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COMMENTARY
Lowering the nuclear threshold
By Ehsan Ahrari
The United States Congress is edging closer to repealing a ban against
developing smaller, more usable nuclear warheads. Such a move looks more like
"business-as-usual" when viewed purely in
the context of US national security. But for the world at large, this
development - though it is ominous - should not be too surprising.
The Bush administration has made several public announcements regarding its
perspectives on the use of nuclear weapons. It was clear from the beginning
that it would consider using nuclear weapons "first against an attacker, or
even potential attacker, whether a state or non-state player, whether armed
with nuclear weapons or not". In his National Security Strategy, President
George W Bush unambiguously stated that America would strike first against its
enemies who are seeking weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear posture review
stressed "the possible use of nuclear weapons to defeat hardened and deeply
buried targets as chemical or biological weapons, storehouses, or factories, or
underground command centers". Then his administration decided not to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty , abandoned the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, and unilaterally opted to develop national missile defense systems.
Cumulatively, these developments created a feeling that the US was determined
to establish its nuclear hegemony, a perception that is virtually guaranteed to
trigger a new nuclear arms race involving China and Russia. India and Pakistan
- the newest nuclear powers - have not deescalated the pace of their own
nuclear arms race since 1998, when they brought their nuclear programs out of
the closet. But their competition has little to do with the nuclear policies of
Bush.
Here are two points of utmost concern. First, in the pre-September 11, 2001,
years, the US largely relied on a plethora of nonproliferation regimes to
control the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Its nonproliferation techniques
also included imposition of stringent economic sanctions, which had telling
effects only on countries like Pakistan, which substantially depended on the US
for military and economic assistance. But a country like India that could
purchase weapons from Russia and other Western sources did not suffer much as a
result of those sanctions. In the final analysis, however, even a country like
Pakistan decided to develop nuclear weapons, no matter the cost. The seeming
lack of potency of nonproliferation measures had already persuaded president
Bill Clinton to consider relying on counterproliferation measures.
However, in the post-September 11 strategic environment, the US readily opted
to develop stout counterproliferation policies and armed them with the threat
of preemptive attacks, especially when there were reports that the terrorist
group, al-Qaeda, might have acquired "dirty bombs". Bush's "axis of evil"
speech of January 2002 clearly identified North Korea, Iran and Iraq as
potential targets of counterproliferation policy and the doctrine of
preemption. After the US invasion of Iraq - especially since one of the
arguments used was to disarm Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass destruction
capabilities - the US counterproliferation policy was no longer viewed as empty
saber rattling, either by North Korea or Iran.
Second, while Washington appears determined to unravel the nuclear weapons
programs of North Korea, and dissuade Iran from continuing its own nuclear
program, this newest wrinkle of the US nuclear weapons policy - ie, of
developing tactical nukes - is likely to convince both those nations that they
had better continue with their respective nuclear options. After all,
Washington still regards them as part of the "axis of evil"; thus they are
fully qualified to be targets, not only of preemption, but also of regime
change.
The rationale underlying the Bush administration's preference for developing
tactical nuclear weapons is that, despite possessing awesome military power, it
envisions the world as "dangerous" and full of new threats that necessitate
acquisition of "a new generation of low yield weapons for pinpoint strikes,
largely against deeply buried caches of weapons of mass destruction".
So, the international system faces two separate arguments about nuclear
proliferation that promise to enhance the significance of nuclear weapons and
even increase the prospects of further proliferation of such weapons, the US
counterproliferation-related threats notwithstanding. From the US side, it is
being argued that tactical nuclear weapons ought to be developed as a response
against rogue nations and future proliferators of chemical and nuclear weapons.
The potential of increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons might have made
the present arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons less relevant. But no one is
arguing that a drastic reduction in the size of that arsenal should be
negotiated by the US and Russia. Thus the nuclear primacy of the US will be
further enhanced.
The second argument from the so-called "axis of evil" nations is that they must
have nuclear weapons of their own because that might be the only way they will
be able to deter a US attack. But while they are developing those weapons, they
are exposing themselves to a potential US strike under the doctrines of
preemption and counterproliferation. North Korea might have saved itself by
already developing nuclear weapons. However, the jury is still out on that
account.
For Iran, however, it is a significantly different story. It has made
substantial progress in its nuclear program, but has not been able to develop
even one nuclear weapon. Now the heat is being turned up on the ayatollahs by
Washington. Their choice is rather stark: abandon the nuclear program or it
will be destroyed. The Iraqi bases will come in handy for the US to lower the
boom on Iran.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent
strategic analyst.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact
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