Mali: West Africa's gate to
intervention By Ramzy Baroud
France is insisting on "rapid" military
intervention in Mali. The European country's
unmanned drones have reportedly been scouring the
desert of the troubled West African nation -
although it claims that the drones are seeking the
whereabouts of six French hostages believed to be
held by al-Qaeda.
The French are likely to
get their wish, especially following the
recent
political fiasco engineered by the country's
strong man and coup leader Captain Amadou Haya
Sanogo. The United States also covets
intervention, but one that would serve its own
growing interests in the Sahel region.
African countries are divided on the issue
and have no clear alternative on how to restore
Mali's territorial integrity - and equally
important political sovereignty - disjointed
between Tuareg secessionists and Islamic militants
in the north and a factionalized army in the
south.
The current crisis in Mali is the
recent manifestation of a recurring episode of
terrible suffering and constant struggles. It goes
back much earlier than French officials in
particular wish to recall. True, there is much bad
blood between the various forces that are now
fighting for control, but there is also much
acrimony between Mali and France, the latter
having conquered Mali (then called French Sudan)
in 1898.
After decades of a bitter
struggle, Mali achieved its independence in 1960
under the auspices of a socialist government led
by president Modibo Keita. One of his very early
orders of business was breaking away from French
influence and the franc zone.
Former
colonial powers rarely abandon their ambitions,
even after their former colonies gain hard-earned
freedom. They remain deeply entrenched by meddling
in various ways that destabilize the former
colonies. Then when opportune, they militarily
intervene to uphold the status quo. In 1968, Keita
was ousted from power, and few years later, in
1977, he died in a lonely cell. His death ushered
in mass protests, compelling a few cosmetic
gestures towards a new constitution and
half-hearted democracy.
Turmoil has
defined Mali for many years since then, even after
the country achieved a level of political
stability in 1992. At the time, it was believed
that Mali was fast becoming a model for democracy,
at least in the West Africa region. A few years
later, thousands of refugees from the
ever-neglected and under-represented Tuaregs began
returning to their towns and villages mostly in
the vast desert region in northern Mali.
That return was introduced by a peace
agreement signed between Tuaregs and the central
government. Little on the ground has changed.
Various bands of Islamic groups, some homegrown,
others fleeing fighting in neighboring countries,
especially Algeria, found haven in Mali's north
and west. At times, they fought amongst each
other, at times they served some unclear agendas
of outside parties, and at times they created
temporary alliances amongst themselves.
While France attempted to keep Mali in its
sphere of influence - thus its decision in 2002 to
cancel more than a third of Mali's debt - the
United States was also taking interest in Mali's
crucial position in the Sahel regions and the
prospects created by the ungovernability of the
northern regions.
Of course, the
all-inclusive definition of al-Qaeda served as the
ever-convenient ruse to justify American
involvement. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) has been used by Washington to rationalize
the establishment of the US Africa Command
(AFRICOM). It was set up in 2008 to manage US
military interests in the whole continent with the
exception of Egypt. The US State Department
claimed that AFRICOM "will play a supportive role
as Africans build democratic institutions and
establish good governance across the continent".
The importance of the al-Qaeda narrative
to the US role in the Sahel was highlighted in the
last presidential debate between President Barack
Obama and his Republican opponent, Mitt Romney. To
flex some political muscle perhaps, Romney warned
of "al-Qaeda type individuals" threatening to turn
Mali into a new Afghanistan.
Some Western
experts on the Sahel dispute the analogy, claiming
instead that Mali is descending into a Sudan-like
model. Either way, the people of Mali are
currently suffering the consequences of the
burgeoning conflict, which reflects a convoluted
mix of foreign agendas, extremist ideologies and
real grievances of Malian tribes in the north and
west.
The south of the country is not
exactly an oasis of stability. The ongoing
territorial struggle and political volatility are
threatening the whole country, which has been
battling a cruel famine and pitiless warlords. The
most dominant faction in the Malian army is led by
US-trained Amadou Sanogo, who on March 22 led a
coup against president Amadou Toumani Toure.
