The eclipse of regime
change By Michael A Weinstein
Under the pervasive uncertainty about whether
the general pattern of world politics will mark a
restoration of multilateralism with American leadership
or a drift toward multi-polarism, strategic options
present themselves to the United States. Those options
define the alternative goals for American foreign and
security policy. Making the American decisional
position the major determinant of the pattern of world
politics does not imply a preference for American power.
It is simply recognition that the present global balance
of power remains heavily weighted in favor of the US, in
the sense that other powers are primarily responsive to
American behavior rather than autonomous initiators. The
only exceptions are the Islamic revolutionary movements
that cross-cut state power politics and are chronically
disadvantaged by their failure to possess or be
protected by a state apparatus.
Since the end of
World War II, the strategic aim of the US has been to be
the military guarantor of the capitalist market system,
gaining thereby the economic benefits that follow from
performing the role of protector. Both the Cold War and
decolonization forestalled the possibility of conquest,
so the operative policy became regime change wherever
the US judged that its basic interest was threatened.
The Utopia of American security policy is a
world of "market democracies" with stable representative
institutions, open to trade and investment, and policed
by the US. Short of that ultimate goal, any regime that
plays ball with the market system and does not threaten
other states within that system has been acceptable. In
the worst case, there has been tolerance of
dictatorships that oppress segments of their populations
and engage in wholesale corruption - a prescription for
long-term instability.
Regime
change Although the term "regime change" has only
become current in the past decade with the rise of
neo-conservative influence in American policymaking, the
policy that bears its name has been operative for more
than 50 years. One need only think of Iran, Guatemala,
Chile, Grenada, Panama and Kosovo to grasp the
consistency of that policy. Regime change will continue
to be the desired outcome of American strategy, as long
as the US remains the major military power in the world.
Whatever ideological differences that they might have,
American security elites are united in the understanding
that America's power advantage does not result from its
economic strength or its cultural appeal, but from its
credibility as a protector of the market system. Wealth
and "soft power" are important, but they are not
decisive.
The notion of regime change is
elastic. At one extreme, it involves the outright
removal and replacement of the policy leadership
(government) of the target state, along with its
administrative apparatus. This polar case applies to
quasi-totalitarian regimes, such as Ba'athist Iraq, in
which the ruling party has staffed the apparatus with
its partisans. Comprehensive regime change involves
military occupation of the target state, refashioning
its constitution and administration, and making sure the
new personnel are favorable to the market system and
American security aims. It can be understood as nation
rebuilding.
At the opposite pole from
comprehensive regime change is influencing the
government of the target state to alter its policies so
that they fall into conformity with the American
strategic design. During the diplomatic prelude to
Operation Iraqi Freedom, President George W Bush at one
point said that if Saddam Hussein disarmed voluntarily,
his regime would have changed and a military
intervention would not be necessary. As much of a
stretch as Bush's statement might seem, it is
analytically sound. The purpose of regime change is not
the replacement of political and military forms
(democratization), or even of personnel, but
transformation of policy to suit American interests. If
that result is effected by the target state's
government, it is no longer an adversary.
Between the extremes of root-and-branch overhaul
and persuasive instigation of policy change are all of
the other means of effecting policy change from measures
to remove governments by military action, through
diplomatic and economic sanctions, to support of proxies
or opposition movements. All of those tactics have been
used, often in combination or successively, by the US
since World War II, and they are all still on the table,
depending for their employment on America's capacity to
exercise power.
The American experience of
nation rebuilding in Iraq has shown that the US is
ill-equipped to undertake comprehensive regime change
successfully in a former quasi-totalitarian state.
Although Iraq is still a "work in progress", it now
appears unlikely that it will become a stable market
democracy in the near to medium term. The limits of
American power revealed by the Iraq experience have
effectively removed comprehensive regime change from the
table for the present and have impaired the
effectiveness of more modest measures. The US would
still prefer regime change in states such as Iran and
North Korea, but it will probably have to settle for
less.
Containment Short of regime
change, the most plausible apparent option is
containment, which has also played a significant role in
American security policy since World War II. Containment
- keeping the target state within bounds so that it does
not expand its military capability and threaten other
regimes - is a fall-back position that cedes to regime
change when a more favorable configuration of power
develops. For example, the containment strategy against
the Soviet Union was supplemented by support of
anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, which hastened the
collapse of the Soviet system.
The most
important consequence of the Iraq intervention for
American power is the release of tendencies toward
multi-polarism on the part of great powers like China,
Russia and - to a lesser extent - the Franco-German
combine. The second global consequence is the increased
difficulty of containing states and movements that fall
outside the order of globalization - specifically, the
two other members of the "Axis of Evil" - Iran and North
Korea - and the stateless movement of Islamic
revolution.
