The
Pentagon's current preoccupation - some say obsession -
with network-centric warfare is increasing in the
context of enhancing America's supremacy over its actual
and potential adversaries. In layman's terms, this type
of warfare relies heavily on "sending secret
intelligence and stratagems instantly to soldiers in
battle". As a result, the US military has become "a
faster [and] fiercer force against a faceless foe".
The effectiveness of network-centric warfare
was proved in the US invasion of Iraq, even though in
two wars prior to the latest one - the Gulf War of
1991, which is referred to as Desert Storm, and the
US military campaign in Afghanistan (Operation
Enduring Freedom) - the technological superiority of the US
military reached new heights. It was recently reported
in the New York Times that the Pentagon was building its
own Internet in order to get a "God's-eye view of
battle".
The
chief basis of the popularity of network-centric warfare
is that it is so natural to the age-old US cultural
idiosyncrasy of viewing technology as a silver bullet to
all
contemporary
problems and challenges, including winning wars. One
only has to recall president Ronald Reagan's commitment
to developing the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) - which was derisively described by its critics as
"Star Wars". With the development of ballistic missile
technology in the 1950s, both the US and the former
Soviet Union invested enormous resources in
unsuccessfully seeking technologies that could defend
them from a potential ballistic missile attack from the
other side. Failing in finding a solution, both sides
agreed to sign the famous anti-ballistic missile treaty
of 1972, which limited the establishment of
anti-ballistic defense systems for both superpowers.
Through SDI research, Reagan envisaged the creation of a
shield defending the US against Soviet ballistic
missiles. The fact that such a technology was not yet
available did not stop him from strongly exhorting
American scientists to pursue its development.
Despite the mirage nature of SDI technology, the
idea of strategic defense against ballistic missile
attacks on the US remained very much alive. President
George W Bush's commitment to develop national missile
defense systems had its genesis in Reagan's dream of
developing SDI. This very same fixation with technology
to institutionalize the supremacy of the US
military is also driving America's commitment to the
transformation of its military on a continuing basis.
The objective of developing network-centric warfare
capabilities is an essential aspect of that commitment.
One of America's potential competitors, if not
adversaries, China, has spent an enormous amount of time
and energy on countering the supremacy of America's
fighting forces related to network-centric warfare.
Beijing knows that there is no way it can even
considerably narrow the technological gap between its
military and America's armed forces in the near future.
The alternative was to develop small offensive and
defensive platforms, as countermeasures in case of a
potential war, that are scattered all over its territory
and sea approaches that could overwhelm America's
offensive strategy, which relies heavily on large and
integrated platforms, such as reliance on aircraft
carriers as a very important aspect of its naval
warfare.
As much as China focuses on mastering
the escalated pace of the use of fighting technologies
by the US armed forces, its chief source of concern is
countering the highly innovative capabilities of the
US military to develop original fighting
strategies that are sui generis to a particular
theater of operation. For instance, the concept of the
use of overwhelming force that Colin Powell, then
serving as the chairman of joint chiefs of staff, used
as the modus operandi for Desert Storm in 1991
was applied in a much different manner during the US
military campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan in
2001. In the latter campaign, US air power was used in
conjunction with the use of Special Forces. However, the
brunt of ground war fighting was carried out by the
Northern Alliance. The result was the collapse of the
rag-tag forces of the Taliban. In the case of the US
invasion of Iraq, the fighting strategy was focused on
the use of US ground forces, but not an overwhelming
force a la Desert Storm. That was also a campaign when
network-centric warfare was utilized with considerable
potency.
However, despite its proven record in
creating the so-called "shock and awe" in toppling
Saddam Hussein, network-centric warfare is not without
its critics, and Pentagon traditionalists never stopped
questioning its value. They call it "nothing more than
an expensive fad", especially when it comes to fighting
insurgents in Baghdad, Samarra and Fallujah. The
traditionalists argue, with some merit, that in urban
warfare, "fire power and armor still mean more than
fiber optic cables and wireless connections" that are
essential ingredients of network-centric warfare.
There is little doubt that if US forces were to
face a conventional adversary in a battlefield,
network-centric warfare would serve as an awesome force
multiplier. However, for the remainder of this and the
next decade, the chief threat to the US comes from
terrorists and insurgents who will fight the US
everywhere they have an advantage. Insurgents and
terrorists, even though they will work assiduously to
maximize their advantage over the US, aren't driven by
the use of high technology, nor do they practice
techniques of conventional warfare.
So the
question is whether the reported US$200 billion that
will "go for the war net's hardware and software in the
next decade or so" is being spent wisely and is fighting
the right enemy. Given what is emerging in the streets
of Iraq and the battlefields of Afghanistan, the answer
is far from a resounding yes.
The future fighting
capabilities of US forces also depend on acquiring
actionable and just in-time intelligence. The 9-11
Commission report has established unequivocally that
the chief problems related to intelligence for the US
forces aren't related to the use of high-tech or satellites,
but that of human intelligence. As the current
debate over reorganizing America's premier intelligence
institutions evolves, there is a lot of room
for improvement by fully incorporating some of the major
recommendations of the 9-11 Commission's report regarding
intelligence. Indeed, more questions are likely
to pop up about the wisdom of investing billions of
dollars for fighting a network-centric warfare while America's
chief adversary - global terrorist groups - is primarily
low-tech based, and might be best tackled by enhancing
the effectiveness of the United States'
intelligence-gathering capabilities worldwide and
disseminating them just in time to the fighting forces.
Also, consider reports that al-Qaeda has
expressed high interest in smuggling dirty bombs to the
US, or even gaining access to nuclear weapons. The
alleged use of such weapons relies on smuggling them to
the US, or to one of its allies. Then there are reports
that al-Qaeda would be interested in acquiring and using
chemical or biological weapons to carry out attacks on
the US. Concerning such scenarios, one wonders how
relevant the Pentagon's current preoccupation with
"weaving American military intelligence services into a
unified system" really is.
In the history
of developing countermeasures against its
conventional enemies, the Pentagon has relied heavily on
devising high-tech-based strategies and plans. Considering that
its current enemy relies heavily on whatever measures
that serve its purpose of harming the US, its assets and
its citizenry, the Pentagon's continued excessive
preoccupation deserves serious reconsideration.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria,
Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
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contemporary
problems and challenges, including winning wars. One
only has to recall president Ronald Reagan's commitment
to developing the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) - which was derisively described by its critics as
"Star Wars". With the development of ballistic missile
technology in the 1950s, both the US and the former
Soviet Union invested enormous resources in
unsuccessfully seeking technologies that could defend
them from a potential ballistic missile attack from the
other side. Failing in finding a solution, both sides
agreed to sign the famous anti-ballistic missile treaty
of 1972, which limited the establishment of
anti-ballistic defense systems for both superpowers.
Through SDI research, Reagan envisaged the creation of a
shield defending the US against Soviet ballistic
missiles. The fact that such a technology was not yet
available did not stop him from strongly exhorting
American scientists to pursue its development.
