|
|
|
|
SPEAKING FREELY
China's eye on African agriculture
By Carl Rubinstein
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
click here if you are interested in contributing.
China's growing appetite for African resources over the last decade is well
documented. Indeed, China's massive industrial machine relies on oil from
Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria, and minerals from South Africa, Zambia, and
Liberia. While China maintains that its trade relationship with Africa is
benign, some commentators see China's investment as a resource grab. In 2006,
South African president Thabo Mbeki was notably frank when he warned that
Africa could fall into a "colonial relationship" with China, leaving Africa
"condemned to underdevelopment".
The latest iteration of the Sino-African relationship involves China's
burgeoning interest in African agricultural resources. While some
commentators have already labeled China's agricultural investment in Africa as
self-serving, Chinese leaders are adamant that their actions are being
misrepresented. Is China's investment in African agriculture primarily
self-interested? In order to better determine the nature and intention of
China's food policy in Africa, it is necessary to examine the details and
context of China's agricultural investment in Africa thus far.
High on the list of priorities within the Chinese central government is feeding
China's 1.3 billion people. But with only 7% of the world's arable land, and
the loss of over a million hectares of arable land annually to pollution and
desertification, this is no simple task. The global food crisis of 2007-08 and
rising food consumption in China only compound the problem. China's food
vulnerabilities make securing agricultural assets abroad tempting.
Beginning in the early 1990s, China's interest in Africa increased considerably
as China found an accessible source of oil and other raw materials with which
to feed its rapidly growing economy. Between 1995 and 2005, China provided at
least US$12.5 billion in aid to Africa, canceled billions of dollars in debt,
and constructed new roads, schools, government buildings, stadiums and
hospitals across the continent. In return, Africa now supplies a third of
China's oil.
Some critics have suggested China's investment and trade strategy is unfair
and, ultimately, disadvantageous to Africa. Business partnerships are often
vague, with loose promises of compensation and profit-sharing that never
materialize. Chinese loans often stipulate that ensuing contracts must be
awarded to Chinese firms and employ Chinese labor. The influx of Chinese labor
and cheap Chinese goods that often follows has weakened local economies and
caused unemployment in parts of the continent.
Furthermore, Western commentators have argued that Chinese loans and
investments in certain countries - Angola for example - have undermined efforts
by Western agencies to improve rule-of-law and government transparency. Many
are also critical of China's relationship with Sudan, given the widespread
unrest in western and southern Sudan. Among both international and African
observers, detractors hold that despite the influx of capital it provides,
China's investment in Africa is primarily driven by self-interest and is
generally destabilizing.
Many commentators view China's recent agricultural investment in Africa in the
same light. Specifically, some worry China will grow food in Africa with
Chinese labor and Chinese technology, and then ship this food back to China for
local consumption. With Africa the largest recipient of food aid in the world,
the consequences of such action could be significant.
China has indeed begun to put down substantial agricultural roots on the
African continent. China's investment in Mozambique illustrates both its
commitment to the agricultural sector and the diversity of Chinese investment
in Africa. Through a series of agreements, China has pledged $800 million to
modernize Mozambique's agricultural infrastructure and has financed the
building of a dam and canal to bring water to arable land. Additionally, at
least 100 Chinese agricultural experts are stationed in several research
stations within Mozambique, working with local groups to increase crop yield
and otherwise improve the performance of the agricultural sector.
Chinese scientists, agricultural experts and farmers are becoming a common
sight in Africa. One estimate from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce puts the
number of Chinese experts in Africa at over 1,100 and the number of farm
laborers at over 1 million, dispersed throughout 18 countries. These Chinese
experts help maintain at least 11 agricultural research stations and no less
than 63 agricultural investment projects scattered over southern and eastern
Africa.
African commentators also worry about the tendency of African nations to part
with their land at the cost of their agricultural security. A recent report
written by two UN food policy centers indicated that the majority of land deals
in Africa - including Chinese agreements - involve few if any land fees. Rather
than collecting rent or fees, African governments settle for prospective
employment gains and future economic benefits supposedly brought by foreign
farming projects. The details of these arrangements are vague and often lack
any guarantees of these potential benefits.
Furthermore, these loose arrangements almost never account for the needs of
poorer Africans subsisting on the land prior to sale. While much of Africa's
arable land is officially classified as "underutilized", this label largely
excludes millions of family farms, small cattle-grazing fields, and even small
village farms. Joachim von Braun highlights this risk in a report for the
International Food Policy Research Institute, writing that "unequal power
relations in the land acquisition deals can put the livelihoods of the poor at
risk".
Commentators worry that Chinese-funded infrastructure projects will not bring
jobs to Africans, and will instead award contracts to Chinese firms and
laborers, as has been China's practice with other non-agricultural investment
projects in Africa. As applied to the agricultural sector, this could affect
not only farmers, agricultural specialists, and shipping companies, but
contractors and construction workers associated with dams, canals, roads and
factories as well.
Compounding suspicions of China's intentions is the fact that although rice is
not a significant part of the typical diet in Mozambique, China is pouring
considerable resources into increasing output of rice, a staple of the Chinese
diet. To some, the implications are clear: China first and foremost seeks to
secure as much rice crop as it can from Mozambique's farmland, and will
advantage its own firms and workforce at the expense of those in Mozambique.
