History was made on April 2, 2004, as the three ex-Soviet republics of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania formally joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). Almost immediately, much to Moscow's consternation, four Belgian
fighter aircraft were positioned in Lithuania, from where they will patrol the
airspace of the new members.
NATO officials insisted the deployment did not foreshadow new bases or a
permanent troop presence on Russia's frontier. But Kremlin concerns were not
eased when Ukraine, which lies between other NATO countries and Russia's Black
Sea coast, agreed to allow NATO forces to transit its territory. Left unsaid
was "to where?" Given the geography, the obvious answer is "to countries in the
lower Caucasus and Central Asia" - Russia's frontier.
A few days before and half a world away, on March 31, the US Navy made more
history as it officially ended a 60-year presence at Puerto Rico's Roosevelt
Roads Naval Station. Envisaged in World War II as the linchpin in the
Caribbean Basin defense system, in its last years the station supported naval
exercises on nearby Vieques Island, which ended in May 2003.
These are but two of the latest changes in a worldwide reassessment
by the Pentagon of where the United States wants air and naval bases and
ground-force posts, access or basing rights, and transit agreements. Such reviews
and realignments are not new; since 1988, the Pentagon has conducted four major rounds
of base closings or restructurings of its domestic installations and will
implement a fifth round in 2005. Foreign bases have undergone only one
large restructuring round - after the 1991 Gulf War - but smaller adjustments have
been made in response to both political-military circumstances (continually
rotating a ground-force brigade into Kuwait in the 1990s to deter Saddam Hussein) and
demands of host governments (consolidating marine bases on Okinawa and leaving
navy facilities at Subic Bay in the Philippines).
The Pentagon hopes that its plan, the Global Posture Review, when
fully implemented, will allow for rapid, tailored responses to contingencies
that could arise from any one of a number of "vital national-security interests".
However, two of these circumstances are paramount: countering any new outbreaks
(and containing existing ones) in the "global war on terror" - with
Afghanistan, Iraq and the hunt for Osama bin Laden as subsets - and reliable
access to energy resources.
The 2003 Defense Department's "Base Structure Report" lists 702 foreign bases
owned or leased by the Pentagon, with about 6,000 more installations in the US
and its possessions. As vast as this network seems, the report inexplicably
fails to include any locations in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait,
Qatar and Kosovo. And to these must now be added at least 14 garrisons in Iraq.
Then there is "under-reporting". In Asia, the 10 US
Marine Corps facilities on Okinawa, including the sprawling 485-hectare USMC Futenma Air Station,
have only one entry. The array of intelligence gathering and other
military installations in Britain are nowhere to be found in the report, possibly because
they all are technically Royal Air Force facilities. Moreover, while a
surface-based "boost-phase" missile defense system to counter North Korean missiles can
be deployed on ships in the international waters of the Sea of Japan,
effective coverage by a surface-based system to counter Iranian missiles would
require launch sites in at least Afghanistan and Iraq (and possibly
Turkmenistan), according to a Congressional Budget Office study completed in July.
A bit of history
"Manifest destiny" is common shorthand for the series of wars, purchases
and broken agreements that fueled continental expansion westward by
European settlers in the New World and their 19th-century descendents. It also covers
myriad motives that led to the annexation of Hawaii (July 7, 1898), declared by
a congressional joint resolution, and to the Spanish-American War (March-August
1898), from which the US acquired Puerto Rico, Guam, a "permanent" lease of
Cuba's Guantanamo Bay, and direct political control of Cuba until 1902 and of
the Philippines until 1946.
As the 20th century began, US industrial prowess merged with the country's
traditional reliance on freedom of the seas for unhindered trade to present an
alternative power center to those in a Europe heading toward the collapse of
the post-Napoleonic "Concert of Europe". But if war, with its embargoes and
exclusion zones, was bad for US commercial interests, so too would be a Europe
under a single power that could regulate access to continental trade to the
detriment of the United States.
This latter consideration drove two interrelated US policies that, with
modifications, remain relevant today. The first is tactical: the acquisition of
strategically located bases or basing and port visiting rights for US warships
(and now land-based aircraft and ground forces) - "coaling stations" in the
vernacular of the day. Although US aircraft carrier battle groups include
highly efficient re-supply vessels, being able to count on immediate access to
a port for emergencies, shore leave or swapping crews is prudent diplomacy.
The second, a strategic policy, opposes any attempted hegemony of the Eurasian
continent. By coincidence, at the time the US first acquired overseas
possessions, Sir Halford Mackinder proposed (December 1904) what became known
as the "Heartland Theory":
Who rules Eastern Europe commands the heartland.
