SPEAKING
FREELY The United Nations strikes
back By W Joseph Stroupe
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their say.
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are interested in contributing.
The
United Nations has long been recognized as a useful
forum where disagreements can be aired, and sometimes
even resolved. It is also well known that when the
world's major powers are in no mood for compromise and
negotiation, then the UN simply gets pushed outside the
center of developments and decision-making. But what is
interesting about the UN is the fact that the world's
powers, not even excepting the last superpower, always
seem to come running back, pleading for its help, when
they have gotten themselves into trouble. Why is that
so? And does that portend that the UN's relevance will
grow rather than decrease? What are the forces pulling
the UN increasingly into the center of geopolitical
developments and decision-making? Are those forces
stronger than the ones that tend to spin the UN to the
outside of the geopolitical center?
Both the
League of Nations and its successor the United Nations
were created on the heels of terrible international
crises, namely World Wars I and II. The UN has played an
important and undisputed role in preventing, so far,
another world war. In that sense it has mostly lived up
to the prime goal enshrined within its charter, namely
to ensure "international peace and security". Though it
is very imperfect and has often been bitterly
disappointing, the world manifests by its repeated
return to the UN in times of crisis that it cannot do
without it. Not even the last superpower can manage to
conduct its international affairs successfully
independent of the UN and its Security Council. The
naked truth of this tenet has been recently driven home
by the Iraq crisis. Relatively few were predicting the
outcome we have witnessed, the return of the US to the
UN for help in extricating itself from a potential Iraqi
quagmire.
The Iraq crisis: Tuning
multilateral strategy However, very importantly,
a closer examination of the Iraq crisis in the light of
the bigger picture, involving the UN and the issue of
unilateralism vs multilateralism, reveals that the
begrudging US return to the UN as a significantly
humiliated and needy supplicant was largely engineered
by weaker but more strategically astute powers that
sought to bring the US to heel on the very issue of
unilateralism vs multilateralism, that it therefore did
not happen merely as a chance occurrence.
No,
rather than by a mere chance occurrence, those weaker
powers arrayed themselves against the last superpower
before, during and after the invasion of Iraq,
specifically for the purpose of discrediting
unilateralism and to establish multilateralism as the
fundamental standard for the conducting of international
affairs. The chosen instrument with which to solidify
their unity on the issue and to thereby exercise
combined influence over the US was none other than the
United Nations Security Council.
Those weaker
but much more cunning powers have done what almost
no-one foresaw or imagined they could do - they have
brought the US to heel on the great issue that stands
before the entire international system, namely, will it
continue to be the unilateralism of the last superpower
or will multilateralism rule?
By now, the
unapologetic unilateralists inside and outside the
current US administration are both frantic and dejected
at contemplating the outcome of US actions in first
pushing past the UN, and then coming back to plead for
its help. The US, in making such an ardent and
shortsighted push for unilateralism, has unwittingly
ended up severely discrediting its own chosen
geopolitical philosophy and has actually helped to
establish multilateralism as the standard, much to the
chagrin of many within the current administration. But
the US has had a great deal of help in humiliating
itself and its unilateralist philosophy.
Thanks
to the stubborn opposition of the anti-war bloc at the
UN, the US was mostly unable to put together a true
international coalition for action in Iraq. The
"coalition of the willing" was nothing in comparison to
the truly international coalition that president George
H W Bush put together in 1990 for action in occupied
Kuwait. As such, the US ran into very significant
logistical problems before the invasion in March 2003,
directly as a result of the anti-war bloc's opposition
at the UN. Turkey's refusal to allow US forces to launch
from its territory is but one example of the influence
that the new bloc was exercising from within the
Security Council. Both by exerting economic, diplomatic
and political pressure on certain important US allies,
and also by disallowing a UN resolution explicitly
authorizing the invasion and thereby providing political
cover at the UN for those already reluctant to support
the US plan, the new anti-war bloc prevented
international support for the US, and even succeeded in
isolating the US on an unprecedented scale before and
after the war.
