SPEAKING
FREELY What is strategic about
China’s European
partnerships? By Richard Zalski
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
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contributing.
The European Union
is China's largest trading partner. A rich partner
is now needed more than ever to help the EU's
failed economies. But for what does China need
Europe? Why the
recent engagement and
mushrooming strategic partnerships? Around the end
of April, China's Vice Premier Li Keqiang toured
Russia, Hungary and Belgium, while Premier Wen
Jiabao was in Iceland, Sweden, Poland and Germany.
The Sino-Russian strategic partnership was
officially established between presidents Boris
Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin in April 1996. Based on
sharing resources, space programs, interests in
Central Asia and Syria, joint military exercises
and arms sales, authoritarian and centralized
governments, problems in their outer regions, and
both countries being United Nations Security
Council members - there is an established basis
for mutual understanding.
Depending on
which reports or articles you read, either arms
sales or hydrocarbons are the most important
industries for both parties. Their strategic
partnership will always be presented by the
officials from both sides as being "at its best
ever" and heading towards an even "higher level".
In reality, things are not quite so
stellar. The arms and resource interests are not
enough to form a defense arrangement. Especially
in terms of declining arms sales, decreasing trust
has become more visible, turning this pillar of
cooperation into a nuisance. In terms of arms
deals, this recently declining trade arrangement
is being offset for Russia by India.[1]
A
new development is cooperation in military
exercises. One can speculate whether this marriage
of convenience [2] is directed against the West or
not. According to Pavel Luzin from the
Moscow-based Pir Center, China is interested in
"Russian domestic stability around its northern
borders", as well as in "Russian neutralism in the
possible conflicts in Pacific region or allied
relations with Russia in the case of turbulence in
the DPRK [North Korea] and in Central Asia".
Given Russia's abundance of oil, combined
with China's growing need for it, as well as their
geographic proximity, it would appear logical,
that cooperation between these two great nations
would flourish. Russia's resources are closer than
those in the Gulf and can be transported over
land, making them independent from foreign
interference. Yet, bilateral cooperation is
limited, nor has there been impressive recent
military cooperation.
Strategic
cooperation between Russia and China suits others
with overlapping interests in Central Asia,
including some of the "stans" in the region.
For the first time in two-and-a-half
centuries, Russia is facing a China in the East
that is stronger than itself in a number of ways.
[3] As a 2011 report by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
concludes, "In the coming years, while relations
will remain close at the diplomatic level, the two
cornerstones of the partnership over the past two
decades - military and energy cooperation - are
crumbling. As a result, Russia's significance to
China will continue to diminish."[4]
Also,
according to Dmitri Trenin from the Carnegie
Moscow Center, "While this feeling is almost never
made explicit, the Chinese have quietly written
off Russia as a country that is in an absolute and
relative decline." [5]
Margarete Klein
from the German Institute for International and
Security Affairs points out "Both sides share more
a negative consensus - what they do not like to
see (like the US dominance) - but they lack a
coherent and forward looking positive agenda". She
also agrees that the bilateral relationship is
increasingly getting asymmetrical - to the benefit
of China.
Pavel Luzin points out
"Sino-Russian future cooperation will be related
to space technologies". He adds, "Another future
area where they will cooperate is the Arctic."
This Sino-Russian strategic relationship
does not work as well as it is being presented.
How does it compare with China's relationship with
EU-members?
The Sino-EU
relationship A rare case when the effort to
define the term "strategic relationship" was
undertaken can be found in the 2003 European
Security Strategy. After discussing relations with
other parts of the world, the document then
considers Asia: "In particular we should look to
develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China,
Canada and India as well as with all those who
share our goals and values, and are prepared to
act in their support".
It is noteworthy
that the adjective "strategic" seems to include a
stronger military dimension in Chinese (there is
the idea of zhan, war, as in
zhanlue, strategy) than in Western
languages, where it is often used to simply mean
"important." [6]
But not so quick - the
EU's readiness did not mean Beijing would go
along. Shortly afterwards, China published a bold
document titled "China's EU policy" [7] in which
very detailed conditions and "requests" are
listed, which Europe "must" fulfill. Not
surprisingly, they were related to Taiwan, Tibet
and the Dalai Lama clique, and lifting the arms
embargo.
In contrast with China's US
relations, its relationship with the EU is free of
strategic competition and rivalry. The latter
managed to achieve a high degree of very peaceful
development and conflict solving since World War
II, which so far is unimaginable with China.
Although in Beijing the focus is on America [8],
the tolerance, diversity and sustainable
development exemplified by the integration of the
EU might be very appealing to the Chinese
Communist Party, especially with all the problems
it has had with its restive regions. In short -
China talks about a peaceful rise, Europe does it.
At the same time, Europe has little
military impact, which is unacceptable for the
rising superpower. The EU does not have an army
(or navy) like the United States and therefore no
stake in the South China Sea. So it can't exert
any influence by force, whether actual or
suggested. Therefore a relationship with
Washington is perceived in China as a zero-sum
game, while Sino-European relations are win-win.
The EU also lacks a coherent China policy,
which enables Beijing to divide and conquer,
playing its members against each other. Especially
in recent years, China has become more of a source
than a host of investments. Its financial
involvement in the EU grew 10 times in the past
decade, particularly after 2008 (with 7.5 billion
euros - US$9.2 billion - in 2011). [9] Chinese
investors give jobs to approximately 45,000
Europeans, [10] which still is 100 times less than
Americans.
Against this backdrop, let us
see how one of the recently accelerating Chinese
relationships in Eastern Europe works.
Sino-Polish relations Premier
Wen Jiabao was the first Chinese leader to visit
Poland in the last quarter century. During his
stay, he announced credit lines of US$10 billion
for East European cooperation projects in
infrastructure and in new technologies.
