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BANKING BUNKUM Part 3c: Still more on the US
experience By Henry C K Liu
Part 1: Monetary theology
Part
2: The European experience
Part
3a: The US experience
Part
3b: More on the US experience
The selection
of the chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, who serves four-year terms, is a political
process closely linked to ideological preference,
subject to Senate confirmation, much like the
appointment of the chief justice of the Supreme Court.
White House and Treasury support for the chairman is of
critical importance for the chairman's exercise of
leadership over Board members, who are known for their
independence.
The late Arthur Burns (Fed
chairman 1970-78) abolished full transcripts of the Fed
Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings after the Freedom
of Information Act was enacted by Congress in 1975. The
transcripts traditionally were kept secret for five
years before public release, but they provided a rich
and reliable source for historians who tried to decipher
the decision-making process in monetary policy. The
interrupted practice was revived after Burns' second
term expired without reappointment by president Jimmy
Carter. Under a policy announced on January 19, 2000,
the FOMC, shortly after each of its meetings, issues a
brief statement that includes its assessment of the
risks in the foreseeable future to the attainment of its
long-run goals of price stability and sustainable
economic growth. Nevertheless, the Fed continues to
enjoy a level of secrecy on its deliberation that is the
envy of the Central Intelligence Agency. Industrialist
Henry Ford was reported to have said: "It is well enough
that the people of the nation do not understand our
banking and monetary system for, if they did, I believe
there would be a revolution before tomorrow morning."
Ford of course was a paternalistic entrepreneur
with latent socialist leanings whose dislike of the
"money trusts" was as passionate as any diehard
communist's, albeit from a different angle. Ford
understood that to sell his mass-produced products, high
wages were necessary, for which he professed a vested
interest in promoting (he doubled the market wage to
US$5 a day, forcing the rest of the auto industry to
follow suit). And he viewed labor unions as having
long-term effects in holding wages down with their
insistence on short-term gains that hampered production
efficiency. Ford partisans believe to this day that
the reason industrial unions are tolerated by management
is that management knows that the long-term effect of
unionism is to moderate the rise of labor costs.
Unionism has been institutionalized in industrial
capitalism in the role of the factory foreman, with the
job of maximizing labor productivity, which means
increasingly lower labor cost per unit of production.
Union chiefs are often invited to sit on corporate
boards of directors, not to influence management but to
deliver management's message to the union rank and file
that wage increases can only come from company profits,
and not from any restructuring of the basic relationship
between labor and capital. What Ford opposed as
fervently as he did industrial unionism was the type of
financial manipulation that created General Motors
through predatory mergers and acquisitions. This view
has come to be known as Fordism, which also influenced
early Soviet industrialization strategy.
Burns,
a conservative Austrian-born economist from Columbia
University, was appointed Fed chairman by president
Richard Nixon in 1969. Between 1953 and 1956, he served
as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under
president Dwight Eisenhower. He was known as the "No 1
inflation fighter". Burns was reportedly not well liked
at the Fed by his colleagues nor by members of his
profession. Many accused him of being intellectually
dishonest.
The Burns era was the most
opportunistically political in Fed history, with Burns'
mistimed economic pump-priming designed merely to ensure
Nixon a second term, by engineering money growth of a
monthly average of 11 percent three months before the
election from a monthly average of 3.2 percent in the
last quarter of 1971. Nixon's second term was
nevertheless aborted by political complications arising
from the Watergate scandal, leaving Gerald Ford in the
White House. The economy was left to pay for the
pre-election boom with runaway inflation that compelled
the Fed to tighten with a vengeance, which produced a
long and painful post-election recession that in turn
contributed to Ford's defeat by Carter. The Fed as an
institution above politics has yet to recover fully from
the rotten smell of 1972. Burns' sordid catering to
Carter in hope of securing a reappointment for a third
term was a contributing factor to the Carter inflation.
And Carter's defeat by Ronald Reagan was in no small
measure caused by his appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed
chairman. Some said it was the most politically
self-destructive move by Carter.
Volcker, having
served four years as president of the New York Federal
Reserve Bank, replaced G William Miller as Federal
Reserve Board chairman on July 23, 1979. Volcker, as
assistant secretary under Treasury secretary John
Connally in the Nixon administration, played a key role
in 1971 in the dismantling of the Bretton Woods
international monetary system formulated by 44 nations
that met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944.
Under that system, as worked out by John Maynard Keynes,
representing Britain, and Harry Dexter White, an
American who later in the McCarthy era was accused
unfairly of having been a communist, each country agreed
to set with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) a
value for its currency and to maintain the exchange rate
of its currency within a specified range. The United
States, as lead country, pegged its currency to gold,
promising to redeem dollars for gold on demand at an
official price of $35 an ounce. All other currencies
were tied to the dollar and its gold-redemption value.