Who rules the heartland commands the world island (Eurasia and Africa).
Who rules the world island commands the world.
While Mackinder's formulation most likely did no more than lend an air
of gravitas to an already determined policy imperative (if even that),
the question of continued access to European markets helped tip the US to
oppose imperial Germany. The same logic can be detected in president
Franklin Roosevelt's support for Britain (eg, lend-lease) in the period between
the Nazi invasion of Poland (September 1, 1939) and Pearl Harbor (December 7,
1941). In a sense, World War II then "morphed" into the Cold War, with the
communist Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China replacing fascist
Germany - at least until the Sino-Soviet split in 1959.
While the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989 and of the USSR itself in 1991
ended the 45-year ideologically based East-West competition for Europe, Europe
itself had steadily been creating its own collective identity - the European
Union. Ironically, through the World Trade Organization, the US is encountering
resistance to some of its trade, price and tax policies that, while not doing
so physically, psychologically and economically threatens to close access to
the heartland for US business and trade.
Emerging energy dependence
As World War II ended, US opposition to a hegemonic Europe was expanded to a
new region. In February 1945, president Franklin D Roosevelt met with the ruler
of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Foreseeing that oil would become
increasingly vital to the US across virtually all sectors, Roosevelt struck a
bargain: a guarantee of access to Saudi oil in return for a guarantee of US
protection. In 1991, after being briefed by US intelligence on Saddam Hussein's
seizure of Kuwait and the dispositions of Iraqi troops along the border areas,
the Saudis called on the US to honor Roosevelt's 1945 promise.
The 1991 war was not the first time that "black gold" was the catalyst of war.
Adolf Hitler's need for petroleum for Germany's military machine and industry lay
behind his assault on the Soviet Union, and Roosevelt's actions to cut Japan's
access to oil contributed to Tokyo's decision to attack the US. Now, under the
"Bush Doctrine", oil has become the catalyst for preventive war.
Why this is so obvious is from the vast quantities of petroleum the US economy
consumes - 26% of global consumption by 5% of the globe's population. Fourteen
of the top 15 foreign sources of crude oil in the first two months of 2004 were
countries with direct access to the US (Canada and Mexico) or access to the
world's oceans for direct transport. (The 15th, landlocked Chad, whose oil
sector first came on line in late 2003, exports its oil through Cameroon.)
Maintaining this immediate access keeps prices low without seriously impeding
the profligate "easy rider" mentality of a significant portion of the public.
The changing US military base blueprint
Before going further, it might be useful to explain the Pentagon's latest
terminology pertaining to overseas bases and describe current basing-related
actions.
In an August 16 joint Defense and State Department background briefing on the
Global Posture Review, briefing officers noted that 202 of the 230 major US
bases worldwide are in the US or its possessions. But they also pointed out the
US military is present in 5,458 "distinct and discreet military installations
around the world". These are broken down into three main categories:
Main operating bases (MOBs) with permanently stationed forces and
families. Current US bases in Germany fit this category. But when the
new Stryker-equipped medium brigade replaces the four heavy brigades now
in Germany, it will probably be stationed at the vast
Grafenwoehr/Vilseck/Hohenfels training complex - a "forward operating location" (see
below). Conversely, Ramstein Air Force Base and Spangdahlem (which houses two
US F-16 squadrons) will remain MOBs. Italy will be the home of other MOBs such
as the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vicenza, US Navy Europe headquarters in
Naples, and two F-16 squadrons at Aviano.
Forward operating locations (FOLs) with "warm" facilities having pre-positioned
equipment and a small military support group but no families.
Cooperative security locations (CSLs) with austere facilities occupied only for
training, exercises and other military "interactions". Locales in Thailand for
joint "Cobra Gold" exercises with Thai and other regional partners are
examples.
About a month after the joint departmental briefing (September 23), Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described for the Senate Armed Services Committee
the general strategy behind the Global Posture Review:
In Asia, our ideas build upon our current ground, air, and naval access
to overcome vast distances, while bringing additional naval and air
capabilities forward into the region. We envision consolidating facilities and
headquarters in Japan and Korea, establishing nodes for special operations
forces, and creating multiple access avenues for contingency operations. In
Europe, we seek lighter and more deployable ground capabilities and
strengthened special operations forces - both positioned to deploy more rapidly
to other regions as necessary - and advanced training facilities. In the
broader Middle East, we propose to maintain what we call "warm" facilities for
rotational forces and contingency purposes, building on cooperation and access
provided by host nations during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
In Africa and the Western Hemisphere, we envision a diverse array of smaller
cooperative security locations for contingency access.
