A daunting task ahead for next CIA chief By Ehsan Ahrari
Don't expect that Porter Goss's resignation on Friday as the head of the US
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) will bring about qualitative changes in the
collection of intelligence or the resolution of another chronic problem, lack
of coordination among various intelligence agencies. Personnel changes at that
high level make for splashy news, but they seldom lead to substantive changes.
Problems related to US intelligence agencies are about their long-term survival
in an unsettled national-security environment.
No official explanation for Goss's resignation was issued, but there are
several reasons for it. Some of them are related to
bureaucratic infighting for
which Washington is legendary. Another may have
something to do with his personal style of running
the agency. And there is even a whiff of scandal
involving one of his
subordinates, who is being
investigated in a federal bribery case.
The foremost reason for the departure of Goss is related to the confusing
nature of the CIA's current role and mission. It was established 60 years ago,
even before the beginning of the Cold War, to prevent another secret attack
such as occurred at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in 1941. The CIA's defenders point to
the lack of any surprise attack in the US between those of Pearl Harbor and of
September 11, 2001. Detractors point out that the CIA could not even forecast
the implosion of the Soviet Union.
The intelligence community in the United States has grown to 16 separate
intelligence agencies, with 100,000 employees. The job of intelligence has
become so huge, so complex, so massive and so interminable that not even this
conglomeration of agencies ensures its continued success. Indeed, it can be
argued that the involvement of so many agencies enhances the chances of
failure.
The large number of agencies spawns interagency politics between various
intelligence gatherers. There is politics between the White House and Congress,
especially during foreign-policy-related controversies, when both branches of
the government want to use - cherry-pick - intelligence to make their
respective arguments.
One of the jobs of the director of central intelligence (DCI), Goss's official
title, was to give the president his daily intelligence briefings. This role
has the potential of providing the DCI daily access to the president, if he
chooses to do the briefing regularly. Such access leads to bonding between the
DCI and the sitting president.
Goss's predecessor, George Tenet, fully used that role to create a personal
bond with President George W Bush. In the process, he was accused of
politicizing intelligence and, consequently, destroying the prestige of the CIA
as it related to Iraq war.
Goss was chosen to re-energize and, in the process, depoliticize the agency.
However, he made more than his fair share of mistakes. A former congressman who
had worked as a CIA spy in the 1960s, Goss did not have any experience managing
large organizations. He brought with him many of his legislative assistants,
and they did everything to alienate the intelligence professionals. Soon they
started to leave the agency in large numbers.
But Goss's chief problem was that he became an obstacle in the way of the
efforts of the director of national intelligence (DNI), John Negroponte, to
make his office the center of power, not for personal reasons, but because that
was a requirement of the post-September 11 era. His was a new position created
as part of a number of recommendations made by a special committee
investigating the September 11 attacks and the intelligence failure behind
them.
Negroponte, then US ambassador to Iraq, was chosen to be the first DNI, and as
such he had the full support of the president and Congress. Goss did not know
how to deal with those developments. He reportedly soon started butting heads
with Negroponte on turf matters. Thus he became a marked man, whose departure
was only a matter of time.
Then there was that element of scandal in the making, which involved Kyle
"Dusty" Foggo, whom Goss appointed as the CIA's executive director and top
budget chief, the agency's third-ranking officer. Foggo is being investigated
in relation to a major federal bribery case. Even though this issue is far from
settled, the fact that Foggo was the personal selection of Goss also doomed his
tenure at the helm of the CIA to be short.
Goss was not a distinguished head of the CIA. As such, his tenure will soon be
remembered only by the historians of that agency. It is important to note,
however, that his departure dramatizes the fact that there remain serious
problems related to America's intelligence gathering, especially interagency
squabbles. Such wrangling is not only debilitating, it also tends to create
inertias that are harmful to America's security.
There is little doubt that with the departure of Goss, Negroponte has emerged
at the center of power; however, his chief fight in the coming days is going to
be with another bureaucratic infighter, who is even more seasoned than Goss
could have ever imagined becoming. That is Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld.
Since September 11, Rumsfeld has insisted that as the chief consumer of
operational and tactical intelligence in its "global war on terrorism", the
Department of Defense should be proactively involved in gathering intelligence,
instead of relying on other intelligence agencies to provide it.
For the most part, Rumsfeld has won that turf fight. He even won the authority
to keep US ambassadors out of the loop while sending clandestine teams aimed at
collecting intelligence or undertaking operations in his assigned country.
Considering the fact that the ambassador to any country is the personal
representative of the president, the power of getting him out of the loop on
such crucial operations was a major victory for Rumsfeld.
As long as Rumsfeld stays in his job, Negroponte is not expected to make much
headway in his attempt to win turf battles over intelligence gathering. When he
leaves the office, the chances are that his successor will insist on using the
same template of fighting and winning the turf wars. Such are the requirements
of the post-September 11 era.
Goss's successor is likely to be General Michael Hayden, former director of the
National Security Agency, and current deputy for Negroponte. However, because
of the NSA's highly controversial program of listening in on international
telephone conversations of US citizens without a warrant, he may face
confirmation difficulties in Congress.
The Democrats would not only want to question him about it during his
confirmation hearing, but would also attempt to draw the administration into
offering more information on the controversial program than it already had
provided before confirming him.
Taking a strategic view of America's intelligence-related problems, and getting
away from personalities of incoming and outgoing major officials, there remain
a number of problems that are not likely to be resolved with the departure of
Porter Goss.
First, restructuring has not solved the problems related to the continued
presence of a number of intelligence agencies in the past, and it is not likely
to do so now. Agencies, to ensure their continued existence, are resolute about
protecting their turfs and refuse to give up what they regard as functions that
are critical to their survival.
Second, the problem of coordination is not likely to be resolved now or even in
the near future, despite the appointment of a national intelligence "czar".
Third, increased organizational complexity is the chief enemy of unfettered
coordination. That problem has only increased regarding intelligence-related
organizations since September 11.
Finally, the Defense Department's demand for controlling its share of
intelligence gathering is not likely to taken away even by the president.
Requirements for fighting a "global war on terrorism" have placed the
department in the front seat of all operational and tactical intelligence
gathering for at least the remainder of this decade, if not longer. Any attempt
to take away that authority is likely to have severe political repercussions in
the event of another terrorist attack on the United States.
Ehsan Ahrari is the CEO of Strategic Paradigms, an Alexandria,
Virginia-based defense consultancy. He can be reached at eahrari@cox.net
or stratparadigms@yahoo.com. His columns appear regularly in Asia Times
Online. His website: www.ehsanahrari.com.
subordinates, who is being
investigated in a federal bribery case.