Given this stark assessment, many see China's agricultural investments in
Africa as nothing more than a grab for cheap, underutilized land. Jacques
Diouf, director of the UN's Food and Agricultural Organization has gone so far
as to specifically label this type of aggressive land-leasing as
"neo-colonialism".
The Chinese, however, protest at being labeled as exploitative and have played
down the notion that their activity in Africa is self-interested. Not oblivious
to being perceived as exploitative, one Chinese businessman recently said, "We
have a large market in China, and here, there is the land and the workforce ...
Have I come to exploit? On the contrary, I come to invest. I'm throwing money
here."
Many within China argue that moving a significant portion of its food-growing
industry to Africa is unrealistic, citing poor infrastructure, high shipping
costs, and unstable governments. Ministry of Agriculture official Xie Guoli
recently stated, "It is not realistic to grow grains overseas, particularly in
Africa or South America. There are so many people starving in Africa, can you
ship the grains back to China? The cost will be very high as well as the risk."
In other words, even if China did intend to import large amounts of African
grains, it would not be economically viable or efficient to do so.
Chinese investment is often geared directly at addressing Africa's hunger
problems. For example, China plans to build an agricultural demonstration
center in Mozambique that will test the durability of various crops that could
be introduced to help feed the Mozambican population. In Kampala, China is
funding projects to increase awareness of sustainable fishing practices in an
effort to ease the overfishing of Lake Victoria - the source of much of the
fish-heavy diet in Uganda.
On further review, China's investments strategies in Africa are not as
self-serving as some critics argue. The discussion of China's desire to grow
rice in Mozambique is incomplete without mention of China's recent attention to
biotechnology and China's role in the biotech movement in general.
Over the last two decades, China has invested heavily in agricultural
biotechnology, working with peanuts, peppers, tobacco, tomatoes, and other
genetically modified organisms. Recently, this research has focused on
engineering rice that is both tougher and healthier than traditional rice
seeds. A recent report by the International Service for the Acquisition of
Agribiotech Applications indicated that because of its implications for the
world's hungry, rice is "the most important of the new biotech crops that are
now ready for adoption".
In March 2009, the Chinese Academy of Agriculture (CCA) began a project funded
by the Gates Foundation entitled "Green Super Rice for the Resource Poor of
Asia and Africa". The project will bring high-yield rice varieties designed to
withstand drought, flooding, harsh weather, and various toxins, to seven
African countries. Working with several international organizations - including
the Africa Rice Center - the CCA estimates that the project will increase rice
production by 20% and will help feed 20 million poverty-stricken farmers in
participating countries.
A recent report commissioned by the African Agricultural Technology Foundation
(AATF) highlights China's successful use of genetically modified rice to feed
its population, and indicates that Africa has much to learn from China's
domestic agricultural investment. Thus, China's push to introduce rice in
non-rice-consuming African nations could be understood as part of a larger
strategy to introduce durable, productive and nutritious staples into the
Africa diet, and not as evidence of suspicious motives as discussed above.
China's agricultural strategy in Africa has indeed brought unprecedented
investment to the agricultural sectors of many nations. Nigerian economist
Jonas Chianu commented that trading land rights for overall development is a
way forward. Without the Chinese, under-utilized farmland would remain
unproductive, benefiting no one. Chianu stated, "Instead of allowing the
resources to lie unexploited it is better to embark on lease arrangements."
While China has invested immense sums in African agriculture, it appears that -
at least thus far - the majority of these funds have not gone directly to
securing land leases.
And where China has invested in land rights, it has tended towards creating
cooperative projects. China certainly has the resources to more aggressively
pursue exclusive land deals. Yet, thus far, it has not. This focus on
cooperatives and on infrastructure over hard land assets suggests a more
complex, possibly more cooperative approach on China's part.
It is perhaps naive to believe that China will not ultimately take advantage of
vulnerable food resources in Africa to some degree or that China would readily
agree to an international standard on foreign agricultural investment. And
indeed, African nations may be best served by enacting stronger local land-use
policies and demanding more specific agreements, as suggested by Van Braun.
However, despite the potential pitfalls, China's investment in Africa has the
potential to significantly change agriculture on the continent. Unprecedented
improvements to infrastructure, increases in education and available
technology, and an influx of investment capital could bring sustainable
solutions to Africa's food troubles.
Upon closer analysis, China has not earned its harsh reputation. Perhaps in an
attempt to reassure its increasingly important African allies, China appears to
be exhibiting more caution than it has in the past. Thus far, this caution has
differentiated China's agricultural investment in Africa from its other
investment projects on the continent. How long this caution lasts and whether
the advancements discussed above will ultimately outweigh the potential
negative consequences of China's investment in Africa remains to be seen.
Carl Rubinstein is with the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in Washington, DC.
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
click here if you are interested in contributing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
All material on this
website is copyright and may not be republished in any form without written
permission.
© Copyright 1999 - 2009 Asia Times
Online (Holdings), Ltd.
|
|
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong
Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
|
|
|
|