Currently, a congressionally mandated Overseas Basing Commission is gathering
evidence on which it will make recommendations for streamlining the
Pentagon's "footprint" abroad. The commission's final report is now due next August 15. Its work will
complement that of the Base Realignment and Closure panel that will begin
meeting in 2005 to review domestic military installations and recommend
closures, realignments and consolidations.
Energy security and US military presence
At first glance, an overlay of US military base locations or allied nations and
the top 15 countries from which the US derives its oil shows significant
divergence.
Excluding NATO
allies Canada, Norway and the United Kingdom, only three of the remaining
12 current main suppliers have basing agreements with the US - Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait and Ecuador - while one, Iraq, is currently occupied by US military
units.
As part of the war to oust the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, the
US secured FOLs in Uzbekistan (Khanabad Airfield) and Kyrgyzstan (Manas
Airfield near Bishkek) for about 1,000-1,200 personnel. These two bases are
still active FOLs. In Afghanistan itself, the US seems sure to retain control
of Bagram airfield outside Kabul as well as a FOL outside Kandahar. Moreover,
an airbase at Shindand, which lies only 16 kilometers from the Iranian border, is
home to some 100 US Special Forces personnel with helicopter support. The
Iranians reportedly suspect that Shindand might be converted into an
eavesdropping base or a forward operating base for a future US attack.
That said, the picture changes when non-NATO countries that (1) are the
main sources or potential sources of oil for the US market, (2) have the
largest petroleum deposits, and (3) have transit facilities vital for moving the
oil are compared with countries that have military agreements with the US, host a
US military presence, or have been identified as a possible host.
Other important bridgeheads in the Persian Gulf include Bahrain and Qatar, both
of which host key US facilities; the United Arab Emirates; and Oman. In
Eastern Europe, after the end of major hostilities in Iraq, 150 US marines remained
at an FOL at the Black Sea port of Constanta, Romania. Conversely, US presence
at the airbase at Incirlik, Turkey, has been sharply reduced from 3,000 to 500.
The challenge of maintaining dominance
Dominant military powers have always had to deal with countries not part of
their "empire" - whether the empire is formal or informal. This rule still
applies in the 21st century despite the US claim to overwhelming "global" power
and reach. And a corollary also still applies: the "natural" tendency of those
outside the empire is to work together to split off parts of the imperium or
even undermine the entire edifice of empire.
As the 21st century began, the two main outsiders were Russia and China. They
had a love-hate relationship during the 20th century, one that, after 1959,
included a series of military encounters along their very long and still
militarized border. In the 1970s, Richard Nixon played "the China card" against
the Soviets by establishing diplomatic relations with China and opening trade.
But the 21st
century brought another challenge to US dominance: the rise of sub-national groups intent
on terrorizing whole populations. The initial reaction of the
administration of President George W Bush after the attacks by al-Qaeda on
September 11, 2001, seemed oriented to rally the world against terror. Yet
within 18 months, the combination of the president's ultimatum to other nations
to be "with us or against us" and the US invasion of Iraq allowed unilateralism
to triumph. The US, mired in Iraq, was arguably much less secure as a result.
Those who reveled in the US "victory" over the Soviet empire, and who came
to power in 2001, were oddly blinded to the Cold War lessons of the power
of cooperative relationships. They seemed to think that the US was so
dominant that it could achieve unilateral security - completely ignoring the
basic principle that every action intended to move closer to this goal generates
one or more counteractions. The post-major-combat phase of the Iraqi adventure
finally compelled the administration to reverse its tactics and invite United
Nations help - only to lose it and the vital assistance of non-governmental
agencies because of the continuing chaos in many parts of Iraq.
There have been other negative consequences of US unilateralism in the
struggle to contain and reduce the number of terrorist acts. Washington has attempted
to gain support by adding to its list of suspect individuals and groups whoever
is named by "allies" in the "war on terror". For example, on April 1,
Ambassador J Coffer Black, the State Department's counter-terrorism
coordinator, appeared before the subcommittee on international terrorism of
the House International Relations Committee to testify about al-Qaeda and the
"global war on terror".