Such collective strategy by
relatively weaker powers against the heretofore
unquestioned global hegemony of the US, and centered
firmly within the Security Council, was a stratagem
whose time had finally arrived. That collective strategy
has refused to disintegrate in the aftermath of the
invasion, and consequently has held sway right up until
today. In denying all but minimal international support
for the US in the form of troops and funds, and in
succeeding in changing the US agenda from rebuilding
Iraq to restoring Iraqi sovereignty, and in greatly
accelerating the timetable for such restoration of
sovereignty, the anti-war bloc has succeeded in bringing
the US hegemon to heel on the great issue. Consequently,
those opposing the US on Iraq have been able pointedly
to demonstrate the real power of a form of
multilateralism (more accurately designated as
collective opposition), even when the last superpower
refuses to play along willingly. Willingly or not,
wittingly or not, the US has been made to come around to
the wishes of the anti-war bloc.
Assault on
state sovereignty Wittingly or unwittingly, the
US and the United Kingdom are now even adding to the
UN's potential relevance and the centricity of its role
in international decision-making. They are doing this by
the proffering of certain doctrines that, on the
surface, would appear to enhance primarily the US, and
to a lesser extent the British, role far above that of
the UN in international decision-making and leadership.
However, in effect they are very likely to have the
opposite effect. They are likely to pull the UN Security
Council directly to the geopolitical center.
The
preemptive war doctrine US President George W Bush and
British Prime Minister Tony Blair put forward in the
lead-up to the Iraq war and the International Community
Doctrine put forward in the spring of 1999 during the
Kosovo crisis and re-emphasized recently by Blair can
have a tremendous weakening effect on the principle of
state sovereignty. Obviously, in the view of the two
leaders, state sovereignty as codified in the Treaty of
Westphalia stands as an unnecessary and dangerous
obstacle in the way of the implementation of the
preemptive war doctrine.
To summarize their
position, sooner or later, unless action is taken now,
there will occur a catastrophic attack by terrorists in
possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), most
probably obtained from terrorist-sponsoring rogue
states. The likely death toll and damage to crucial
infrastructure and the economy of the target state will
dwarf that of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the US.
In fact, in the event that certain biological weapons
are used in such an attack, truly catastrophic damage
could result worldwide. The acquiring of WMD by
terrorist groups bent on the destruction of the West is
truly the nightmare scenario. In fact, the two leaders
are absolutely correct with respect to the fact that
such an attack will eventually come if action is not
taken immediately. And even if it is taken immediately,
there may be no way to assure that such an attack does
not occur anyway.
The issue here, though, is
what kind of action must be taken? And should action be
taken multilaterally, or even unilaterally if necessary?
The two leaders, while obviously recommending military
action (preemptive war), would clearly prefer very tough
non-military and multilateral action against the "bad
guys" wherever possible and practical. However, they are
warning once again that, lacking such multilateral
support at the UN, they will act militarily and
unilaterally if need be.
Blair has made a number
of impassioned appeals for a multilateral but more
courageous stance at the UN to confront the "bad guys".
He has called for significant reform of the UN Security
Council, to give it significantly more authority. He has
also clearly laid out a vision of the Security Council
operating at the very center of decision-making and
decision-enforcing. He is very much more the
internationalist than Bush is, yet, as shown in the Iraq
crisis, when push comes to shove, he will come down on
the unilateralist US side.
Bush, however, pays
only lip service to the principle of multilateralism. He
is interested in multilateralism and a strong UN role
only insofar as it rubber-stamps his agenda. In the
event that the international community and the UN refuse
to support his agenda, he is determined to act mostly on
his own if need be. Of course, it is not entirely clear
that any other world leader, in the same unequaled
position atop the last superpower, would act much
differently than Bush has acted. Hence it is abundantly
clear, notwithstanding all the very serious setbacks in
the past year, that the two leaders are mostly
unrepentant over their unilateral military action on
Iraq. And they warn that such action may be necessary
again in the very near future. Not only is the entire
international situation extremely complicated at the
present time, but it is also exceptionally dangerous.