Containment of a target state is
relatively easy when the US has overwhelming military
superiority and international support, as was the case
after the Gulf War of 1991, despite the progressive
tattering of the sanctions regime. It becomes much more
difficult when those two conditions are not present and
the target state moves to expand its military power
and/or to mix in the affairs of its neighbors. Such is
the case for Iran and North Korea at present. When
target states seek to change the balance of power in
their favor, the US is faced with the choice of trying
to repel the moves or to make concessions that erode
containment.
Iran Iran is
currently the greatest test of American security policy.
The recent face-off between Iran and the International
Atomic Energy Agency, in which Iran was able to avoid
having its nuclear program become an issue for the
United Nations Security Council, indicates concession by
the US rather than effective containment. Iran has
announced that it deserves a place in the "nuclear
club", and its path appears to be open at the moment.
In addition, Iran has close relations with the
Shi'ite factions in Iraq and is preparing to exert as
much influence as possible over post-occupation Iraqi
politics. Whether Iran will try to gain a sphere of
influence over an autonomous Shi'ite mini-state,
encourage dissidence in the Shi'ite areas of a unified
federalist Iraq, or collaborate with a Shi'ite-dominated
Iraqi state, will depend on how Iraqi politics gel.
What is clear is that Iran is flexing its
muscles. Part of the rationale for pre-emptive war in
the American National Security Strategy of 2002 was to
diminish the threats from other "rogue states". The
result of the first application of that policy seems to
have been the reverse of what was intended.
North Korea North Korea is also
more favorably positioned than it was before Operation
Iraqi Freedom. It is still free to pursue its nuclear
weapons program and is presently simply trying to drag
out the multilateral negotiations over it as long as it
can, with the help of China. Again, the US has very
little leverage, having announced that it does not
intend to launch a pre-emptive war against North Korea,
which simply reflects political and military realities.
Despite American assurances that commitment of the US to
South Korea's defense will be undiminished, the rebasing
of American troops in the south of the country and the
transfer of troops to Iraq can only heighten North
Korea's resolve to pursue its security strategy.
South Korea's decision to send 3,000 of its
troops to Iraq in the face of widespread public
opposition indicates how seriously South Korea takes the
prospect of an American concessionary drift. The South
Korean government understands that North Korea seeks to
shift the balance of power on the Korean peninsula
decisively, and knows that South Korea needs a
protector.
Islamic revolution The third issue of containment faced by the United
States concerns the stateless Islamic revolutionary
movements, which also aim at regime change - the
replacement of the governments of states with majority
Islamic populations with theocratic regimes, ultimately
to be subsumed under a revived caliphate.
Mischaracterized as a "war on terror", the conflict with
Islamic revolution is, for the US, a struggle of
counter-regime change. Military attacks by Islamic
revolutionaries against the US and its grand coalition
of allies are meant to further the goal of regime change
by weakening American resolve to prop up target states.
Containing Islamic revolutionary movements was
difficult enough before the Iraq intervention; it is now
even more so. Recent waves of violence against the
non-democratic regimes of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
indicated increased instability in those states, as does
the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The US
does not have the resources to bolster weak regimes in
the Islamic world, much less to engineer their
democratization. It must rely on whomever will help it
contain the revolutionaries, even if in the long run
such alliances increase instability. The US is
constrained to condone the dictatorships in Uzbekistan
and Sudan, to the point of being unable to act
effectively to stop the ethnic cleansing/genocide in the
latter's Darfur region.
Having allowed a
military enemy to grow up in the Islamic world, the US
cannot easily make concessions in a struggle which is an
actual - not a pre-emptive - war. Appeasement is a
theoretical possibility - and, like most strategies, has
its possible benefits - but it is not a live policy
option for domestic political reasons and, more
importantly, because it would shift the balance of power
too far to the disadvantage of the globalization
project.
Given their clandestine nature, it is
difficult to assess accurately the power of Islamic
revolutionary movements. What is clear is that they are
still active, possibly growing in strength and present a
continuing challenge to a US whose nation-state
adversaries are emboldened and whose allies are
skeptical. The American advantage in the conflict with
Islamic revolution is the support it gains from regimes
around the world, on the basis of their own
self-interest. That advantage is considerable, but it is
diminished by the presence of weak and unpopular regimes
in the Islamic world, with which the US is constrained
to cooperate.
Conclusion As the US
adjusts to its loss of power resulting from the Iraq
intervention, its security elites will attempt to
recover capability for a policy of regime change and to
hold the lines of containment as that diplomatic and
military effort proceeds, with - at present - uncertain
prospects for success. Along the way, Washington will
probably find that it has to make some major
concessions.
Published with permission of
thePower and Interest News Report,
an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide
insight into various conflicts, regions and points of
interest around the globe. All comments should be
directed tocontent@pinr.com