While the value of the dollar was tied strictly to gold
at $35 an ounce, other currencies, tied to the dollar,
were allowed to vary in a narrow band of 1 percent
around their official rates which were expected to
change only gradually, if ever. Foreign-exchange control
between borders was strictly enforced, the mainstream
economics theory at the time being inclined to consider
free international flow of funds neither necessary nor
desirable for facilitating trade.
Nixon was
forced to abandon the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate
system in 1971 because recurring lapses of fiscal
discipline on the part of the United States had made the
dollar's peg to gold unsustainable. By 1971, US gold
stock decline by $10 billion, a 50 percent drop. At the
same time, foreign banks held $80 billion, eight times
the amount of gold remaining in US possession.
Ironically, the problem was not so much US fiscal
spending as the unrealistic peg of the dollar to $35
gold.
The Smithsonian Agreement concluded in
December 1971 between the Group of Ten of the IMF at a
meeting at the Smithsonian Institute in Washington, DC,
restored the major currencies to fixed parities but with
a wider margin, plus or minus 2.25 percent of permitted
fluctuation around their par values. The dollar was
effectively devalued by about 8 percent and the dollar
price of gold increased to $38 per ounce. Sterling was
set at $2.6057. Improved telecommunications and
computerized fund-transfer techniques allowed
speculators to move funds quickly and efficiently around
the world in anticipation of foreign exchange
fluctuation and intervention, making it difficult to
support even this widened band, which was eventually
suspended. Foreign-exchange control was largely
abandoned by most governments by the late 1970s,
bringing forth the rapid growth of a largely unregulated
international exchange market, along with a globalized
capital and credit market. Foreign-exchange fluctuation
increasingly became subject to financial market
pressures not directly related to trade. It has now
become a source of high speculative profit for many
institutions and hedge funds. The huge size of the
market has reduced the effectiveness of central-bank
intervention in maintaining the exchange value of
currencies.
Miller, after only 17 months at the
Fed, had been named Treasury secretary as part of
Carter's desperate wholesale cabinet shakeup in response
to popular discontent and declining presidential
authority. After isolating himself for 10 days of
introspective agonizing at Camp David, Carter emerged in
early summer to make his speech of "crisis of the soul
and confidence" to a restless nation. In response, the
market dropped like a rock in free fall. Miller was a
fallback choice for the Treasury, after numerous other
potential appointees, including David Rockefeller,
declined personal telephone offers by Carter to join a
demoralized administration.
Carter felt that he
needed someone like Volcker, an intelligent if not
intellectual Republican, a term many liberal Democrats
considered an oxymoron, who was highly respected on Wall
Street if not in academe, to be at the Fed to regenerate
needed bipartisan support in his time of presidential
leadership crisis. Bert Lance, Carter's chief of staff,
was reported to have told Carter that by appointing
Volcker, the president was mortgaging his own reelection
to a less than sympathetic Fed chairman.
Volcker
won a Pyrrhic victory against inflation by letting
financial blood run all over the country and most of the
world. It was a toss-up whether the cure was worse than
the disease. What was worse was that the temporary
deregulation that had made limited sense under
conditions of near hyper-inflation was kept permanent
under conditions of restored normal inflation.
Deregulation, particularly of interest-rate ceilings and
credit market restrictions, put an end to market
diversity by killing off small independent firms in the
financial sector since they could not compete with the
larger institutions without the protection of regulated
financial markets. Small operations had to offer
increasingly higher interest rates to attract funds
while their localized lending could not compete with the
big volume, narrow rate spreads of the big institutions.
Big banks could take advantage of their access to
lower-cost funds to assume higher risk and therefore
play in higher-interest-rate loan markets nationally and
internationally, quite the opposite of what Keynes
predicted, that the abundant supply of capital would
lower interest rates to bring about the "euthanasia of
the rentier".
In the longer term, Keynes may
still turn out to be prescient, as the finance sector,
not unlike the transportation sectors such as railroads,
trucking and airlines in earlier waves, or the
communication sector such as telecom companies, has been
plagued by predatory mergers of the big fish eating the
smaller fish, after which the big fish, having grown
accustomed to a unsustainably rich diet that has damaged
their financial livers, begin to die from self-generated
starvation from a collapse of the food chain.
High real interest rates ahead of inflation rate
moved wealth from borrowers to lenders in the economy
and from bottom to top in the wealth pyramid. Moreover,
the impact of high interest rates modifies economic
behavior differently in different income groups and even
on different activities within the same individual. When
the prime rate for some banks exceeded 20 percent in
1980, credit continued to expand explosively in sectors
where price appreciation occurred at a much higher rate,
such as in real estate. High rates only work to slow
credit expansion if the rates are ahead of inflation.