There is no international consensus on how best
to meet the threat of a catastrophic terrorist attack.
But interestingly, and primarily as a result of the
ardent US/UK push for adoption of the preemptive war
doctrine in the past year and its unilateral application
in Iraq against the will of most of the international
community, the world seems divided primarily into two
camps: those who side with the US and the UK, and those
who side against the doctrine of unilateralism and
preemptive war.
Blair has analyzed the debate as
essentially boiling down to the two differing views of
state sovereignty. In the Westphalia view, the issue of
the legitimacy of the sovereignty of any state is not to
be used as a justification to violate its sovereignty.
Hence, in the strict Westphalia view, even the
sovereignty of despot regimes must not be violated
absent a serious provocation. However, in the US view,
the issue of legitimacy has primacy over sovereignty,
such that any sovereign state that proves itself (or
whose leaders prove themselves) illegitimate, based on
internationally accepted norms of conduct, may be
declared or considered illegitimate and forfeit its
sovereignty, by force if necessary.
The
strengths and weaknesses of both philosophies should be
readily apparent. The Westphalia model has the proven
advantage of strengthening the principle of state
sovereignty and thereby tending to assure the inviolable
integrity of nations, thus tending to avert military
invasion and war. However, it has the weaknesses of its
strengths, also having demonstrated in two world wars
that it can allow the rise of dangerous, illegitimate
regimes, eventually leading to significant crisis and
war. The US model has the proven advantage of raising
the bar of acceptable conduct on the part of nations by
raising high the issue of legitimacy. However, it also
has the weaknesses of its strengths in that it has
demonstrated that by severely weakening the principle of
state sovereignty, military invasion becomes more easily
justifiable and thus more frequent, with instability and
even near-chaos as the result. The post-invasion
nation-building required is both terrifically costly and
enormously risky, since more often than not such
invasions take place in nations with deep but mounting
ethnic rivalries, which can easily plunge the violated
nation into civil war, risking region-wide involvement.
The Westphalia model is predominantly laid back,
whereas the US model, especially as envisaged by Bush
and Blair, tends to be very activist, even militant.
Neither model, in its pure form, is a desirable
"solution". It is clear from Blair's recent speech
proffering the doctrine of international community that
the UN Security Council is envisaged as undergoing
structural changes to facilitate investing it with
significantly greater authority in dealing with the
threats to international peace and security, and to
avoid the deadlock that often paralyzes the Security
Council.
Acceleration toward the multipolar
world order These are very significant
proposals, though not new ones. However, the atmosphere
of urgency and environment of international danger in
which the proposals are being made, and the particular
parties making such proposals, are quite significant
indeed. In the past, it was mostly the lesser,
marginalized powers at the UN that made such Security
Council reform proposals. Now the US has been forced to
pull the UN closer to the geopolitical center, and the
UK is actually playing the role of activist in
attempting to oversee the creation of a UN Security
Council-centered world order. In the past the US and
Britain were the main obstacles to such reform. Now
Britain has become the proponent, tutor and activist,
and the US is the still-reluctant but somewhat malleable
student. This is an enormously important transformation.
Despite bluster, evident lack of repentance over
Iraq and confident statements, manifestly the Bush and
Blair administrations have lost significant confidence
in their own ability to act effectively alone - they do
need international consensus and support in any effort
to disarm the "bad guys". So they feel they have to go
to the UN to get what they need. They still believe very
deeply in the preemptive war doctrine - but in the
pragmatic and effective application of that doctrine in
the real world, they are having to face the reality of
their own inability to make it work on the ground
without international support from the very start. The
Iraq invasion and its aftermath have given them pause,
significantly eroding their formerly over-inflated
opinion of their own capabilities. Britain appears
primed and ready to help facilitate the creation of a
Security Council-centric world order with significant
authority. But what about the United States?
