Soaring, cryptography and nuclear weapons
By Martin Hellman
Let's face it, nuclear weapons are the elephant in the room that no one likes
to talk about. So let's approach the issue from the less threatening
perspective of the awesome picture of the glider.
The glider looks like it's suspended above the runway, but in reality it's
screaming toward the photographer at over 200 kilometers an hour in a maneuver
known as a high-speed low
pass. The pilot starts about 2,000 feet (609 meters) high and over a kilometer
from the runway. He then dives to convert altitude into speed and skims the
runway. Next, he does a steep climb to reconvert some of that speed into
altitude so he can turn and land.
Given that the glider has no engine, you might wonder how the pilot can be sure
he'll gain enough altitude in the climb to safely turn and land. The laws of
physics tell us exactly how altitude is traded for speed and vice versa. While
there is a loss due to the air resistance of the glider, that is a known
quantity which the pilot takes it into account by starting from a higher
altitude than needed for the landing phase.
But it's important to read the fine print in that guarantee provided by the
laws of physics. It only applies if the air is stationary. If there's a slight
wind the difference is negligible, but if the air movement is unusually strong
all bets are off - which is what happened to a friend of mine who had safely
executed the maneuver many times before. But this time he hit an unusually
strong, continuous downdraft. The laws of physics still applied, but the model
of stationary air was no longer applicable and he had no way of knowing his
predicament until he approached the runway with much less speed than needed for
a safe landing. He managed to land without damage to himself or his glider, but
was so shaken that he no longer does that maneuver.
While most experienced glider pilots sometimes do low passes (and some race
finishes require them), I've opted not to because I regard them as a 99.9% safe
maneuver - which is not as safe as it sounds. A 99.9% safe maneuver is one you
can execute safely 999 times out of 1,000, but one time in 1,000 it can kill
you.
Even though they are clearly equivalent, one chance in 1,000 of dying sounds a
lot riskier than 99.9% safe. The perspective gets worse when it's recognized
that the fatality rate is one in 1,000 per execution of the maneuver. If a
pilot does a 99.9% safe maneuver 100 times, he stands roughly a 10% chance of
being killed. Worse, the fear that he feels the first few times dissipates as
he gains confidence in his skill. But that confidence is really complacency,
which pilots know is our worst enemy.
A similar situation exists with nuclear weapons. Many people point to the
absence of global war since the dawn of the nuclear era as proof that these
weapons ensure peace. The MX missile was even christened the Peacekeeper. Just
as the laws of physics are used to ensure that a pilot executing a low pass
will gain enough altitude to make a safe landing, a law of nuclear deterrence
is invoked to quiet any concern over possibly killing billions of innocent
people: Since World War III would mean the end of civilization, no one would
dare start it. Each side is deterred from attacking the other by the prospect
of certain destruction. That's why our current strategy is called nuclear
deterrence or mutually assured destruction (MAD).
But again, it's important to read the fine print. It is true that no one in his
right mind would start a nuclear war, but when people are highly stressed they
often behave irrationally and even seemingly rational decisions can lead to
places that no one wants to visit. Neither US president John F Kennedy nor
Russian premier Nikita Khrushchev wanted to teeter on the edge of the nuclear
abyss during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, but that is exactly what they did.
Less well known nuclear near misses occurred during the Berlin crisis of 1961,
the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's
(NATO's) Able Archer exercise of 1983. In each of those episodes, the law of
unintended consequences combined with the danger of irrational decision-making
under stress created an extremely hazardous situation.
Because the last date for a nuclear near miss listed above was 1983, it might
be hoped that the end of the Cold War removed the nuclear sword hanging over
humanity's head. Aside from the fact that other potential crises such as Taiwan
were unaffected, a closer look shows that the Cold War, rather than ending,
merely went into hibernation. In the West, the reawakening of this specter is
usually attributed to resurgent Russian nationalism, but as in most
disagreements the other side sees things very differently.
The Russian perspective sees the United States behaving irresponsibly in
recognizing Kosovo, in putting missiles (albeit defensive ones) in Eastern
Europe, and in expanding NATO right up to the Russian border. For our current
purposes, the last of these concerns is the most relevant because it involves
reading the fine print - in this case, Article 5 of the NATO charter, which
states that an attack on any NATO member shall be regarded as an attack on them
all.
It is partly for that reason that a number of former Soviet republics and
client states have been brought into NATO and that President George W Bush is
pressing for Georgia and the Ukraine to be admitted. Once these nations are in
NATO, the thinking goes, Russia would not dare try to subjugate them again
since that would invite nuclear devastation by the United States, which would
be treaty bound to come to the victim's aid.
But, just as the laws of physics depended on a model that was not always
applicable during a glider's low pass, the law of deterrence which seems to
guarantee peace and stability is model-dependent. In the simplified model, an
attack by Russia would be unprovoked. But what if Russia should feel provoked
into an attack and a different perspective caused the West to see the attack as
unprovoked?
Just such a situation sparked World War I. The assassination of Austria's
Archduke Ferdinand by a Serbian nationalist led Austria to demand that it be
allowed to enter Serbian territory to deal with terrorist organizations. This
demand was not unreasonable since interrogation of the captured assassins had
shown complicity by the Serbian military and it was later determined that the
head of Serbian military intelligence was a leader of the secret Black Hand
terrorist society. Serbia saw things differently and rejected the demand. War
between Austria and Serbia resulted, and alliance obligations similar to NATO's
Article 5 then produced a global conflict.
