SPEAKING
FREELY Salvaging the nuclear non-proliferation
regime By Jing-dong Yuan
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MONTEREY, California - Signatory states to the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on May 7 wrapped
up a two-week Third Preparatory Committee meeting in New
York to prepare for next year's NPT Review Conference.
With all the media attention focused on the abuse of
Iraqi prisoners, this important meeting - the last one
to be held prior to next year's conference - passed
without much notice. However, the future of the
international nuclear non-proliferation regime hangs in
the balance.
Indeed, developments since the 2000
meeting of the review committee depict a rather gloomy
picture. The "13 steps" toward nuclear disarmament,
including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and
the negotiation of a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty
(FMCT), have not made any progress. And though the
US-Russian Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT,
or the Moscow Treaty) of May 2002 reduced the two
leading nuclear-weapon states' arsenals to 2,200 each by
2012, it does not carry the effect of an arms-control
treaty that is irreversible and verifiable.
At
the same time, the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime's authority and integrity have
received major assaults over the past few years. Among
these are the North Korean nuclear-weapons program,
questions surrounding Iran's nuclear activities, and the
revelation of an international nuclear-proliferation
network involving Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of
Pakistan's nuclear-weapons program.
These grave
developments raise serious questions about the
effectiveness of the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime in its ability to detect, deter
and stop nuclear proliferation activities. They also
highlight the weakest joint in the current international
non-proliferation arrangement - the variation and
inability of national export-control systems to screen
and prevent proliferation transfers and exports. The
greatest concern of all is the possibility that
terrorist groups will gain access to weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and actually use them.
At
stake are two critical issues: First, has the
international nuclear proliferation landscape changed so
drastically that the current regime, established a
quarter of a century ago, can no longer handle the
emerging challenges and therefore necessitate
alternative strategies? And second, does that regime,
while assaulted and vulnerable, remain the best
available and most widely acceptable instrument to serve
the international nuclear non-proliferation cause and
one that still can and should adapt to the changing
international security environment?
Obviously,
developments over the past two decades pose serious
challenges to the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime. Three come out prominently.
One is the political foundation of the NPT. The
grand political bargain negotiated at the time and
reiterated in 1995 and 2000 is the commitment of
non-nuclear-weapons states not to seek nuclear weapons,
while the five designated nuclear-weapons states - the
United States, Russia, China, France and the United
Kingdom - would undertake good-faith efforts toward
nuclear disarmament. That bargain is being undermined by
the slow progress in nuclear disarmament.
The
second development is that since the early 1970s and the
first oil shock, there has been a growing interest and
demand for nuclear energies. In accordance with Article
6 of the NPT, over the past three decades there have
been both significant increases in the development of
nuclear power and the availability of nuclear materials
and technologies that are dual-use.
Third, and
related to the second, is the ability of the
international nuclear non-proliferation regime to
monitor nuclear transactions in a way that can detect
non-compliance without hindering the peaceful use of
nuclear energies. Achieving this objective requires not
only an effective IAEA (International Atomic Energy
Agency) inspection regime and recipient states'
willingness to enter into safeguard agreements with the
former but also the scope and effectiveness of national
export control systems of supplier states. The growing
number of dual-use nuclear items and technologies adds
further complications to the balancing of commercial
interests and non-proliferation concerns.
Can
the international nuclear non-proliferation regime deal
effectively with these developments and challenges?
There are essential approaches to this. One is to
consider the regime's lost cause and seek alternative
strategies. The other is to amend the regime to make it
more effective.
The current US policy reflects
the first approach. While not completely discarding the
regime, Washington clearly shows less faith in the
regime's ability to stop proliferation and has launched
its own counter-proliferation offensive, which includes
the preemptive use of force for regime change, the
development of missile defense shields, and a greater
resort to coercive diplomacy such as economic sanctions.
However, the US approach raises serious
questions and its effectiveness is far from clear. The
irrefutable fact is that regardless of its unchallenged
power, its ability to stem nuclear proliferation depends
on international cooperation, which is best achieved
through such international arrangements as the NPT.
Indeed, the pursuit by one state of absolute security
can cause others to seek greater military capabilities.
This is the logic of the security dilemma. The use of
overwhelming force cannot effectively deal with the
non-state-operated international nuclear smuggling
network; at the same time, it can actually harden the
determination of proliferant states to acquire nuclear
weapons to avoid Saddam Hussein's fate.
The
current international nuclear non-proliferation regime
must adapt to the new environment to remain a viable
instrument for preventing nuclear proliferation. This
requires major political and technical efforts and can
be achieved only through the broadest extent of
international cooperation. On the latter, the
strengthening of the IAEA safeguards regime in both
extending the signing and ratification of the Additional
Protocol to the largest number of member states possible
and giving the agency greater resources so that it can
effectively carry out its mandate.
In addition,
the lesson of the Abdul Qadeer Khan
nuclear-proliferation network suggests that national
export-control systems also need to be strengthened as
the first-line defense against illicit transfers.
Greater awareness and resources must be invested in
developing the necessary infrastructure and training
personnel, as well as better coordination among member
states in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a multilateral
nuclear export-control regime.
However, the
ultimate solution to nuclear proliferation is a
political one. It requires addressing the issue of why
states seek nuclear weapons and the obligations of the
nuclear weapons states in good-faith disarmament.
One of the key factors in influencing states'
decisions to go for or to forgo nuclear options is the
security environment under which a particular state is
situated. In regions where perennial hostility pits
states against one another, there is strong pressure for
the weaker party to seek nuclear-weapons capabilities.
This certainly applies to South Asia, the Korean
Peninsula and, to some extent, the Middle East. In
addition, the pursuit of prestige and regional dominance
also has driven states to acquire nuclear-weapon
capabilities. Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and
Iraq to various degrees exemplify these proliferation
drivers.
The perceived failure of the
nuclear-weapons states in fulfilling their part of the
bargain sends a wrong message to the international
community. This tarnishes the image of the regime and
raise questions about its viability as it continues to
maintain two-tiered groups of the haves and have-nots
within.
However, perhaps more damaging than the
apparent double standard is the US decision to develop
mini-nukes, the so-called bunker busters. The US Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) of 2002 blurs the boundary between
nuclear and conventional use of force, giving legitimacy
to nuclear weapons at precisely the moment when the
international nuclear non-proliferation regime needs to
be salvaged.
Clearly, reining in nuclear
proliferation requires bolder initiatives and political
leadership. The United Nations Security Council recently
adopted a binding resolution criminalizing the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-state
actors and requiring member states to adopt and enforce
measures to prohibit such activities. US President
George W Bush last February proposed major initiatives
calling for renewed efforts to combat the proliferation
of WMD and their delivery systems. The Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI), a US-led multilateral effort,
seeks to interdict shipments of WMD-related items.
These initiatives are laudable. But ultimately
to win the non-proliferation war, not just engage in
non-proliferation battles, requires even more extensive
international cooperation in salvaging and rejuvenating
the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. For
long-lasting international peace and security, and to
secure its own fundamental interests, the United States
must take the leadership role, and indeed, lead by
example. The Iraq experience shows that the US can ill
afford the absence of international cooperation, and its
resources are better spent in cultivating its leadership
rather than squandering it in unilateralism.
Jing-dong Yuan, PhD, is director of
research for the East Asia Non-Proliferation Program at
the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey
Institute of International Studies. A version of this
article ran in the Taipei Times on May 11.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their say.
Please click hereif you
are interested in contributing.
