Testing the currents of
multipolarity By Dr Michael A
Weinstein
The tendency toward a multipolar
configuration of world politics, in which a number of
regional power centers compete for hegemony over their
spheres of influence within a framework of international
agreements and institutions, is a long-term process
involving incremental gains and losses for the major
players.
The transition to multipolarity - if it
prevails - has been set off by the severe problems
confronted by the United States in its occupation of
Iraq and by the decline of the dollar in international
currency markets. The former has revealed the
limitations and vulnerabilities of US military power and
the latter has brought forward underlying weaknesses in
the US economic system that are symbolized by persistent
trade and budget deficits and are rooted in changes in
the world balance of economic power.
At present,
the US has lost the position that it was perceived to
have after the fall of the Soviet Union as the
undisputed global superpower presiding over an economic
order integrating a world of market democracies.
Contemporary global politics are structured primarily by
a struggle of regional powers to assert themselves
against efforts by Washington to reclaim at least some
of its dominance.
What Washington has most
essentially lost is acquiescence to its leadership.
Other powers no longer have any compunction about
opposing US policies and preferences when it is not in
their own independent interests to follow them. It is a
game of every power for itself, in which each regional
power center cooperates with others when it shares
common interests with them and opposes them when
interests conflict. The result is the absence of a
single paradigm of world order or even of a coherent
pattern of alliances. In their place are coalitions of
convenience that - taken together - have no consistent
direction.
Currently, the major presumptive
power centers are China in East Asia, India in South
Asia, Brazil in South America, the Franco-German combine
in Europe, and Russia at the center of its
multi-regional periphery. As an area of contention that
is internally divided and subject to strong pressures
from outside powers, the Near East has no single
presumptive power center, although Iran is bidding for
that role. There is no state in Africa that has the
resources to be a hegemon, although Nigeria and the
Republic of South Africa might take that position or
share it in the future. The US has secure dominance in
its North American base, but its global reach is in
question as it faces challenges and tests from ascending
powers elsewhere.
Assessing the status of the
struggle between Washington and the other power centers
demands constant attention to incremental changes in
every corner of the world since everything is in play.
Sometimes a measure of the currents can be taken,
especially when international gatherings spotlight
ruptures and alliances. During the week of December 5,
the drift toward multipolarity was confirmed at six
international meetings - with one special exception - at
which Washington's power was challenged to the detriment
of its perceived interests.
EU weapons sales
to China The most significant geostrategic issue
that came up for deliberation in the week of December 5
was whether the European Union would end its arms
embargo on China. The EU-China summit at The Hague
illustrates the tendency of regional power centers to
deal directly with one another, apart from international
organizations and Washington.
At present, China
is under arms embargoes imposed by the EU and the US,
dating from the suppression of the Chinese pro-democracy
movement in 1989. Beijing does not expect Washington to
lift its embargo, but it wants to resume military trade
with Europe. Beijing's request is supported by Paris and
Berlin, and opposed by the states that rely on
Washington to balance the power of the Franco-German
combine.
The purpose of the summit was to
spotlight, consolidate and advance the growing economic
and political links between China and the EU. The EU has
become, since its enlargement, China's biggest trading
partner, and China has become the EU's second-largest
trading partner - total trade between them is now US$200
billion per year. Beijing and its European supporters
believe that the Sino-European relationship has reached
a level at which China should become a full partner with
no restrictions. The opponents of lifting the embargo
cite Beijing's continued human-rights violations, but
they also are motivated by pressure from Washington,
whose interests are primarily geostrategic.
For
Washington, EU cancellation of its embargo would be
"unacceptable". Washington does not want China to have
advanced weapons technology that it could employ against
the US in any future Sino-American military
confrontation, particularly over Taiwan. It also fears
that Beijing will be able to sell the technology to
Washington's adversaries and that US technology will
find its way into Chinese hands through US-European
weapons sharing. Washington has threatened to curtail
military cooperation with Europe if the embargo is
lifted.
Despite Washington's opposition, the
summit reached a result favorable to Beijing. EU
President Jan Peter Balkenende announced: "Within the EU
there is a willingness to lift the arms embargo. We have
given a positive signal." The final decision awaits the
completion of an EU "code of conduct" on arms sales that
is expected in early 2005, when the embargo would end.
If Washington cannot find a way to stop the
embargo's cancellation, its diminished influence in
Europe will be confirmed, as will the independence of
the EU as a regional power bloc with global reach acting
in its separate interests.
South American
Community of Nations Another instance in which a
regional power center acted independently and against
Washington was the creation - led by Brasilia - of a
South American Community of Nations at a meeting in
Cuzco, Peru. The community unites the Andean Community
of Nations (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and
Venezuela), Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay), and Chile, Guyana and Suriname. The ultimate
aim of the initiative is a transnational entity with a
single currency and a parliament modeled on the EU,
although that result is probably decades away, if it's
ever realized. At present, the community does not even
have a separate institutional structure. Its
geostrategic importance is as an alternative to
Washington's design of a Free-Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) that it would dominate.
