It has been almost three years since the
terrorist attacks on September 11 [2001], during which
time we, the people, have been placed under a constant
threat of terror and asked to exercise vigilance in our
daily lives. Your commission, the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, was created by
law to investigate "facts and circumstances related to
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001" and to
"provide recommendations to safeguard against future
acts of terrorism", and has now issued its "9-11
Commission Report". You are now asking us to pledge our
support for this report, its recommendations, and
implementation of these recommendations, with our trust
and backing, our tax money, our security, and our lives.
Unfortunately, I find your report seriously flawed in
its failure to address serious intelligence issues that
I am aware of, which have been confirmed, and which as a
witness to the commission, I made you aware of. Thus I
must assume that other serious issues that I am not
aware of were in the same manner omitted from your
report. These omissions cast doubt on the validity of
your report and therefore on its conclusions and
recommendations. Considering what is at stake, our
national security, we are entitled to demand answers to
unanswered questions, and to ask for clarification of
issues that were ignored and/or omitted from the report.
I, Sibel Edmonds, a concerned American citizen, a former
FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] translator, a
whistleblower, a witness for a United States
congressional investigation, a witness and a plaintiff
for the Department of Justice inspector general
investigation, and a witness for your own 9-11
Commission investigation, request your answers to, and
your public acknowledgement of, the following questions
and issues:
After the terrorist attacks of
September 11 we, the translators at the FBI's largest
and most important translation unit, were told to slow
down, even stop, translation of critical information
related to terrorist activities so that the FBI could
present the United States Congress with a record of
"extensive backlog of untranslated documents", and
justify its request for budget and staff increases.
While FBI agents from various field offices were
desperately seeking leads and suspects, and completely
depending on FBI HQ and its language units to provide
them with needed translated information, hundreds of
translators were being told by their administrative
supervisors not to translate and to let the work pile up
(please refer to the CBS 60 Minutes transcript
dated October 2002, and provided to your investigators
in January-February 2004). This issue has been confirmed
by the Senate Judiciary Committee (please refer to
Senator [Charles] Grassley's and Senator [Patrick]
Leahy's letters during the summer of 2002, provided to
your investigators in January-February 2004). This
confirmed report has been reported to be substantiated
by the Department of Justice Inspector General Report
(please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI
Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of
your report). I provided your investigators with a
detailed and specific account of this issue and the
names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this
(please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by
Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on
February 11, 2004).
Today, almost three years
after [September 11], and more than two years since this
information has been confirmed and made available to our
government, the administrators in charge of language
departments of the FBI remain in their positions and in
charge of the information front lines of the FBI's
counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence efforts. Your
report has omitted any reference to this most serious
issue, has forgone any accountability whatsoever, and
your recommendations have refrained from addressing this
issue, which when left unaddressed will have even more
serious consequences. This issue is systemic and
departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude this
information and this serious issue despite the evidence
and briefings you received? How can budget increases
address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level
bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new
bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon
removed from the action lines, address and resolve this
problem?
Melek Can Dickerson, a Turkish
translator, was hired by the FBI after September 11, and
was placed in charge of translating the most sensitive
information related to terrorists and criminals under
the bureau's investigation. Melek Can Dickerson was
granted Top Secret Clearance, which can be granted only
after conducting a thorough background investigation.
Melek Can Dickerson used to work for a semi-legit
organizations that were the FBI's targets of
investigation. Melek Can Dickerson had on going
relationships with two individuals who were FBI's
targets of investigation. For months Melek Can Dickerson
blocked all-important information related to these
semi-legit organizations and the individuals she and her
husband associated with. She stamped hundreds, if not
thousands, of documents related to these targets as "Not
Pertinent". Melek Can Dickerson attempted to prevent
others from translating these documents important to the
FBI's investigations and our fight against terrorism.
Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct
supervisor, Mike Feghali, took hundreds of pages of
top-secret sensitive intelligence documents outside the
FBI to unknown recipients. Melek Can Dickerson, with the
assistance of her direct supervisor, forged signatures
on top-secret documents related to certain [September
11-related] detainees. After all these incidents were
confirmed and reported to FBI management, Melek Can
Dickerson was allowed to remain in her position, to
continue the translation of sensitive intelligence
received by the FBI, and to maintain her Top Secret
Clearance. Apparently bureaucratic mid-level FBI
management and administrators decided that it would not
look good for the bureau if this security breach and
espionage case was investigated and made public,
especially after going through Robert Hanssen's case
(FBI spy scandal). This case (Melek Can Dickerson) was
confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (please
refer to Senator Leahy's and Grassley's letters dated
June 19 and August 13, 2002, and Senator Grassley's
statement on CBS 60 Minutes in October 2002,
provided to your investigators in January-February
2004). This Dickerson incident received major coverage
by the press (please refer to media background provided
to your investigators in January-February 2004).
