The
al-Qaeda terrorist network has attacked and sunk vessels
in recent years or tried or planned to do so. It is also
clear that international terrorists see the potential of
using the maritime trading system to conceal weapons or
agents or to provide funding or support for their
operations.
Al-Qaeda has shown interest in cargo
containers on ships to ferry agents, weapons and
terrorist-related material across the globe. Shortly
before his capture in Pakistan in March 2003, al-Qaeda's
director of global operations, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed,
offered to invest US$200,000 in an export firm in
exchange for access to the containers used by the firm
to ship garments to Port Newark in the New York-New
Jersey harbor complex. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is the
alleged mastermind of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks.
Concern that terrorists could use
container shipping to mount a catastrophic attack on the
United States prompted the George W Bush administration
to implement the Container Security Initiative (CSI).
The CSI was first announced in January 2002 and is now
operational in at least 16 major seaports in Europe,
Canada and Asia. Most of the 20 leading mega-ports that
ship cargo containers to the US are in Asia and Europe.
The CSI identifies and checks a relatively small number
of cargo containers for possible weapons of mass
destruction or dangerous radioactive substances that
terrorists might try to place inside. The checking of
suspect cargo bound for the United States is based on
intelligence profiling and is done at foreign ports,
before the containers are shipped to America. US
officials call this "defense in depth".
As many
as 15 million containers are in circulation,
criss-crossing the globe by sea and making over 230
million journeys each year. Some 7 million containers
arrive annually by sea in US ports alone. Checks of
containers reaching US ports by sea increased to 5.2% of
total arrivals by September 2003, from 2% two years
earlier. Worldwide, less than 1% of shipped cargo is
screened using X-ray and gamma-ray devices to check for
explosives, radioactive substances or other dangerous
materials.
Officials and counter-terrorism
experts have warned that the next step up in terrorism
may be an attack using chemical, biological,
radiological or nuclear weapons. A ship or container is
regarded as one of the most likely delivery devices for
a nuclear or radiological bomb. The exposure in February
of an extensive and long-running nuclear black market
that funneled weapons technology to Iran, Libya and
North Korea from Pakistan has heightened these fears.
Shipping is the heart of global trade. Most
international trade - about 80% of the total by volume -
is carried by sea. About half the world's trade by
value, and 90% of the general cargo, is transported in
containers. The most dangerous possibility is that
terrorists might use a powerful radiological bomb or
even a nuclear explosive device, perhaps concealed in
any one of the millions of cargo containers that move
through the world's ports each year.
Somewhat
less catastrophic would be a terrorist attack that did
not use nuclear or radiological bombs but instead used
ships carrying explosive, inflammable or toxic cargo as
weapons to close one or more key international ports,
straits or waterways. The damage to world trade caused
by such action would depend on how long the blockage
lasted, the extent to which it could be bypassed, and
the costs involved.
The detonation of a nuclear
or powerful radiological bomb in a major port-city would
cut the arteries of maritime commerce if the device was
believed to have come by sea. It would halt much of the
world's trade and severely damage the global economy as
governments scrambled to put extra security measures in
place to protect their populations, cities and
economies.
What would happen to insurance rates
if terrorists attacked, or worse still, closed a major
port, strait or waterway? Ship and cargo insurance rates
would skyrocket. After terrorists used a small boat
packed with explosives to set the French oil tanker
Limburg ablaze off the Yemeni coast in October 2002,
underwriters tripled premiums on ships calling at ports
in Yemen. The exorbitant cost of insurance and the fear
of further attacks made many vessels cut Yemen from
their schedules or divert to ports in neighboring
states.
A nuclear or powerful radiological bomb
attack on a major port would send ship and cargo
premiums to prohibitive levels. The bigger the attack,
the greater the insurance shock would be. There is no
insurance for a maritime-related terrorist attack using
a nuclear bomb. The recovery costs would be
unimaginable. They would also be very heavy if a
radiological bomb were detonated in a mega-port-city.
Whether private insurance payouts would be available to
aid recovery from a dirty bomb explosion is doubtful.
If these are the major risks to seaborne trade,
what are the most appropriate layered defenses? Accurate
and timely intelligence about any attempt by terrorists
to make use of ships or cargo containers is vital. So,
too, is the continuing crackdown on the al-Qaeda
network's leaders, operatives, organization, finances
and recruiting. The tighter security measures mandated
by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for
ports, port facilities and vessels are also important.
They will take effect from July 1 this year.
But
other actions are needed to build a more effective web
of layered defense and deterrence against
maritime-related terrorism. These preventive measures
should include:
A universal container initiative
is needed to supplement the US-driven CSI and provide
better security throughout the global supply chain to
prevent a nuclear or radiological bomb being placed in a
container or on a ship involved in international trade.
At present, containers bound for the United States are
the main focus of checks, although Canada and Japan have
accepted a US offer to screen any suspect containers in
US ports before they leave for Canada or Japan.
The US and the EU agreed in November 2003 to
work out ways of ensuring the security of containers
from all locations that are imported into, transhipped
through or transit the EU and the US. This would amount
to a very large portion of the world's general cargo
trade. Leading Asian traders should adopt a similar
approach. Also, lifting the shroud of secrecy
covering the ownership and control of vessels, and
improving seafarer recruitment and identification, are
critically important in preventing terrorists from using
ships for their own purposes.
Michael
Richardson, a former Asia editor of the
International Herald Tribune, is a visiting senior
research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies in Singapore.
