Although the investigation into the recent
bombings in Spain is still underway, three different
scenarios have emerged, each of which suggests a number
of worrisome issues, particularly in the context of the
US-led "war on terror". The first scenario, pointing to
the Basque ETA separatist organization as the culprits,
was the initial reaction that emerged from Spanish
authorities and remained firmly entrenched as Madrid's
official position for some time.
Despite the
fact that this ETA scenario seems increasingly unlikely
as the investigation proceeds, initial analysis was
grounded in the fact that the explosives and detonators
used in the bombings were allegedly linked to the ETA
organization. But this factor was the only positive
linkage, as the other elements were rooted in either the
negative - such as clues pointing away from traditional
ETA methods - to the speculative, mainly resting on the
political choreography that the attacks were aimed at
disrupting Spain's national election.
The second
scenario under consideration focuses on al-Qaeda, with
the assistance of local activists. Obviously, other
factors moving the inquiry in this direction include the
arrest and links to the bombings of three Moroccans with
allegedly extensive ties to al-Qaeda, the discovery of a
stolen van with Koranic tapes and the video release
claiming al-Qaeda responsibility. According to this
scenario, the bombings represent the al-Qaeda network's
first major attack on Europe proper and pose several new
troubling developments for the anti-terror movement.
The most notable development in this case
includes a modification of tactics by al-Qaeda, moving
away from its traditional use of suicide bombers and
utilizing synchronized bombs triggered remotely, as well
as a more sophisticated recognition of the political
vulnerabilities of Western democracies and their
inherent susceptibility to properly timed terrorist
disruptions. The most interesting implication from this
scenario is the suggestion that al-Qaeda has succeeded
in using the attacks as its own form of "regime change",
forging a role in bringing down a Western government.
The most intriguing analysis, however, is found
in the third scenario, suggesting a new alliance between
radical elements of the ETA and the al-Qaeda network.
This scenario rests on several important, although still
somewhat disparate, factors. The first link in this
analytical ETA-al-Qaeda chain rests with an individual:
Yusuf Galan, a Spanish national (and Islam convert)
charged with ties to al-Qaeda back in November 2001. The
second link is operational, stemming from a reported
record of ETA supplying explosives to Islamic terrorists
in general, and to the Palestinian militant group Hamas,
in particular. Such a linkage also raises fears in
neighboring France, which has its own recent history of
ETA members operating on its territory.
Adding
to the complexity of the investigation, there is also a
deeper level of troubling trends in this possible
ETA-al-Qaeda combination. Specifically, the revelation
that some 80 radical ETA militants were reportedly in
Iraq prior to the war and that some were allegedly
implicated in the November 2003 killing of seven Spanish
intelligence agents in Suwayrah raise new fears of a
renewed terror threat. In fact, two of these 80 radical
ETA members that were in Iraq were later arrest by the
Spanish authorities as they attempted to transport some
500 kilograms of explosives to Madrid on February 29.
Endowing ETA with a new global reach based on a tactical
alliance with the al-Qaeda network and/or the Iraqi
insurgency would significantly "raise the stakes" in the
current round of the war on terrorism, with troubling
implications for a Europe set to become only more
vulnerable with the looming expansion of its visa-free
borders.
Regardless of which scenario turns out
to be the most accurate, there is perhaps an even more
significant lesson that this speculation over the
responsibility for the attacks has tended to obscure:
what it reveals about the transformation of al-Qaeda.
Even in the event that al-Qaeda itself is not directly
involved in the bombings, the renewed focus on the group
has demonstrated that it has substantially changed from
Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda of September 11, 2001. This
transformation consists of a move from what is defined
as al-Qaeda from the "corporate terrorism" structure
under bin Laden's direct control to what has more
recently been termed as a "terror franchise". The
attacks in Morocco and Turkey, well before Spain, were
what first revealed this "phased transition". The threat
is now posed by "al-Qaeda the movement" and not
"al-Qaeda the international terrorist organization".
Such a decentralizing, broadening shift away from the
original al-Qaeda organization into a new more diverse
array of local, more distantly linked affiliates makes
targeting its center of gravity, or even acquiring the
target, especially difficult.
Moreover, this new
al-Qaeda movement also incorporates the local offshoots
of radical Islamic groups as more autonomous franchises
throughout the periphery of the Islamic world. Matched
by a more localized focus, this movement is marked by
local operators acting on their own soil (local Turks
involved with the attacks in Turkey, local Moroccans
carrying out the attacks in Morocco, etc) with little or
no global reach but using the tenets of al-Qaeda to
enhance their standing within their own smaller arena of
operations. And although arguably to bolster the global
jihad, the priority is on promoting the image, appeal,
and even the recruiting opportunities of home-grown
groups in their home countries. This is also seen by the
increased activity in peripheral states of Indonesia,
the Philippines, and most recently even in the West
African nation of Chad.
This also seems to be
reflected in the current strategy of the remnants of the
bin Laden al-Qaeda organization, still struggling to
regroup and hindered by a greatly weakened command and
control structure. For the al-Qaeda organization, its
priorities are Iraq and its remaining refuge along the
Pakistani-Afghan border. The attacks carried out under
the banner of al-Qaeda by the local, but remote
affiliates serve to uphold the broader struggle, an
important element, but no longer exhibiting the
extensive preparations and global ambitions of the
previous al-Qaeda. Thus, it seems likely that attacks in
the name of the al-Qaeda movement will continue and most
likely spread, but will be limited more to attacks of
opportunity than of global strategy and increasingly
isolated to the fringe areas of the periphery.
The course of this new al-Qaeda movement is not
without historical parallel, however. In fact, there is
an ironic similarity between the ideological
justification and tactical support provided by the
Soviet Union to the international communist movement of
the 20th century, whereby so-called communists waged
wars of national liberation and/or outright terrorism in
the name of an overarching communist ideology in such
remote places as small, isolated countries in Central
America, Africa or even in parts of Europe through urban
terrorism. But in the case of these operatives,
including such urban-focused terrorist groups as the Red
Brigades, Action Directe, Baader-Meinhoff and others,
their viability proved short-lived, with an intensity so
destructive that it eventually turned on itself. It
remains to be seen whether the al-Qaeda movement will
meet the same demise.
Richard
Giragosianis a Washington-based analyst specializing
in international relations and military security in the
former Soviet Union, the Middle East and the
Asia-Pacific region.