According to [FBI] director [Robert] Mueller, the
inspector general criticized the FBI for failing to
adequately pursue this espionage report regarding Melek
Can Dickerson (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel
Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to
the completion of your report). I provided your
investigators with a detailed and specific account of
this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to
corroborate this, and additional documents (please refer
to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds,
provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).
Today, more than two years since the Dickerson
incident was reported to the FBI, and more than two
years since this information was confirmed by the United
States Congress and reported by the press, these
administrators in charge of FBI personnel security and
language departments in the FBI remain in their
positions and in charge of translation quality and
translation departments' security. Melek Can Dickerson
and several FBI targets of investigation hastily left
the United States in 2002, and the case still remains
uninvestigated criminally. Not only does the supervisor
facilitating these criminal conducts remain in a
supervisory position, he has been promoted to
supervising Arabic-language units of the FBI's
counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence
investigations. Your report has omitted these
significant incidents, has forgone any accountability
whatsoever, and your recommendations have refrained from
addressing this serious information security breach and
highly likely espionage issue. This issue needs to be
investigated and criminally prosecuted. The translation
of our intelligence is being entrusted to individuals
with loyalties to our enemies. Important "chit-chats"
and "chatters" are being intentionally blocked. Why did
your report choose to exclude this information and these
serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you
received? How can budget increases address and resolve
this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management?
How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer,
"intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the
action lines, address and resolve this problem?
Over three years ago, more than four months
prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, in April
2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset who had been
providing the bureau with information since 1990,
provided two FBI agents and a translator with specific
information regarding a terrorist attack being planned
by Osama bin Laden. This asset/informant was previously
a high-level intelligence officer in Iran in charge of
intelligence from Afghanistan. Through his contacts in
Afghanistan he received information that: 1) Osama Bin
Laden was planning a major terrorist attack in the
United States targeting four to five major cities, 2)
the attack was going to involve airplanes, 3) some of
the individuals in charge of carrying out this attack
were already in place in the United States, 4) the
attack was going to be carried out soon, in a few
months. The agents who received this information
reported it to their superior, Special Agent in Charge
of Counter-terrorism Thomas Frields, at the FBI
Washington Field Office, by filing "302" forms, and the
translator translated and documented this information.
No action was taken by the special agent in charge, and
after [September 11] the agents and the translators were
told to "keep quiet" regarding this issue. The
translator who was present during the session with the
FBI informant, Mr Behrooz Sarshar, reported this
incident to director Mueller in writing, and later to
the Department of Justice inspector general. The press
reported this incident, and in fact the report in the
Chicago Tribune on July 21, 2004, stated that FBI
officials had confirmed that this information was
received in April 2001, and further, the Chicago Tribune
quoted an aide to director Mueller that he (Mueller) was
surprised that the commission never raised this
particular issue with him during the hearing (please
refer to Chicago Tribune article, dated July 21, 2004).
Mr Sarshar reported this issue to your investigators on
February 12, 2004, and provided them with specific
dates, location, witness names, and the contact
information for that particular Iranian asset and the
two special agents who received the information (please
refer to the tape-recorded testimony provided to your
investigators during a 2.5 hours' testimony by Mr
Sarshar on February 12, 2004). I provided your
investigators with a detailed and specific account of
this issue, the names of other witnesses, and documents
I had seen (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours'
testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your
investigators on February 11, 2004). Mr Sarshar also
provided the Department of Justice inspector general
with specific information regarding this issue (please
refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI
Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of
your report).
After almost three years since
September 11, many officials still refuse to admit to
having specific information regarding the terrorists'
plans to attack the United States. The Phoenix Memo,
received months prior to the [September 11] attacks,
specifically warned FBI HQ of pilot training and their
possible link to terrorist activities against the United
States. Four months prior to the terrorist attacks the
Iranian asset provided the FBI with specific information
regarding the "use of airplanes", "major US cities as
targets", and "Osama bin Laden issuing the order".