The only other East European country with
such Chinese involvement was supposed to be
Hungary. After initial excitement, that
cooperation opportunity has cooled down, with even
Prime Minister Viktor Orban trying very hard to
keep Chinese interest. As a person in the know
(who wishes to remain anonymous) says, China
values bigger countries, with stable environments
and a positive public persona. During his recent
visit to Hungary, Chinese Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs Song Tao stated in front of Prime
Minister Orban the very same opinion about China's
preferences. [11]
So far, Poland has won
this competition with Hungary. The PRC's long-term
interest in the Polish market is exemplified by
the opening of branches of the Bank of China and
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in
Warsaw. Bartosz Komasa from the Polish branch of
the Bank of China points out "Poland offers our
market, available EU funds, a stable and
developing economy. We [the Bank of China] will be
soon helping Shanghai Electric and Shanghai
Construction Group to enter the Polish market."
According to some Polish experts, the
turning point in this relationship was the World
Expo 2010 in Shanghai. The Polish pavilion was
granted a great location, was visited by
high-ranking CCP officials and enjoyed high
popularity among the Chinese. So the groundwork
for the current cooperation was laid.
However, Bartosz Komasa from the Bank of
China gives another explanation: "During the
beginning of my previous job in the Polish
Information and Foreign Investment Agency, which
was in 2004, I received one Chinese business or
governmental delegation every two months. At the
end of this job - in 2011 - it was three
delegations every week. So it has been a long-term
and slowly developing relationship. They
appreciate our openness."
Polish President
Bronislaw Komorowski visited Beijing at the end of
last year and expressed support for EU granting
China market economy status and lifting the EU's
arms embargo on China. Half a year later, after
visiting the US, the PRC's Defense Minister Liang
Guanglie visited Poland in mid-May interested in a
closer military relationship. [12] The Polish side
was much more restrained.
As we can tell
from Poland's example, building-up a relationship
with China and attracting Chinese interest is
doable, without offering hydrocarbons and
world-class brands. It will be interesting to see
whether China will enable Polish and European
companies further access to the Chinese market.
The final relationship we explore here is
the cherry on the Chinese-European cake.
The Sino-German
relationship China and Germany enjoy a
unique position due to extensive trade and
symbiotic economies as high-tech markets. This
excellent standing was exemplified by the arrival
in June of a delegation comprising of the Chinese
premier with 13 ministers, who together held a
cabinet meeting in Berlin.
This
flourishing relationship is the only one discussed
here that we could call truly strategic. It is
based on solid mercantile foundations. This
translates into German officials being in pole
position in Beijing. The Germans feel that, for
them, the stakes are so high that they cannot wait
for Europe to get its act together. Thus, on
issues affecting its economic interests, Germany
sometimes takes unilateral action. [13]
The down side to this relationship is that
the very technologies German companies are
providing China with are ones the Chinese want to
excel in and will one day compete with Germany in
other markets around the globe.
Still,
according to one report [14], unlike many American
companies, there seems to be a lot of optimism
concerning the future of German companies in the
Chinese market, due to the idea that trade would
lead to societal change, or simply cooperation
instead of confrontation. Ring a bell?
The
George H W Bush and Bill Clinton administrations
played the same role and it did not end happily.
The Germans on the other hand, instead of pushing
the PRC on human rights, promote "dialogue on the
rule of law". Rather than then deputy secretary of
state Robert Zoellick's 2005 call for China to be
a "responsible stakeholder", they had foreign
minister (2005-09) Frank-Walter Steinmeier's
"Community of responsibility". Which is only a
part of a more complex co-operation and commitment
initiated by chancellor Gerhard Schroder.
Notwithstanding the flourishing
Berlin-Beijing ties, both countries' companies
might soon clash in the Polish market during
infrastructure bids, which would be very
interesting in the light of the recent failure of
China Overseas Engineering Group Co (or COVEC),
the first Chinese construction company to win a
state infrastructure bid. It was a decision
criticized heavily both in Poland and by Brussels.
To make things worse, COVEC withdrew in
the midst of a highway construction and caused an
embarrassment for the Polish government right
before the Euro 2012 football championship. Polish
media and online forums were full of fierce
discussions about the newly arrived Chinese
business. German competition likely had its
schadenfreude moment.
Go
China What might make Europe's situation
easier would be letting off steam from
human-rights issues. This is a fundamental threat
to the CCP's very existence and as we have seen
especially since 2008, Western pressure simply
doesn't work - the party doesn't care. It is up to
the Chinese people to change their regime if they
consider it right, not to Western governments.
It might be wiser to support Taiwan, which
is a major issue for Asian security, one that
affects many of China's neighbors. Both human
rights and Taiwan are hot potatoes, and in the
latter case, other East Asian countries might
welcome the EU's concern for regional security. As
would probably the US, as Taiwan's lone supporter.
Beijing would be furious, as it always is with any
"interference".
What follows are some
brief conclusions for China's future European
"strategic partners".
First, really "Go China". Realize the
potential in cooperating with it. When doing so,
show respect and long-term commitment.
Second, go there hand-in-hand - government
plus big business and small and medium-sized
enterprises.
Third, it is about trade, not changing their
country to our moral standards or vision of how
things should be.
Lastly, there are not many European
governments like Berlin that have the wherewithal
to come to Asia and bring a strong approach to
supporting their businesses abroad. It's a model
that other European governments should seek to
emulate.
Richard Zalski is a PhD
candidate at the Tamkang University in Taipei and
a regular contributor to the major Polish
Asia-related think-tank CSPA.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their
say. Please click here
if you are interested in contributing. Articles
submitted for this section allow our readers to
express their opinions and do not necessarily meet
the same editorial standards of Asia Times
Online's regular
contributors.
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