Sanogo's reasoning - blaming Toure for failing to
stamp out growing militant influence in the north
- sounded more like a pretense than a genuine
attempt at recovering the disintegrating country.
It remains unclear who Sanogo's backers
are. France and the US are relatively tolerant of
his political transgressions and violent conduct.
Sanogo's coup came shortly before elections,
scheduled for last April. While the African Union
(AU) reacted assertively to the coup by suspending
Mali's membership, Western powers remained
indecisive.
Despite a half-hearted handing
over of power from the coup leaders to a civilian
government of president Dioncounda Traore, Sanogo
remains firmly in charge. In May, the junta struck
again, retaking power, as pro-Sanogo mobs almost
beat president Traore to death inside his
presidential compound.
Sanogo, empowered
by the lack of decisiveness to his conduct,
continued to play some political game or another.
A short-lived "national unity government" under
prime minister Cheick Modibo Diarra was more or
less toppled when Diarra was arrested by Sanogo's
men. He was forced to concede power and install a
little-known government administrator as his
predecessor.
Sanogo's political show
continues, especially as the West African regional
grouping (ECOWAS), along with the African Union
remains focused on what they perceive as a more
urgent priority: ending the territorial
disintegration in the north and west.
The
conflict in the north is in a constant influx.
Alliances change, thus the nature of the conflict
is in perpetual alteration. Large consignments of
weapons that were made available during the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's war in Libya early
last year, made their way to various rebel and
militant groups throughout the region. The Tuaregs
had received support from the ousted Libyan
government and were dispersed during and following
the war. Many of them returned to Mali,
battle-hardened and emboldened by the advanced
weapons.
Fighting in the north began in
stages, most notably in January 2012. Sanogo's
coup created the needed political vacuum for
Tuaregs' National Movement for the Liberation of
Azawad (MNLA) to declare independence in the north
a mere two weeks later. The declaration was the
result of quick military victories by MNLA and its
militant allies, which led to the capture of Gao
and other major towns.
These successive
developments further bolstered Islamic and other
militant groups to seize cities across the country
and hold them hostage to their ideologies and
other agendas. For example, Ansar al-Din had
reportedly worked jointly with the MNLA but
declared a war "against independence" and "for
Islam" in June, as soon as it secured its control
over Timbuktu. Al-Tawhidwa al-Jihad, along with
AQIM, made their moves. The allies soon became
bitter enemies.
Last September, rebels
from various Islamic groupings in control of the
north began advancing onto other strategic areas
in the center and south-west parts of the country.
Their territorial advances are now made against
government-held towns and areas that are still
controlled by Azawad Tuareg rebels.
There
is now a semi-consensus on the need for military
intervention in Mali, although some differences
persist over the nature and scope of that
intervention. Sanogo himself has little interest
in seeing other West African powers jockeying for
influence in Bamako, which could threaten his thus
far unchallenged rule. Moreover, it is unclear how
effective military force can be, as the
territorial fragmentation, many militant groupings
and political discord throughout the country are
almost impossible to navigate.
The
stability of West Africa is surely at stake. The
chances of a political solution are all but
completely dissipated. The growing chaos will
likely benefit interventionist states - France and
the US in particular. A long-drawn new "war on
terror", will justify further intervention in West
Africa and more meddling in the affairs of ECOWAS
countries.
A few years ago, a new
"scramble for Africa" was unleashed due to China's
growing influence in the continent. It was
heightened by a more recent North African turmoil
caused by the "Arab Spring". Opportunities now
abound for those ready to stake more claims over a
long-exploited region.
Ramzy Baroud
(www.ramzybaroud.net) is an internationally
syndicated columnist and the editor of
PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is: My
Father was A Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story
(Pluto Press).
(Copyright 2012 Asia Times
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