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The economics of nuclear
proliferation
By Jeffrey
Robertson
SEOUL - Nuclear
non-proliferation can readily be compared to basic
economics. Like the regulation of any functioning
market, it's about influencing demand and supply.
But what the failure of the May review conference
of the parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) has shown, regulating demand has been
quietly neglected in favor of regulating supply.
On the demand side of proliferation there
is the largely theoretical question as to why
states decide to acquire nuclear weapons. On the
supply side, there is the more practical question
as to how states go nuclear.
Why do states
acquire nuclear weapons? The widest-held
understanding comes from what is known as the
"realist" school of international relations. This
theory, simply put, posits that states acquire a
nuclear capability for the sole purpose of
increasing their power relative to other states,
in what can be understood as a rational decision
to ensure their survivability in the anarchic
system of international relations. Adaptations to
the theory cite domestic concerns such as national
prestige or perceived isolation, as adding to a
state's desire to go nuclear.
Other more
neutral approaches put forward the notion that
proliferation is more a question of scientific
determinism - states acquire nuclear know-how
because the intellectual threshold to achieve a
weapons capability has steadily eroded over time.
Today, the knowledge required to build a
Hiroshima-type device is available with an
undergraduate education from a half-decent
university, a personal computer and access to the
Internet. In the 1940s, it required the finest
scientific minds (at least several Nobel Prize
winners among them) backed by top-of-the-line
facilities.
But theories that aim to
explain why states seek nuclear weapons remain
piecemeal at best. Why did South Africa seek a
nuclear capability, given the weakness of its
neighbors, and then later give up its capability?
Why did the Ukraine return its arsenal to the
Soviet Union, which unarguably represented the
gravest threat to its newfound independence? Why
have states such as Japan, South Korea, Argentina
and Australia, that have all the industrial,
technical and intellectual capacity to do so,
remained non-nuclear weapon states?
Controlling the demand for nuclear weapons
remains a theoretical problem, as much a problem
of philosophy as politics. This is why
international efforts to counter proliferation
have increasingly focused on the supply side of
the equation.
On the ground, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the
United Nations' nuclear watchdog, has been focused
on how states acquire nuclear weapons. The NPT
requires non-nuclear weapons state signatories to
undertake a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
Only India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea
remain outside the NPT (although arguably, the
legality of North Korea's hasty withdrawal in
early 2003 could be questioned under international
law). The safeguards agreement allows for IAEA
verification that nuclear programs are not used
for non-peaceful purposes.
Weaknesses in
the safeguards system became apparent after the
first Gulf War in 1991 and the discovery of Iraq's
extensive clandestine efforts to acquire a nuclear
weapons capability under the noses of IAEA
inspectors. Traditional safeguards had relied on
inspections to verify only declared facilities -
Iraq had been busy readying undeclared facilities
to produce highly enriched uranium.
Reform
of the safeguards system has closed such
loopholes. This has included more rigorous use of
existing powers, such as environmental sampling
and ad hoc inspections, as well as an enhanced
information collection and analysis system to aid
safeguards inspections. In addition, states are
encouraged to implement an additional protocol,
which increases IAEA information collection and
analysis powers, enables further short-notice
inspections of declared or non-declared facilities
and requires signatories to streamline entry and
processing of IAEA inspectors. While traditional
safeguards verified that nuclear programs were not
used for non-peaceful purposes, the additional
protocol verifies the absence of non-peaceful
nuclear programs.
Efforts to influence the
supply side are ongoing. The Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) maintains strict controls on the
export of dual-use materials and technologies that
could be used in a nuclear program. The
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) goes even
further to curtail the supply of materials used in
clandestine nuclear programs. The US-led coalition
to interdict suspect shipments, disrupting the
proliferation supply chain, contains 16 states,
including Japan, Singapore, the United Kingdom and
Russia.
Global counter-proliferation
efforts have previously weathered spikes in
proliferation demand and supply. The breakup of
the Soviet Union and the immediately subsequent
period of corruption, profiteering and lawlessness
flooded regional rare-metal black markets with
promises of easy access to radioactive materials,
treatment and processing machinery - even complete
nuclear devices. This occurred when demand surged
as non-state actors with access to substantial
finance and global networks planned and prepared
prior to the global clampdown that occurred with
September 11. As it became clear that black
markets were primarily composed of con-men
peddling inferior goods and undercover police
stings, the reality set in that the proliferation
market, like any other, also feeds on expectation
and fear.
But could even a complete suite
of initiatives to limit the supply of materials
stop what occurred with the network of Abdul
Qadeer Khan? The network of the founding father of
Pakistan's nuclear program exchanged expertise,
technology and materials, allegedly providing the
basis of the North Korean, Iranian and Libyan
clandestine nuclear programs. It stretched from
North Korea to Europe, sullying Libya, Iran, the
United Arab Emirates and Malaysia on the way.
Expertise, technology and materials were sourced
from various states and sent to intermediate front
companies, making it impossible for any single
state to know the scale of the operation.
Importantly, the network flourished under supply
constraints, driven only by the insatiable demand
of determined proliferators.
Addressing
the demand side of the proliferation question will
always remain more difficult. But like any
functioning market, if demand remains great, even
a strictly limited supply can still result in a
discernible, albeit small volume of trade. The
problem with proliferation is that even this level
is too much.
Jeffrey Robertson
is a political affairs analyst focusing on
international relations in Northeast Asia,
currently residing in Seoul, South Korea.
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