Even though the Bush administration has indeed
suffered a significant blow to its inflated opinion of
US capabilities, and this has forced the administration
to come back to the UN and ask for its help in Iraq, it
would be a mistake to say that any fundamental,
philosophical change has yet occurred within the
administration with respect to the great issue of
unilateralism vs multilateralism. In fact, the
administration is highly unlikely ever to undergo such a
fundamental philosophical transform. Yet, as crises
continue to present themselves, the US will have little
choice but to progressively (but reluctantly) pull the
UN and its Security Council closer to the geopolitical
center. This is an unavoidable fact of life in the ever
more closely interconnected and intertwined
international system we are making for ourselves.
Additionally, both the US and Britain, by
tearing away at the principle of state sovereignty, are
actually helping to pave the way toward a new world
order in which a significant amount of power is
transferred from the sovereign state and invested in an
international body (the UN and its Security Council)
gifted with the authority to decree on the legitimacy of
any state's sovereignty, and with the authority to
violate that state's sovereignty by an array of means,
including preemptive war. The US is, in effect,
attempting to make that transfer of power from the
sovereign state to the US itself, rather than to any
international body. However, on Iraq, the transfer of
power went not to the US as expected, but to the very
organization the administration disdained and pushed
aside. The US has had to change both its agenda and its
timeframe to that of the UN and its anti-war bloc.
Consequently, what the US evidently doesn't
consider is that once you weaken the principle of state
sovereignty, it is weakened for all, and not just for
the "bad guys". The US still imagines it can remain an
exception to this rule - but can it? The Iraq crisis has
demonstrated that the US is not nearly omnipotent -
therefore, how can it guarantee its exception status? In
a future crisis, how can the US ensure that it won't
have to again appeal to, and again bow to, international
will at odds with its own will? No such guarantee exists
for the US or anyone else. Hence, by tearing away at
state sovereignty in the pursuit of preemptive war,
unwittingly the US and Britain are helping to establish
Security Council-centric multilateralism. They are
accelerating the transfer of significant power away from
the sovereign state and toward the Security Council.
This is the direction the international system is
heading, prompted by a procession of crises.
All
these developments carry with them enormous significance
with respect to the future relevance and even the
authority of the UN Security Council. We now have very
potent forces acting from two disparate directions but
converging precisely at the UN and its Security Council.
As noted above, the anti-war bloc, centered firmly
within the Security Council, is intent on maintaining,
and even increasing, their own power and influence by
increasing the relevance and influence of that council.
Additionally, Britain seems intent on giving the
Security Council the authority it requires in order to
meet the imminent threat of terrorism and its state
sponsors. And while still very reluctant to go down that
path, the US is being forced, by circumstances and
events, to concede that it now needs the UN far more
than it realized. And there is every indication that
need will grow, not diminish.
The geopolitical
forces moving the world toward a Security
Council-centric world order are like big waves crashing
against the principles of state sovereignty and
unilateralism. The US will have to decide, very soon,
whether it wants to place itself on the crest of the
wave, or remain in its wake, floundering, as it
currently is. Consequently, the UN Security Council has
become the real focal point where all those forces must
wreak change - significant, structural change. This
situation, while still developing and still in flux, is
brand new, unprecedented and enormously significant.
This autumn, the special panel on UN reform,
appointed last September, will report to the Security
Council on its recommendations for making the UN more
effective and relevant. Unlike past calls for reform,
this September's confab may prove to be of real
significance. Especially will that be true in the event
of another terrorism-inspired crisis in late 2004, circa
the third anniversary of September 11, and near to the
US election. That possibility cannot, and should not, be
discounted, because, like it or not, a convergence of
all the forces pushing the international system toward
fundamental change, the move toward a multipolar world
order, is inevitable.
W Joseph Stroupe
is editor in chief of GeoStrategyMap.com, an online
geopolitical magazine specializing in strategic analysis
and forecasting. He can be reached by email at
editor_in_chief@geostrategymap.com
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their say.
Please click hereif you
are interested in contributing.
(Copyright 2004, W Joseph Stroupe. All rights
reserved.)
