The
transformation of the US military is not just a new
buzz, nor is it a current fad. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld has a very broad vision of what the
military should look like as a result of transformation.
To the extent that the profession
of warfare is highly dynamic, military transformation is
a never-ending process. It comprises, inter alia,
creating new concepts to fight wars, development of new
war plans, exploitation of the incessant changes in
all realms of technology, especially in
information technology, elimination of archaic thinking that
has been focused on war-fighting and
parochial service orientation, reduction of the size of
the armed forces, incorporation of lighter but highly
lethal technological platforms that would enable the
military to remain the most agile and most deadly force
in the world. Despite this rather long list of
characteristics that are the core of the concept of
transformation, I have not done justice in terms of
capturing its comprehensiveness.
The
transformation of the US military is taking place at a
time when two massive paradigms of US foreign policy are
also competing for national attention and precious
resources. They are: President George W Bush's global
"war on terrorism", and his equally ambitious goal of
transforming the Muslim Middle East. Needless to say, a
substantial focus of the war on terror is also on the
world of Islam. That focus stretches beyond the Middle
East to South Asia and Southeast Asia.
One
of Rumsfeld's pet concerns is that the transformed
US military must (and can) do more with less. Viewing
this proposition from the perspective of the
military's continuously mounting reliance on high
technology, one may think that doing more with less is
conceivable, as long as the adversarial or potentially
adversarial forces are significantly behind in the realm
of their reliance on technological tools of warfighting.
However, considering the immensity of the missions at
hand - ie, the "war on terror" and transforming the
Middle East - doing more with less becomes a highly
controversial proposition. In order to comprehend its
contentious nature, one has to disaggregate the
specifics of these missions in light of the current US
global force positioning.
The current total strength of the
US military is 1.4 million on active duty and 1.2
million in the reserves. Currently, US forces are
committed to 136 countries. The United States has
140,000 troops deployed in Iraq, 34,000 in Kuwait,
10,000 in Afghanistan and 5,000 in the Balkans. Then
37,000 troops are stationed in South Korea, serving as a
small "tripwire" force.
Since the
security situation in Iraq has taken a turn for the worse, there
are open and persistent calls from a number of
retired flag officers and legislators for an increased force
presence in Iraq. For instance, retired General Barry McCaffrey
- who led a US division in the Gulf War of 1991 - said,
"We are in a global war on terror with
inadequate forces." Senator John McCain, an important Republican
voice, advocated an additional deployment of 100,000-150,000 more
soldiers in Iraq. Senator Joseph Biden, a major
Democratic voice on the prestigious Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, called for an additional 40,000
troops in Iraq. He is also one of the major advocates
for the United States sharing its governing authority
with the United Nations.
In Afghanistan,
US troops have picked up the pace of
anti-terrorism operations to respond to resurgent Taliban-al-Qaeda
forces. There are not as yet any public calls for
additional deployment of US forces in that country,
especially since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)-commanded International Security Assistance Force
has taken the command. However, if the mission of these
forces were to change, from patrolling Kabul and some
other populated areas to widening the scope of the
authority of Hamid Karzai's government to rural regions
as well as to all provinces of Afghanistan, the US
government would come under immediate pressure to commit
its own additional troops for that mission.
Then there is added concern about what happens
if the Korean conflict flares up. Even though the chances
of such an eruption are minimal at this
time, the contingency planners of the Joint Staff at the
Pentagon and the Pacific Command (PACOM) are required by
the very nature of their job to be ready for it.
The question, then, becomes: What kind of pressure would
a Korean contingency put on the already highly stretched US
forces all over the globe?.
Returning
to Middle East, no one can state for sure what kind
of plans the neo-conservative-heavy Bush administration
is contemplating. Are there any additional plans for
regime change? Iran or Syria, maybe? Given the deteriorating
security situation in Iraq, no overt plans for regime
change may be implemented any time soon. But,
considering the fact that the Bush administration went
after Saddam Hussein's regime long before the war-on-terror-related job
was done in Afghanistan, no one can be sure
that an additional front toward the east of Iraq (ie, Iran)
or toward its west (ie, Syria) might not be open. How
would such a scenario affect the deployment of US troops,
since such an operation (or operations) have to be
carried out solely by applying US forces? Considering the
heat British Prime Minister Tony Blair has been
taking from those who opposed the United Kingdom's
participation in the Iraq campaign, he is not likely to
support the aspirations of the US to carry out any
additional regime change.