Coleen Rowley likewise reported that specific
information had been provided to FBI HQ. All this
information went to the same place: FBI Headquarters in
Washington, DC, and the FBI Washington Field Office, in
Washington DC. Yet your report claims that not having a
central place where all intelligence could be gathered
as one of the main factors in our intelligence failure.
Why did your report choose to exclude the information
regarding the Iranian asset and Behrooz Sarshar from its
timeline of missed opportunities? Why was this
significant incident not mentioned, despite the public
confirmation by the FBI, witnesses provided to your
investigators, and briefings you received directly? Why
did you surprise even director Mueller by refraining
from asking him questions regarding this significant
incident and lapse during your hearing (please remember
that you ran out of questions during your hearings with
director Mueller and [Attorney General] John Ashcroft,
so please do not cite a "time limit" excuse)? How can
budget increases address and resolve these problems and
failure to follow up by mid-level bureaucratic
management at FBI Headquarters? How can the addition of
a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its
cocoon removed from the action lines, address and
resolve this problem?
Over two years ago, and
after two "unclassified" sessions with FBI officials,
the Senate Judiciary Committee sent letters to director
Mueller, Attorney General Ashcroft, and Inspector
General Glenn Fine regarding the existence of
unqualified translators in charge of translating high
level sensitive intelligence. The FBI confirmed at least
one case: Kevin Taskesen, a Turkish translator, had been
given a job as an FBI translator, despite the fact that
he had failed all FBI language proficiency tests. In
fact, Kevin could not understand or speak even
elementary-level English. He had failed
English-proficiency tests and did not even score
sufficiently in the target language. Still, Kevin
Taskesen was hired, not due to lack of other qualified
translator candidates, but because his wife worked in
FBI Headquarters as a language proficiency exam
administrator. Almost everybody in FBI Headquarters and
the FBI Washington Field Office knew about Kevin. Yet
Kevin was given the task of translating the most
sensitive terrorist-related information, and he was sent
to Guantanamo Bay to translate the interrogation of and
information for all Turkic-language detainees (Turkish,
Uzbek, Turkmen, etc). The FBI was supposed to be trying
to obtain information regarding possible future attack
plans from these detainees, and yet the FBI knowingly
sent unqualified translators to gather and translate
this information. Further, these detainees were either
released or detained or prosecuted based on information
received and translated by unqualified translators
knowingly sent there by the FBI. Senator Grassley and
Senator Leahy publicly confirmed Kevin Taskesen's case
(please refer to Senate letters and documents provided
to your investigators in January-February 2004). CBS
60 Minutes showed Kevin's picture and stated his
name as one of the unqualified translators sent to
Guantanamo Bay, and as a case confirmed by the FBI
(please refer to CBS 60 Minutes transcript
provided to your investigators). Department of Justice
inspector general had a detailed account of these
problems (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel
Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to
the completion of your report). I provided your
investigators with a detailed and specific account of
this issue and the names of other witnesses willing to
corroborate this (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5
hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your
investigators on February 11, 2004).
After more
than two years since Kevin Taskesen's case was publicly
confirmed, and after almost two years since CBS 60
Minutes broadcast Taskesen's case, Kevin Taskesen
remains in his position, as a sole Turkish- and
Turkic-language translator for the FBI Washington Field
Office. After admitting that Kevin Taskesen was not
qualified to perform the task of translating sensitive
intelligence and investigation of terrorist activities,
the FBI still keeps him in charge of translating highly
sensitive documents and leads. Those individuals in the
FBI's hiring department and those who facilitated the
hiring of unqualified translators due to
nepotism/cronyism are still in those departments and
remain in their positions. Yet your report does not
mention this case, or these chronic problems within the
FBI translation departments, and within the FBI's hiring
and screening departments. The issue of accountability
for those responsible for these practices that endangers
our national security is not brought up even once in
your report. This issue, as with others, is systemic and
departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude this
information and these serious issues despite the
evidence and briefings you received? How can budget
increases address and resolve the intentional
continuation of ineptitude and incompetence by mid-level
bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new
bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon
removed from the action lines, address and resolve this
problem?