The formation of
the community is a political victory for Brasilia, which
has a geostrategy hinged on South American integration
that would permit it to lead a regional power bloc
within international organizations. Such a bloc would be
adverse to Washington's interests. Finding the path to
the FTAA blocked by Brasilia and the left-of-center
administrations in other South American capitals,
Washington has concentrated with mixed success on
forging bilateral trade agreements in the region, hoping
eventually to coordinate them into a comprehensive
free-trade area.
The South American Community is
currently a weak fledgling. Brasilia continues to
negotiate deals with the EU and the North American
Free-Trade Area independently of Mercosur; Buenos Aires
resists Brasilia's dominance, trade among the two
uniting blocs is small; and Washington's strategy has
not been convincingly thwarted. Nonetheless, the 12
states within the community see it in their interests to
make the initial move toward integration, which
indicates that they want at least a counterweight
against Washington's influence. Although the prospects
of the community to achieve its maximum aims are
problematic, it will probably block the full realization
of US dominance over the Western hemisphere, increasing
the possibility that Brazil will emerge as a
full-fledged regional power center, effectively pursuing
interests independent of Washington's.
US-India military
cooperation Washington also encountered
resistance to its geostrategic interests in South Asia
at a meeting in New Delhi of US Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld with his Indian counterpart Shri Pranab
Mukherjee. Washington's South Asian policy is to
cultivate strong military ties with both India and
Pakistan. That policy is compromised by the persistence
of conflict between the two South Asian states over the
disputed region of Kashmir. Neither New Delhi nor
Islamabad wants to see the balance of military power
shift in favor of its adversary. Washington tries to
walk a fine line between keeping Islamabad as a
collaborator in the struggle against Islamic revolution
and gaining influence over the geostrategic direction
that New Delhi's rising economic and military power will
take.
Were it not for the "war on terrorism",
Washington would favor India over Pakistan. As it
stands, Washington is committed to selling $1.2 billion
worth of military equipment to Pakistan, including
surveillance planes, anti-tank missiles and anti-missile
gun systems. In addition, Islamabad is asking for F-16
aircraft. New Delhi strongly opposes the sales, warning
that they could damage the peace negotiations between
India and Pakistan that are in the early stages of
detente.
Rumsfeld was met with calls by Indian
officials to cancel US arms sales to Pakistan. External
Affairs Minister Natwar Singh asserted that New Delhi
would "ensure that our defense preparedness is not
compromised in any way". It is not clear how much the
growing security ties between Washington and New Delhi
will be compromised if the sales to Pakistan go through,
but the incident indicates the difficult choices among
conflicting interests that Washington faces in South
Asia. India's overriding geostrategic interest is to be
the regional power center of the subcontinent and it
will cooperate with Washington only so far as it
perceives that cooperation serves that interest.
NATO training mission in Iraq Further
opposition to Washington's desires surfaced at the
meeting of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
foreign ministers in Brussels, where US Secretary of
State Colin Powell encountered the refusal of France,
Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain and Greece to
participate in a mission to train Iraqi security forces.
As in the case of potential EU arms sales to China,
Washington was backed by NATO members that rely on it to
balance the power of the Franco-German combine: Poland,
Hungary and the Netherlands promised increased
contributions to the mission.
Powell responded
to the six non-cooperating states by accusing them of
"hurting the credibility and cohesion" of NATO, yet
their rejection was a foregone conclusion, even though
the mission is a NATO policy. This latest demonstration
of the rift between the Franco-German combine and the US
points to the continuing failure of Washington to
restore its leadership of the North Atlantic alliance
structure. NATO is now a disputed entity and no longer a
secure beachhead of US strategic dominance in Europe.
The refusal of the six non-cooperating states marks the
first time in NATO's history that members will not
participate in an authorized mission.
Powell had
come to Europe to mend fences and smooth the way for
President George W Bush's planned visit there in
February. He left seeing the divisions widened.
Middle East reform versus Palestinian
peace From Brussels, Powell proceeded to Rabat
for a meeting with leaders from the Middle East and
Europe. Originally inspired by Washington to showcase
and push its "Greater Middle East Initiative", which was
a move to commit Arab states to a program of
democratization and market reform in exchange for
economic aid, the Morocco conference was dominated by
calls from the Arabs and Europeans for Washington to
abandon its unwavering support for Israel and to act as
an honest broker in that country's conflict with the
Palestinians.
The Rabat meeting underscored the
failure of Washington's strategy of spreading democracy
in the Middle East through a successful demonstration
project in Iraq. At present, democratization is in
severe question in Iraq, given the Sunni Arab insurgency
and the growing rivalries among the Shi'ite Arab, Sunni
Arab and Kurdish communities and their political
representatives.
Long before Powell arrived in
the Moroccan capital, the original aims of the meeting
had been pared down to making progress on economic and
social development without reciprocal political reform.
Washington had hoped at least to avoid focus on the
Palestine issue, but the other participants were
emboldened by Washington's failure in Iraq to make a
public show of their opposition to the Bush
administration's pro-Israel stance.