Calls
for the deployment of additional US forces
in Iraq notwithstanding, Rumsfeld has been
steadfastly insisting that no additional forces are needed. More
than ever before, the Bush administration is forced to ask
for the deployment of multinational
peacekeeping forces. Especially if the operational tempo (Optempo)
of the US forces in Afghanistan picks up, Rumsfeld
is likely to face additional pressure and heat for more
troops.
At least for now, Rumsfeld and the top
Pentagon brass are not actively considering the notion
of expansion of the military, since that would
contradict two of the much-heralded propositions of
military transformation, doing more with less, and
lethal but agile force. In fact, the secretary of
defense has been adamant in denying the necessity for
it. He recently stated, "At the current time, every bit
of analysis supports just the opposite - that we do have
adequate forces. Now that could change, and if it
changes, we'll change."
One suggestion is that
in order to alleviate the awesome deployment-related
pressure from the military, the Bush administration is
in dire need of a new foreign policy. The mere
suggestion of a new foreign policy is likely to open up
an additional wave of acrimonious debates at a time when
the presidential campaign is about to pick up its pace.
Bush's popularity is already coming under mounting
downward pressure.
A less controversial aspect
of a new US foreign policy might be a different
emphasis, without necessarily changing the overall major
objectives. But this option may not be valid for too
long in the wake of a study issued by the non-partisan
Congressional Budget Office. That study states, "If the
Pentagon stuck to its plan of rotating active-duty army
troops out of Iraq after a year, it would be able to
sustain a force of only 67,000 to 106,000 active duty
and reserve army and Marine forces." It went on to add,
"A large force would put at risk the military's
operations elsewhere around the globe."
Now
the pressure is on the Bush administration to come up with
a different emphasis, but it is also obvious that in
the near future major changes in the US objectives in
Iraq will have to be introduced. Sooner than later,
the presence of a large number of multinational forces
would lead to demands that the US share the ruling
authority with the UN. Secretary of State Colin Powell, more
than Bush, knows that. That is one of the reasons Powell,
along with the joint chiefs, has reportedly "nudged" the
president toward the UN.
Bush is aware that any
sharing of authority with the UN or with other nations
is likely to jeopardize his own vision of what the
post-Saddam Iraq should look like. The element of
realism among the Europeans - and I also include the
United Kingdom on this point - is such that they will
have no objection in seeing the establishment of a
moderate Islamic democracy in Iraq. However, there is
little doubt that the Bush administration will have a
difficult time accepting that proposition, since such an
acceptance would come into serious conflict with its
other major foreign objective - transformation of Muslim
Middle East.
Another option worth considering is
pushing for the transformation of Muslim Middle East
through diplomacy, as opposed to waving the red flag of
potential regime change in the face of current Middle
Eastern governments. I have no doubt that the US
government will think about such an option only if the
security situation in Iraq deteriorates beyond control.
But that might not be the extent of impending
major changes in the US objectives regarding force
deployment. A potential worsening of the security
situation in Afghanistan will also significantly affect
the issue of force commitment. NATO might not want to
absorb the brunt of fighting without a similar
commitment of US forces.
In the meantime, in
terms of its war-fighting capabilities, the pace and scope
of the transformation of the US military are going extremely well.
However, to the extent that training for the post-conflict
aspects of its capabilities (Phase IV in the
technical jargon, which includes peacekeeping) is still not
popular in the Bush administration, and the US military is
suffering from "mission fatigue", or, I would even
argue, a new version of "mission creep". In this sense,
regardless of whether a major revision of US foreign policy
takes place or not, the issue of military transformation will
have to expand its scope and consider developing
an intense focus on peacekeeping and nationbuilding. That
would require a whole slew of additional training
programs. However, considering the sustained commitment
of the United States' armed forces to the
notion of excellence and professionalism, it is capable
of taking on even that mission without much difficulty.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria,
Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
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Sep 27, 2003
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