SPEAKING
FREELY Proliferation: A good
idea badly executed By Mark J Valencia
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
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As the United States
ratchets up pressure against North Korea and Iran
over their alleged weapons-proliferation
activities, the Proliferation Security Initiative
may become a leading coercive tool in its arsenal.
The PSI is an activity initiated by the
administration of US President George W Bush to
prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their
delivery systems and related materials from
reaching or leaving states or sub-state actors of
proliferation concern.
Reflecting the Bush
administration's disdain for the United Nations,
it was conceived, originated and implemented
outside
the UN system. Despite
frequent claims of success by US officials,
the PSI suffers from serious shortcomings that can
be resolved by the exact opposite - bringing the
activity into the UN system.
The main
focus of the PSI has been on interdiction of ships
carrying WMD-related materials to or from targeted
countries such as North Korea, Libya, Iran, Sudan,
Syria and Cuba. According to US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, there have been at least 12
successful intercepts in two years. And some US
officials attribute Libya's abandonment of its WMD
programs to a PSI interdiction. Countries
supporting the PSI have grown from an initial core
of 11 to supposedly about 80.
But its
aggressive promotion and implementation have
created considerable controversy. It has been
criticized for insufficient public accountability,
stretching if not breaking the limits of existing
international law, undermining the UN system,
impeding legal trade, being politically divisive,
and having limited effectiveness.
It is
unclear what "support" for the PSI means and how
robust it is. Criteria for "support" of the PSI
are vague and soft. It is nearly impossible to
obtain an "official" list of supporting countries
because many have not publicly endorsed the PSI
"Principles" for fear of retaliation. This in
itself indicates less than stalwart support in
general as well as in time of specific need. In
reality it remains a US-initiated and -driven ad
hoc activity conceived primarily to deter trade in
WMD components and "related materials" to and from
North Korea and, more recently, Iran.
There is insufficient public information
and no objective measure of PSI success or
failure. And it is far from clear that the 12
US-proclaimed successful interdictions in two
years mean that the PSI is effective. The
intercepted shipments may be only the tip of an
iceberg of rampant, uncontrolled trade in WMD
components. Observers dispute the claim that the
interdiction of WMD components bound for Libya was
part of the PSI. And a subsequent shipment of WMD
components from Pakistan reached Libya undetected.
Moreover, state and non-state actors that want to
avoid PSI interdictions can still transport WMD
components on their own flag vessels or aircraft
or on those of non-participating states.
The secretiveness surrounding PSI
interdictions and the methods employed make
difficult the evaluation of its success and its
legitimacy, and thus the garnering of support from
countries suspicious of US-driven endeavors. Some
fear that the United States would like to change
existing international law to allow PSI
interdictions on or over the high seas. Others do
not agree with the US argument that such
interdictions are warranted by a right to
preemptive or preventive self-defense. Indeed,
they do not want to see the PSI lead to a
weakening of the international prohibition against
the unilateral use of force. Thus countries that
are key to an effective PSI - such as China,
India, Indonesia and Malaysia - have not publicly
joined the activity despite considerable US
pressure to do so, and Japan, Russia and South
Korea seem to be rather reluctant participants.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to PSI
effectiveness is the fact that most of the
ingredients for WMD are dual-use in nature, having
both civilian and WMD application. Few if any
countries export "turn-key" WMD. The harsh reality
is that countries and non-state actors can build
their own WMD from dual-use components, using
dual-use technologies and machines. But a
proliferation of interdictions of dual-use
materials may hamper legitimate commerce and thus
engender opposition, even from PSI participants.
This means that it is very difficult to make
decisions regarding "good cause" for interdiction,
and that such decisions will inevitably be
politically influenced and based on who is sending
or receiving the shipment. For example, although
India, Pakistan and Israel are nuclear states and
not parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the US does not consider them "states of
proliferation concern". Thus they are apparently
exempt from PSI interdictions.
The PSI
obviously has some way to go before it becomes the
effective tool its founders envisaged. As is often
proclaimed by its proponents, the PSI is not an
organization - only an activity - and thus it
lacks an independent budget or coordinating
mechanism. Although these features may enhance its
flexibility as well as the speed of
decision-making and resultant action, they also
constrain its capacity. Indeed, for it to be fully
successful will require near-universal support.
And even if that is forthcoming, inadequate
resources, intelligence and capacity may ensure
that a significant portion of WMD-component
shipments will still avoid detection and air or
sea interdiction.
Most of the PSI's
shortcomings stem from its ad hoc, extra-UN,
US-driven nature. Bringing it into the UN system
would rectify many of these shortcomings by
loosening US control, enhancing its legitimacy,
and engendering near-universal support. Whether or
not the PSI is formally brought into the UN
system, its reach and effectiveness could be
improved by eliminating double standards,
increasing transparency, and establishing a
neutral organization to assess intelligence,
coordinate and fund activities, and make decisions
regarding specific or generic interdictions. Such
an organization could provide more objective and
legitimate definitions of "states of proliferation
concern" and "good cause" (for interdictions),
help avoid erroneous judgments, resolve
disagreements, provide consistency and a concrete
structure and budget, and ensure compliance with
international law or be a vehicle for any agreed
changes thereto.
If PSI effectiveness is
not dramatically improved, WMD and related
materials will continue to fall into the "wrong"
hands. And it may take only one coincidence of
will, means and opportunity to create a
catastrophe.
Mark J Valencia is
a maritime-policy analyst based in Hawaii and the
author of The Proliferation Security
Initiative: Making Waves in Asia published by
the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
London, in October 2005.
(Copyright
2006 Mark J Valencia.)
Speaking
Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows
guest writers to have their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
