degree [8]. As Tunlan is actually one of the best
state-owned collieries in China, the picture of staff qualification is far
bleaker for other coal mining enterprises, especially China's numerous TVE
mines.
Is there a way out?
Given the large size of operating collieries in China, Beijing's efforts to
reduce the number of operating mines is legitimate. Yet, instead of blindly
closing coal mines whenever a major accident happens in the adjacent region or
just for the sake of avoiding political sensitivity, the authorities should
take each mine's unique conditions into consideration even if a safety
rectification campaign is necessary.
At present, Beijing plans to reduce the number of "small mines" (a politically
correct terminology for TVE mines) to 10,000 by 2010. At the same time,
shutting down a coal mine based solely on its capacity is not only unfair for
small collieries that strive to meet safety standards but also encourages more
to operate illegally across the country, which will have a detrimental impact
on the accounting methods used in calculating Chinese coal statistics.
TVE mines are widely regarded as the black sheep of China's coal industry, and
private colliery owners are often portrayed by the media as rude,
self-aggrandizing and tax-evading upstarts. Yet, since 1978, TVE mines have
provided more than 35% of China's cumulative coal output to fuel China's
burgeoning economy [9], and have become an indispensable part of China's energy
sector.
They were always Beijing's last resort whenever a coal supply shortage occurred
due to the flexibility of their operations. As a result of the extremely
complex geological structure of China's coal resources, a large portion of
Chinese coal deposits are only suitable for small-scale underground mining
operations. Without a reasonable presence of private enterprises, the level of
competition required for long-term healthy development of China's coal mining
industry cannot be ensured.
Further, TVE mines are important taxpayers in many coal-producing regions, they
employ large number of migrant workers, and are important to China's social
stability. Not only the governmental favoritism towards state-owned mines needs
to be reconsidered, the indispensable role of TVE mines to the Chinese economy
should also be formally recognized.
The most formidable measurement imposed by Beijing regarding safety management
so far may be the "The Safety Framework Governing Resignation of Responsible
Officials". Meng Xuelong, the former governor of Shanxi, was the first
provincial cadre in China to resign under such a safety framework after a major
mining-related accident in September 2008. Following Meng's resignation,
Beijing appointed Wang Jun, the former director of the State Administration of
Work Safety, as the acting governor of Shanxi. While Wang Jun's political
ascendancy in Shanxi has shown Beijing's determination to reign in China's
chaotic coal industry, the Tunlan blast nevertheless demonstrates that the
"top-down" punitive measurements used toward government officials alone are
insufficient to solve China's mounting safety challenges.
As the Chinese economy becomes increasingly market-oriented, Beijing should
adopt an alternative approach that can be described as "enforceable sticks with
sufficient carrots". While punitive measurements for safety violation are an
indispensable component to solve China's safety challenges, enforceability
should be a prerequisite for introducing such enactment.
For instance, introducing overly ambitious targets (for example, TVE mine
closures) is a very counterproductive practice that should be avoided. More
importantly, a legal and taxation environment featuring transparency and
stability should be nurtured to create a fair playground for all coal
enterprises, especially TVE mines. Only if such types of carrots are made
available can sufficient resources in the private coal mining industry be
directed towards safety investment and long-term growth instead of attention
being spent on beating around the rules and colluding with local officials.
Notes
1. According to the Mine Safety and Health Administration, US Department of
Labor, coal mining fatality rates in the US were 1.191 and 1.041 in 1952 and
1953, respectively.
2. Production share is based on 2008 data from the China Coal Transportation
and Marketing Association, fatality share is based on 2007 data from the SAWS.
3. He, Y. (1998). "Wen Cangmang Dadi (Report of China's Most Deadly Coal Mining
Accident)," China Coal Post.
4. Zhao, S. (2004). Nandan Mining Accident: Case Study of the Struggling News
Coverage, in Investigating China: Stories behind the Headlines. Chinese
Fangzheng Publishing House: Beijing.
5. China Coal Industry Yearbook, various years.
6. Source: China Coal Transport and Distribution Association (CCTD).
7. Inter-ministry Office on Coal Mine Methane Accident Prevention (2006).
"Shanxi Limits Number of Coal Miners Working Underground." Coal Mine Methane
Prevention. Issue 32.
8. Website of the Safety Training Centre of the SCCG, at www.xsmdap.com/ns.php
9.
China Coal Industry Yearbook, various years /
CCTD.
JianJun (Kevin) Tu
(jjtu@mkja.ca) is a Vancouver-based senior energy and environmental consultant,
and a research associate of the Canadian Industrial Energy End-Use Data and
Analysis Centre.
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