In October 2001, approximately one
month after the September 11 attack, an agent from a
[city name omitted] field office, re-sent a certain
document to the FBI Washington Field Office, so that it
could be re-translated. This special agent, in light of
the [September 11] terrorist attacks, rightfully
believed that, considering his target of investigation
(the suspect under surveillance), and the issues
involved, the original translation might have missed
certain information that could prove to be valuable in
the investigation of terrorist activities. After this
document was received by the FBI Washington Field Office
and re-translated verbatim, the field agent's hunch
appeared to be correct. The new translation revealed
certain information regarding blueprints, pictures, and
building material for skyscrapers being sent overseas.
It also revealed certain illegal activities in obtaining
visas from certain embassies in the Middle East, through
network contacts and bribery. However, after the
re-translation was completed and the new significant
information was revealed, the unit supervisor in charge
of certain Middle Eastern languages, Mike Feghali,
decided not to send the re-translated information
to the special agent who had requested it. Instead, this
supervisor decided to send this agent a note stating
that the translation was reviewed and that the original
translation was accurate. This supervisor stated that
sending the accurate translation would hurt the original
translator and would cause problems for the FBI language
department. The FBI agent requesting the re-translation
never received the accurate translation of that
document. I provided your investigators with a detailed
and specific account of this issue, the name and date of
this particular investigation, and the names of other
witnesses willing to corroborate this (please refer to
tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds,
provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).
This information was also provided to the Department of
Justice inspector general (please refer to DOJ-IG report
Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you
prior to the completion of your report).
Only
one month after the catastrophic events of September 11,
while many agents were working around the clock to
obtain leads and information, and to investigate those
responsible for the attacks, those with possible
connections to the attack, and those who might be
planning possible future attacks, the bureaucratic
administrators in the FBI's largest and most important
translation unit were covering up their past failures,
blocking important leads and information, and
jeopardizing on going terrorist investigations. The
supervisor involved in this incident, Mike Feghali, was
in charge of certain important Middle Eastern languages
within the FBI Washington Field Office, and had a record
of previous misconducts. After this supervisor's several
severe misconducts were reported to the FBI's
higher-level management, after his conducts were
reported to the Inspector General's Office, to the
United States Congress, and to the 9-11 Commission, he
was promoted to include the FBI's Arabic-language unit
under his supervision. Today this supervisor, Mike
Feghali, remains in the FBI Washington Field Office and
is in charge of a language unit receiving those
chitchats that our color-coded threat system is based
upon. Yet your report contains zero information
regarding these systemic problems that led us to our
failure in preventing the [September 11] terrorist
attacks. In your report, there are no references to
individuals responsible for hindering past and current
investigations, or those who are willing to compromise
our security and our lives for their career advancement
and security. This issue, as with others, is systemic
and departmental. Why does your report choose to exclude
this information and these serious issues despite all
the evidence and briefings you received? Why does your
report adamantly refrain from assigning any
accountability to any individuals responsible for our
past and current failures? How can budget increases
address and resolve these intentional acts committed by
self-serving career civil servants? How can the addition
of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its
cocoon removed from the action lines, address and
resolve this problem?
The latest buzz topic
regarding intelligence is the problem of sharing
information/intelligence within intelligence agencies
and between intelligence agencies. To this date the
public has not been told of intentional blocking of
intelligence, and has not been told that certain
information, despite its direct links, impacts and ties
to terrorist related activities, is not given to or
shared with counter-terrorism units, their
investigations, and countering terrorism related
activities. This was the case prior to [September 11],
and remains in effect after [September 11]. If
counter-intelligence receives information that contains
money laundering, illegal arms sale, and illegal drug
activities, directly linked to terrorist activities, and
if that information involves certain nations, certain
semi-legit organizations, and ties to certain lucrative
or political relations in this country, then that
information is not shared with counter-terrorism,
regardless of the possible severe consequences. In
certain cases, frustrated FBI agents cited "direct
pressure by the State Department", and in other cases
"sensitive diplomatic relations" is cited. The
Department of Justice inspector general received
detailed and specific information and evidence regarding
this issue (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel
Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to
the completion of your report). I provided your
investigators with a detailed and specific account of
this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to
corroborate this, and the names of certain U.S.
officials involved in these transactions and activities
(please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by
Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on
February 11, 2004).