It is not
even clear that Washington desires the democratization
of Arab states anymore. For the neo-conservative
perspective that informs the Greater Middle East
Initiative, democratization would reduce the alienation
of segments of Arab societies that support Islamic
revolution. Yet were those sectors to gain a legitimate
political voice, they might install Islamist regimes. As
it stands, Washington has fallen back to effective
support of the Arab crony regimes and has lost any
leverage to open up reform. Without support from the
Europeans, Powell was reduced to saying that getting the
participants in the conference to meet at all was a
"victory".
The official statement issued at the
end of the conference registered the defeat of
Washington's explicit aims. The participants "reaffirmed
that their support for reform in the region will go hand
in hand with their support for a just, comprehensive and
lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict". The
clear signal is that there will be no reform without
movement to satisfy Palestinian aims. Rather than
realizing Washington's hopes, the Rabat meeting affirmed
the very linkage that Washington wanted to avoid.
Washington does not have as yet any strategy to replace
the Greater Middle East Initiative.
Confrontation with Russia at the
OSCE Washington's most direct geostrategic
confrontation came early in the week of December in
Sofia, Bulgaria, at the meetings of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The issue
there was Moscow's behavior after the disputed
presidential election in Ukraine, which had led to a
political crisis marked by mass demonstrations and
blockades of state institutions in Kiev aimed at forcing
a second run-off between opposition candidate Viktor
Yuschenko and the Moscow-backed putative winner of the
first round, Viktor Yanukovych, after documented reports
of widespread electoral fraud and intimidation.
In the Ukrainian election, Moscow had followed
its neo-imperialist strategy of having President
Vladimir Putin endorse a favored candidate and supplying
campaign support to the favorite. When that strategy
failed, Putin responded by affirming Yanukovych's
victory and supporting efforts to block the second
run-off. By the time the OSCE meeting had convened,
Ukraine's Supreme Court had voided the first run-off and
Moscow had fallen back to accepting the result.
Viewing Ukraine as essential to maintaining and
consolidating a sphere of influence on Russia's
periphery, Moscow attempted to dig in its heels at the
OSCE. The day before the meetings, Putin warned the
Euro-American alliance not to interfere in Ukraine's
internal affairs through its attempts to broker a new
election. The EU and US, which share a common interest
in extracting Ukraine from Russia's sphere, met Moscow
head-on, insisting that their efforts were legitimate.
At the meetings, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov accused the Western alliance of "political
manipulation". Powell responded that OSCE election
monitoring and mediation activities in Ukraine were not
interference, but "the international community coming
together to support democracy". Powell also took the
offensive by calling for Moscow to withdraw its troops
from the breakaway mini-states of Trans-Dniester in
Moldova and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. The
meetings ended without a unified policy on Ukraine,
because of Russian opposition to the Euro-American
position.
After the OSCE meetings, a compromise
was reached in Kiev opening the way for a second run-off
and a reconstituted electoral commission, but conceding
to the pro-Moscow camp a new constitutional arrangement
in which parliament would gain powers at the expense of
the president, putting a possible brake on the
pro-Western Yuschenko should he win the run-off. When
the NATO meeting convened later in the week, Lavrov
signed on to a unified statement calling on all parties
to refrain from intimidating voters in the second
run-off and "to work to ensure a free, fair electoral
process".
The provisional resolution of the
Ukraine issue was a victory for Washington, but one that
it did not win through its own efforts. If Ukraine is
partially pried away from Moscow's influence, it will be
because of a popular movement within that country and
the diplomatic pressure afforded by a coincidence of
interests between the US and EU. The latter has the most
to gain from a Western-oriented Ukraine, which could
become a key element in a possible future expansion of
the bloc.
Moscow misjudged and mishandled its
role in Ukraine, bringing the erosion of its influence
on itself. It has perhaps learned its lesson: in a
similar post-election crisis in Abkhazia, Moscow has
retreated from its hardline support of its favorite
presidential candidate and has brokered a deal between
him and his opponent.
How serious a loss Moscow
has taken will depend on the results of the run-off and
the balance of forces in Ukraine's parliament. The
Ukraine affair shows that when it works with another
power center, Washington can gain an advantage. The five
preceding cases show that Washington is vulnerable to
the diminution of its influence when it must act alone.
Conclusion Except where Washington had
the support of Europe, which stood to gain most from
successfully confronting Moscow over Ukraine, its
geostrategic aims suffered setbacks at the six
international meetings that were held during the week of
December 5.
The drift toward multipolarity has
been confirmed by the EU's move to lift its arms embargo
on China, Brazil's success in starting a South American
Community as an alternative to the FTAA, India's
opposition to US arms sales to Pakistan, the
Franco-German combine's refusal to support the training
mission in Iraq, and Euro-Arab insistence on coupling
the Palestine issue to democratic reforms.
In
most international meetings, a consensus is reached in
advance so that conflicts will not be highlighted under
the glare of publicity. Washington's loss of leadership
is indicated by the fact that the meetings in which it
participated during the week of December 5 were marked
by clear public opposition to its policies.
In
the wake of the Iraq intervention, Washington continues
to retreat and retrench. How far that process will go
depends more on how the regional power centers
contesting Washington take advantage of their
opportunities instead of on anything that Washington can
do.
Published with permission of thePower and
Interest News Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
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