On al-Qaeda, he asserted that the organization still poses a significant threat
despite the loss of its training base in Afghanistan and the arrest or death of
70% of its seasoned leaders and more than 3,400 "operatives or associates". On
the "war on terror", he singled out six terror organizations or locations for
particular mention: Ansar al-Islam and the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi network, both
in Iraq; the Salafist group for Call and Combat and the Salafiya Jihadia, both
in North Africa; Jemaah Islamiya in East and Southeast Asia; and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan. He also referred to "thousands of jihadists around the
world who have fought in conflicts in Kosovo, Kashmir, Chechnya and elsewhere".
Some
observers believe the mention of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was a quid
pro quo for basing access in that country. Yet the Central Asia-western China
"terror" scene is confused, to say the least. For years, China had played down
the frequent incidents of violence in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region (XUAR). But after October 7, 2001, when the first US bombs hit
Afghanistan, Beijing started playing them up, attributing them to East
Turkestan Islamic "terrorists" who formed part of the international terrorism
network and hence should be a legitimate target of the US-led coalition.
At first, Washington resisted Beijing's ploy. After a December 6, 2001, meeting
with Chinese vice foreign ministers Li Zhaoxing and Wang Yi, Francis Taylor,
the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, said: "The legitimate
economic and social issues that confront the people in western China are not
necessarily terrorist issues and should be resolved politically rather than
using counter-terrorism methods." Eventually, however, opposition turned to
ambivalence until finally the East Turkestan group was added to the list.
Another group, Hizb-e Tehrir (HT) or Party of Liberation, claims it has
substantial membership across Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Its agenda
includes a caliphate that would unite east and west Turkestan (China's XUAR and
the Central Asian Republics, respectively). Russian media link them to the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which reportedly has adopted HT's vision.(1)
Looking ahead
Where does this leave the future? Clouded, to say the least, until the
Overseas Basing Commission finishes its work. But others are examining some
options based on criteria laid down by the Pentagon. In May, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) released a study examining overseas bases and options for
realignment ranging from maintaining the status quo through minor consolidation
to complete withdrawal of most permanently based forces.
One of the main criteria the CBO considered was the "time needed to deploy a
heavy army brigade combat team [BCT] by sea" to potential conflict zones - one
of the administration's rationales for change. (Rumsfeld's "transformation"
program envisions meeting a 10-30-30 timeline: 10 days to move forces to any
place on the globe, 30 days to defeat an enemy, and 30 days to reconstitute for
another war.) CBO looked specifically at Nigeria, Azerbaijan (potentially
important future sources of oil), Uganda and Djibouti (potential staging bases
for conducting operations in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula to counter
instability and terrorism).
CBO compared times to move a BCT from hypothetical FOBs in Bulgaria, Poland and
Romania with current bases in the Indian Ocean at Diego Garcia (equipment on
ships) and in Germany. Azerbaijan is the only destination which could be
reached more quickly (six days) from FOBs - and then only from Bulgaria and
Romania. In all cases, departures from Poland take as long (or one day longer)
as from Germany, while departures from Bulgaria and Romania take one, three and
six days longer than from Diego Garcia to reach Nigeria, Djibouti and Uganda,
respectively.
(Changing the BCT from tank-heavy to the new Stryker configuration would save
even more time compared to current times, but this difference rests more on the
fact that the Stryker-equipped BCT can be moved by air more efficiently.)
CBO also looked at times required to move combat service and combat service
support units that sustain the BCTs. Elapsed time from Germany was equal or
quicker than from the US in all cases, but from Qatar, which hosts an entire
division's equipment, Uganda and Djibouti could be reached nine and seven days
quicker, respectively, than from Germany.
The CBO study suggests two conclusions. First, relocating bases in Europe does
not improve operational response time except to the Caspian region.
Nonetheless, the Pentagon seems determined to continue to draw down the biggest
troop MOBs outside the US while increasing the number of FOLs and CSLs to
enhance its "freedom of action". The latter two types of bases undoubtedly will
multiply in sub-Sahara Africa, Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia.
Second, notwithstanding current consolidations under way in Germany (13
facilities closing) and in South Korea (18 facilities closing), what remains
unchallenged in the CBO report is the contention by outside observers that
future US base locations in Europe, the Middle East, Southwest and Central Asia
will be tied to oil sources and oil transport considerations.
Even with additional closings and consolidations to the 702 overseas
"installations" (army 381, navy 44, Marine two, air force 275) identified by
the CBO, the US will continue to maintain the most extensive foreign basing
structure of any country. For the Pentagon, it seems, not only is "location
everything", it's "everywhere".
Dan Smith is a military affairs analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus, a
retired US army colonel, and a senior fellow on military affairs at the Friends
Committee on National Legislation.