After almost three years the
American people still do not know that thousands of
lives can be jeopardized under the unspoken policy of
"protecting certain foreign business relations". The
victims' family members still do not realize that
information and answers they have sought relentlessly
for over two years has been blocked due to the unspoken
decisions made and disguised under "safeguarding certain
diplomatic relations". Your report did not even attempt
to address these unspoken practices, although, unlike
me, you were not placed under any gag. Your hearings did
not include questions regarding these unspoken and
unwritten policies and practices. Despite your full
awareness and understanding of certain criminal conduct
that connects to certain terrorist related activities,
committed by certain US officials and high-level
government employees, you have not proposed criminal
investigations into this conduct, although under the
laws of this country you are required to do so. How can
budget increases address and resolve these problems,
when some of them are caused by unspoken practices and
unwritten policies? How can a new bureaucratic layer,
"intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the
action lines, override these unwritten policies and
unspoken practices incompatible with our national
security?
I know for a fact that problems
regarding intelligence translation cannot be brushed off
as minor problems among many significant problems.
Translation units are the front line in gathering,
translating, and disseminating intelligence. A warning
in advance of the next terrorist attack may, and
probably will, come in the form of a message or document
in foreign language that will have to be translated.
That message may be given to the translation unit headed
and supervised by someone like Mike Feghali, who slows
down, even stops, translations for the purpose of
receiving budget increases for his department, who has
participated in certain criminal activities and security
breaches, and who has been engaged in covering up
failures and criminal conducts within the department, so
it may never be translated in time if ever. That message
may go to Kevin Taskesen, or another unqualified
translator; so it may never be translated correctly and
be acted upon. That message may go to a sympathizer
within the language department; so it may never be
translated fully, if at all. That message may come to
the attention of an agent of a foreign organization who
works as a translator in the FBI translation department,
who may choose to block it; so it may never get
translated. If then an attack occurs, which could have
been prevented by acting on information in that message,
who will tell family members of the new terrorist attack
victims that nothing more could have been done? There
will be no excuse that we did not know, because we do
know.
I am writing this letter in light of my
direct experience within the FBI's translation unit
during the most crucial times after the [September 11]
terrorist attacks, in light of my first hand knowledge
of certain problems and cases within the bureau's
language units, and in light of what has already been
established as facts. As you are fully aware, the facts,
incidents, and problems cited in this letter are by
no means based upon personal opinion or
un-verified allegations. As you are fully aware, these
issues and incidents were found confirmed by a senior
Republican senator, Charles Grassley, and a senior
Democrat senator, Patrick Leahy. As you know, according
to officials with direct knowledge of the Department of
Justice inspector general's report on my allegations,
"none of my allegations were disproved". As you are
fully aware, even FBI officials "confirmed all my
allegations and denied none" during their unclassified
meetings with the Senate Judiciary staff over two years
ago. However, neither your commission's hearings, nor
your commission's 567-page report, nor your
recommendations include these serious issues, major
incidents, and systemic problems. Your report's coverage
of FBI translation problems consists of a brief
microscopic footnote (Footnote 25). Yet your commission
is geared to start aggressively pressuring our
government to hastily implement your measures and
recommendations based upon your incomplete and deficient
report.
In order to cure a problem, one must
have an accurate diagnosis. In order to correctly
diagnose a problem, one must consider and take into
account all visible symptoms. Your commission's
investigations, hearings, and report have chosen not to
consider many visible symptoms. I am emphasizing
"visible", because these symptoms have been long
recognized by experts from the intelligence community
and have been written about in the press. I am
emphasizing "visible" because the few specific symptoms
I provided you with in this letter have been confirmed
and publicly acknowledged. During its many hearings your
commission chose not to ask the questions necessary to
unveil the true symptoms of our failed intelligence
system. Your commission intentionally bypassed these
severe symptoms, and chose not to include them in its
567-page report. Now, without a complete list of our
failures pre-[September 11], without a comprehensive
examination of true symptoms that exist in our
intelligence system, without assigning any
accountability whatsoever, and therefore, without a
sound and reliable diagnosis, your commission is
attempting to divert attention from the real problems,
and to prescribe a cure through hasty and costly
measures. It is like attempting to put a gold-lined
expensive porcelain cap over a deeply decayed tooth with
a rotten root, without first treating the root, and
without first cleaning/shaving the infected
tooth. Respectfully Sibel D Edmonds
CC: Senate Judiciary Committee CC: Senate
Intelligence Committee CC: House Government Reform
Committee CC: Family Steering Committee CC: Press
Aug 5, 2004
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