Thinking beyond port
security By Tamara Renee Shie
On September 9 and 10, the US Coast Guard issued
two more directives aimed at improving security at the
nation's 361 commercial ports. The guidelines call for
the additional boarding of vessels from or passing
through 17 countries failing to meet the International
Maritime Organization's International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) code requirements.
We
should applaud the coast guard's efforts to protect US
ports from terrorists. They have undertaken a daunting
task. However, we must ask if drawing the line at the US
borders and in ports is sufficient to protect the United
States against a maritime-related terrorist attack at
home or abroad.
For many years the intricacies
of the international maritime trading system have
inhibited the establishment of viable security measures.
With multiple actors based in several countries, the
maritime trade sector was largely left to itself.
However, the 2000 terrorist strike on the USS
Cole and the 2002 attack on the French-flagged Limburg,
the reports of Osama bin Laden's alleged fleet of ships,
and rising concerns over the vulnerability of maritime
shipping since September 11, 2001, forced governments
and security specialists to focus much overdue attention
on seaports and cargo.
Improving maritime
security has become the 2004 security focus. This year
two major port and shipping security measures received a
great deal of attention - the International Maritime
Organization's ISPS code and the US Customs and Border
Protection Agency's Container Security Initiative (CSI).
On July 1, the ISPS code went into effect.
Crafted in late 2002, the ISPS is designed to increase
security surrounding seaports and maritime shipping from
criminal use or terrorist attacks. In order to receive
ISPS code certification, shipping companies, vessels,
port facilities and contracting governments must meet a
specified number of minimum-security requirements.
The CSI stations US Customs officers in
participant foreign ports to identify and screen
containers that pose a risk for terrorist use. By
mid-2004, about 18 of the world's largest ports,
handling a majority of the world's cargo, had signed on
to the CSI.
Unfortunately, relying on these
initiatives alone creates a false sense of security.
They are inadequate to deter terrorists from pursuing
many maritime targets.
The principal limitation
of these two initiatives is their specific focus on the
security of major transshipment ports. Though these are
essential to international trade, securing only these
ports will not protect them or a region from terrorist
attacks.
First, the emphasis on upgrading the
security of major ports neglects the fact that these
represent only a single link in the transportation
chain. A shipping container may pass through some 15
physical locations and some two dozen individuals and/or
companies while traveling from departure point to
destination. Because containers are only searched at the
major port, there is no guarantee they cannot be waylaid
in route after that point.
Second, the CSI
conducts security checks only on US-bound containers.
Therefore, even if a tampered container arrives at a
major port, if it is destined for a country other than
the US, it is more likely to escape notice. Containers
between the major ports of Singapore and Shenzhen or
Pusan and Hong Kong are not subject to CSI requirements.
Yet terrorist assaults on US ships or interests can
occur outside the US.
Third, as major ports
increase security, terrorists will look for other
maritime targets or other means to target those ports.
Terrorists are increasingly aiming at soft
targets. Attacking maritime targets has never been
particularly easy, often requiring a greater
sophistication in planning, training and coordination
than those aimed at many land-based facilities. This is
why maritime terrorism is rather rare, and why
terrorists are less likely to attack a more secure major
port. Yet in considering maritime terrorist threat
scenarios - using a ship to smuggle goods or weapons,
sinking a vessel in a major shipping thoroughfare, using
a ship as a weapon, or even targeting maritime vessels -
none require access to a major port or a shipping
container to carry out a strike. There remain numerous
small ports and small vessels not covered under the new
security initiatives. The ISPS code, for instance, only
covers ships of 500 tons or more and port facilities
that serve large international-bound vessels. The code
would not have protected the USS Cole.
How
else might terrorists strike? Piracy in Southeast
Asia may provide a clue as to how terrorists will
respond to these new measures. In 2002, there were 161
actual and attempted pirate attacks in Southeast Asian
waters. Of those, 73% occurred within ports. The
following year, of the 187 attacks, only 37% occurred
within ports. Between the two years, the total number of
attacks increased by 26. In the first quarter of 2004,
of the 41 reported attacks, only one-third were
committed in ports. Also between 2002 and 2003, pirate
attacks in traditionally targeted ports fell while they
rose in ports where few if any attacks were previously
reported. Though it may be too soon to tell
definitively, it would appear that pirates are adapting
to the more stringent security measures in larger ports.
If pirates can do it, so can terrorists.
Finally, an attack on a major port does not
require terrorists to gain direct access to that port.
As pirates are capable of attempting more attacks on
vessels at sea, it is not unimaginable that terrorists
will commandeer a ship at sea and steer it toward a
target. The bomb, biological, chemical or radiological
agents, or even nuclear materials can be loaded on to
the ship once seized. Then they head for a port or
another ship. The collision last May between two cargo
ships off Singapore's Sentosa Island illustrates how
easily terrorists could conduct a similar but more
disastrous operation.
What can be
done? Other security measures proposed or in
their early stages aim at expanding protection of
shipping beyond the major ports, such as the
Proliferation Security Initiative and the Regional
Maritime Security Initiative, but they are mired in
legal and political battles. Those also have
limitations.
More concrete and enduring measures
need to be taken to protect ports and ships from
criminal and terrorist exploitation.
First,
there needs to be tighter security restrictions for
vessels of less than 500 tons and for regional ports not
covered under the current ISPS and CSI regulations.
Rigorous shipping and port-security rules should be
firmly established, standardized and enforced through
national and international supervisory organizations. A
blind eye has been turned toward the international
shipping trade for too long.
Second, greater
burden sharing, technology assistance, and intelligence
cooperation are essential. The costs of installing the
necessary equipment, establishing monitoring centers,
and hiring and training employees to implement new
security procedures are immense and beyond the
capabilities of some countries. This investment is lost
if intelligence is not shared among governments.
Third, the creation and expansion of cooperation
between domestic and regional maritime law-enforcement
units is essential. Often national navies are used for
maritime surveillance and pursuit, complicating
political cooperation and jurisdiction. Many nations do
not have well-established coast guards or marine police
and those that do exist are relatively new, small and
underfunded and have poorly defined or overlapping
duties with domestic navies. Building up the capacity
for regional forces to combat maritime security threats
on their own will yield longer-term maritime security
beyond the ports.
Tamara Renee Shie
was a visiting fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. She can
be reached attamara.shie@miis.edu.
This article was used by permission ofPacific Forum CSIS.
