One of the key recommendations of the 9-11
Report after the attacks on the US in 2001 was
that intelligence should be depoliticized. The
ongoing controversy related to the leaked National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) reminds everyone that
this has not been the case.
President
George W Bush has accused his critics of playing
politics by "selectively" leaking some of the
findings of the NIE because they were "motivated
in the run-up to the mid-term
elections in November". That
is one reason he abruptly authorized his director
of national intelligence, John Negroponte, to
declassify and publicly issue portions of the
report.
The NIE is a highly credible
estimate, since its conclusions are developed on
the basis of consensus among 16 US intelligence
agencies. However, in the election season in the
United States, no document, no action or
governmental statement is free of politics.
Here is one conclusion of the NIE: "We
assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new
generation of terrorist leaders and operatives;
perceived jihadist success there would inspire
more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.
The Iraq conflict has become the cause
celebre for jihadists, breeding a deep
resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world
and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist
movement."
The trouble with that
professional judgment is that it contradicts
Bush's belief, which appears not to be based on
fact. Making an appearance with President Hamid
Karzai of Afghanistan, Bush said it was a mistake
to think that the Iraq war had increased the
terrorism threat.
The troubling part of
the entire controversy involving the NIE is that
its sobering observations are being submerged in
the cacophony of partisan bickering that is
steadily growing in Washington and in the country
at large.
The NIE lists four factors that
are popularizing the jihadist movement. The first
one is corrupt Muslim regimes; second, "fear of
Western domination" and related "humiliation and
sense of powerlessness"; third, economic
underdevelopment; and fourth, anti-American
sentiments.
Even though the NIE does not
say so, the most important variables are
anti-Americanism and the fear of Western
domination. The continuation of authoritarian
regimes in the world of Islam is directly linked
to Muslim backwardness. In that sense, both these
factors contribute to Muslim anger and
frustration.
The solution for these
problems, according to the NIE, is "democratic
reforms". Inside the US, no one would object to
that recommendation. However, there is little
doubt that those who authored the report were
thinking of Western secular democracy when they
jotted down that phrase. But that was not what
resulted in either Afghanistan or Iraq.
In
Iraq especially, there is an Islamist
national-unity government. Democracy brought to
office an Islamist party, Hamas, in Palestine. The
clout of Hezbollah has immensely escalated since
its war with Israel in July-August. In fact,
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is publicly
hinting about ousting the government of Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora, through legal means, of
course.
Thus the US faces an awesome
dilemma in the Middle East. It wishes to create a
string of Jeffersonian democracies, while Muslims
are determined to bring about Islamic democracy,
which, in the US lexicon, is an oxymoron.
What Bush and other US leaders should have
paid attention to was the following observation
contained in the NIE: "The loss of key leaders,
particularly Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri
and [Abu Musab] al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession,
probably would cause the group to fracture into
smaller groups. Although like-minded individuals
would endeavor to carry on the mission, the loss
of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and
disagreements. We assess that the resulting
splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a
less serious threat to US interests than does
al-Qaeda."
It should be noted that Zarqawi
was alive when this report was put together. But
it was on the right track in observing that the
loss of effectiveness for the jihadis emanating
from the death or capture of any major leader
would be temporary. The Bush administration has
not paid any attention to the fact - or maybe it
has failed to grasp this reality - that the
Islamist or jihadist movement has long been a
self-starter.
It needs an effective
leader, certainly, but it is not paralyzed in the
absence of one. That might have something to do
with the Sunni frame of mind - since almost all
jihadis are Sunni Muslims - as they are not
totally committed to the personality of any one
leader. That is not true for Shi'ite Islam,
however, where the personality of a grand
ayatollah becomes very important in terms of
getting religious and political guidance.
Another important point that was raised in
the NIE is the following: "Although we cannot
measure the extent of the spread with precision, a
large body of all-source reporting indicates that
activists identifying themselves as jihadists,
although a small percentage of Muslims, are
increasing in both number and geographic
dispersion. If this trend continues, threats to US
interests at home and abroad will become more
diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide."
The NIE is also right in observing, "The
jihadists' greatest vulnerability is that their
ultimate political solution - an
ultra-conservative interpretation of sharia-based
governance spanning the Muslim world - is
unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims." It
adds, "Exposing the religious and political
straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists'
propaganda would help to divide them from the
audiences they seek to persuade."
But the
NIE misses an important fact. The notion of a
caliphate has been around for the past 1,400
years. However, in the contemporary era, no one
outside the Salafi movement has paid much
attention to the concept. Nevertheless, somehow,
Bush and his team latched on to the idea and use
it to explain to the American people the "real
motive" of al-Qaeda.
The most important
outcome of the publicity given to the NIE is not
that it contains any earth-shattering information.
Its significance stems from the fact that it has
done a lot of damage by underscoring an already
well-known fact: Iraq has become the "cause
celebre" of global jihadis, which the US
president refuses to acknowledge.
The
entire brouhaha about the report thus now revolves
around winning the hearts and minds of American
voters for November's congressional elections. And
Congress might be heading for its own "regime
change", in that the Democrats could recapture
both chambers from the Republicans. Such a
development would make it even harder for Bush to
justify staying in Iraq.
That is the
essence of the controversy and high-visibility
diplomatic maneuvering that Bush is conducting
with visiting presidents Pervez Musharraf of
Pakistan and Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan. In the
realm of US foreign policy, the appearance of
"doing something" at times becomes more important
than its outcome.
None of these activities
is likely to save Iraq, however. A recent opinion
poll of Iraqis indicates that an overwhelming
number of them (with the exception of the Kurds)
want US forces out of their country.
It is
possible that Iraq has reached a point where the
population is edging toward chancing life without
occupying forces. As much as such a scenario would
be unpalatable to Bush, the Iraqi people, in their
collective judgment, might be seeing something
that others can't: if Bush has learned the real
lesson from the NIE, he will be thinking very hard
about an exit strategy for Iraq.
Ehsan Ahrari is the CEO of
Strategic Paradigms, an Alexandria, Virginia-based
defense consultancy. He can be reached at
eahrari@cox.net or
stratparadigms@yahoo.com. His columns appear
regularly in Asia Times Online. His website:
www.ehsanahrari.com.
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