When this article was first written in May 2008, little noticed coverage of a
dispute between Russia and Georgia reported that "both sides warned they were
coming close to war". As it was being revised, in August, the conflict had
escalated to front page news of a low-intensity, undeclared war. If Bush is
successful in his efforts to bring Georgia into NATO, we would face the
unpleasant choice of reneging on our treaty obligations or threatening actions
which risk the destruction of civilization. A similar risk exists between
Russia and Estonia, which is already a NATO member.
Returning temporarily to soaring, although I will not do low passes, I do not
judge my fellow glider pilots who choose to do them. Rather, I encourage them
to be keenly aware of the risk. The pilot in the photo has over 16,000 flight
hours, has been doing low passes at air shows for over 30 years, will not do
them in turbulent conditions, ensures that he has radio contact with a trusted
spotter on the ground who is watching for traffic, and usually does them
downwind so that he only has to do a "tear drop" turn to land. The fact that
such an experienced pilot exercises that much caution says something about the
risk of the maneuver. The danger isn't so much in doing low passes as in
becoming complacent if we've done them 100 times without incident.
In the same way, I am not arguing against admitting Georgia to NATO or
suggesting that Estonia should be kicked out. Rather, I encourage us to be
keenly aware of the risk. If we do that, there is a much greater chance that we
will find ways to lessen the true sources of the risk, including patching the
rapidly fraying fabric of Russian-American relations. The danger isn't so much
in admitting former Soviet republics into NATO as in becoming complacent with
our ability to militarily deter Russia from taking actions we do not favor.
Substates
Part of society's difficulty in envisioning the threat of nuclear war
can be understood by considering Figure 2.
The circle on the left represents the current state of the world, while the one
on the right represents the world after a full-scale nuclear war. Because World
War III is a state of no return, there is no path back to our current state.
Even though an arrow is shown to indicate the possibility of a transition from
our current state to one of global war, that path seems impossible to most
people.
How could we possibly transit from the current, relatively peaceful state of
the world to World War III? The answer lies in recognizing that what is
depicted as a single, current state of the world is much more complex. Because
that single state encompasses all conditions short of World War III, as
depicted below, it is really composed of a number of substates - world
situations short of World War III, with varying degrees of risk:
Society is partly correct in thinking that a transition from our current state
to full-scale war is impossible because, most of the time, we occupy one of the
substates far removed from World War III and which has little or no chance of
transiting to that state of no return.
But it is possible to move from our current substate to one slightly closer to
the brink, and then to another closer yet. As described below, just such a
sequence of steps led to the Cuban missile crisis and could lead to a modern
day crisis of similar magnitude involving Estonia, Georgia, or other some other
hot spot where we are ignoring the warning signs.
The Cuban missile crisis surprised Kennedy, his advisors and most Americans
because we viewed events from an American perspective and thereby missed
warning signs visible from the Russian perspective. Fortunately, that view has
been recorded by Fyodr Burlatsky, one of Khrushchev's speechwriters and close
advisors, as well as a man who was in the forefront of the Soviet reform
movement. While all perspectives are limited, Burlatsky's deserves our
attention as a valuable window into a world we need to better understand:
In
my view the Berlin crisis [of 1961] was an overture to the Cuban missile crisis
and in a way prompted Khrushchev to deploy Soviet missiles in Cuba ... In his
eyes [America insisting on getting its way on certain issues] was not only an
example of Americans' traditional strongarm policy, but also an underestimation
of Soviet might ... Khrushchev was infuriated by the Americans' ... continuing
to behave as if the Soviet Union was still trailing far behind ... They failed
to realize that the Soviet Union had accumulated huge stocks [of nuclear
weapons] for a devastating retaliatory strike and that the whole concept of
American superiority had largely lost its meaning ... Khrushchev thought that
some powerful demonstration of Soviet might was needed ... Berlin was the first
trial of strength, but it failed to produce the desired result, [showing
America that the Soviet Union was its equal] . [Burlatsky 1991, page 164]
[In 1959 Fidel Castro came to power and the US] was hostile towards the Cuban
revolutionaries' victory from the very start ... At that time Castro was
neither a communist nor a Marxist. It was the Americans themselves who pushed
him in the direction of the Soviet Union. He needed economic and political
support and help with weapons, and he found all three in Moscow. [Burlatsky
1991, page 169]
In April 1961 the Americans supported a raid by Cuban emigrees ... The Bay of
Pigs defeat strained anti-Cuban feelings in America to the limit. Calls were
made in Congress and in the press for a direct invasion of Cuba ... In August
1962 an agreement was signed [with Moscow] on arms deliveries to Cuba. Cuba was
preparing for self-defense in the event of a new invasion. [Burlatsky 1991,
page 170]
The idea of deploying the missiles came from Khrushchev himself ... Khrushchev
and [Soviet defense minister] R Malinovsky ... were strolling along the Black
Sea coast. Malinovsky pointed out to sea and said that on the other shore in
Turkey there was an American nuclear missile base [which had been recently
deployed]. In a matter of six or seven minutes missiles launched from that base
could devastate major centers in the Ukraine and southern Russia ... Khrushchev
asked Malinovsky why the Soviet Union should not have the right to do the same
as America. Why, for example, should it not deploy missiles in Cuba? [Burlatsky
1991, page 171]
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can be understood by considering Figure 2.