The Fed has traditionally never been prepared to
raise interest rates too abruptly, trying always to
prevent inflation without stalling the economy
excessively, thus resulting in interest rates often
trailing rampant inflation. The market demand for new
loans, or the pace for new lending, obviously would not
be moderated by raising the price of money, as long as
the inflation/interest gap remain profitable. Yet bank
deregulation diluted the Fed's control of the supply of
credit, leaving price as the only lever. Price is not
always an effective lever against runaway demand, as Fed
chairman Alan Greenspan was also to find out in the
1990s. Raising the price of money to fight inflation is
by definition self-neutralizing because high interest
cost is itself inflationary. Deregulation also allows
the price of money to allocate credit, often directing
credit to where the economy needs it least, namely the
speculative arena.
The Fed might have had in its
employ a staff of very sophisticated economists who
understood the complex multi-dimensional forces of the
market, but the tools available to the Fed for dealing
with market instability was by ideology and design
single-dimensional. Interest-rate policy was the only
weapon available to the Fed to tame an aggressively
unruly market that increasingly viewed the Fed as a
paper tiger.
In the early weeks of 1980, the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) was 17 percent, prime rate
was 16 percent and rising, and gold hit as high as $875
an ounce. Having told the House Banking Committee on
February 19 that credit controls do not deal with the
"basic causes of inflation", the Fed chairman Volcker
announced on March 14 a program of emergency credit
controls not only on commercial banks, but also on
money-market mutual funds and retail companies that
issue credit cards. Banks would be limited to 9 percent
credit growth instead of the 17 percent in February.
Only a week earlier, the FOMC, trailing inflation data,
was forced to raised the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) target
to 18 percent.
The economy crash-landed abruptly
in response. The gross domestic product (GDP) shrank 30
percent within three months. Consumer credit, instead of
growing by $2 billion a month, shrank by $2 billion a
month. Money dried up suddenly, leaving many otherwise
healthy projects hanging in midstream. Construction
loans could not roll over into permanent mortgages.
Asset prices fell below their collateralized value,
causing loans to be "underwater" overnight, giving
otherwise conscientious borrowers an incentive to walk
away from their debt obligations. Insolvency became
widespread, with financial dead bodies strewn on the
sidewalks of every city. For the first time in recent
history, a Democrat in the White House pushed the
country into recession, and in an election year.
Senate
Democrat minority floor leader Robert Byrd of West
Virginia expressed concern but was rebuked by senator
William Proxmire, Senate Banking Committee ranking
Democrat from Wisconsin, who gave a technical lecture on
the iron law governing inflation and interest rates, a
TINA (there is no alternative) argument. More
unemployment and bankruptcies, while painful, had to be
accepted as needed medicine.
Then the
Hunt brothers' speculative silver bubble burst,
punctuated by the silver price dropping from $50 an
ounce to $10. The banks had lent the Hunts $800 million
to corner speculatively a silver cartel, 10 percent of
all bank lending in the past two months, at rising
interest rates that inched toward 20 percent. By March
31, the Hunts defaulted on their future contracts
because they were unable to roll over the short-term
loans, partly due to credit control. To prevent systemic
panic, Volcker engineered a private bailout from the 11
banks with a new $1.1 billion loan, similar to the
Fed-engineered Long Term Capital Management (LTCM)
bailout in 1998. The Hunt brothers were wiped out of
their billion-dollar equity and had to file for
bankruptcy, but their banks were saved from the fate of
having to raise more capital to cover non-performing
loans that magically became performing with the wave of
the Fed's unseen hand. The Fed waived credit-control
rules imposed only two weeks earlier. "Moral hazard"
became a loud murmur heard from shaking heads
everywhere. The Fed had in the past refused requests for
bailouts for Chrysler, New York City, Midwestern grain
farmers, Lockheed, Pan Am Airways, etc, in the real
economy, but it seldom refuses to bail out the financial
markets. TINA, together with the "too big to fail
syndrome", was after all a selective doctrine applicable
only to the Fed's political constituents.
Volcker,
as chairman of the Fed, adopted a "new operating method"
for the Fed in 1980 as a therapeutic shock treatment for
Wall Street, which seemed to have been conditioned by
Burns' brazen political opportunism to lose faith in the
Fed's political will to control inflation. The new
operating method, by concentrating on monetary
aggregates, and letting it dictate FFR swings within a
range from 13-19 percent, to be authorized by the FOMC,
was an exercise in "creative uncertainty" to shock the
financial market out of its complacency about
interest-rate stability and gradualism. There had been a
traditional expectation that even if the Fed were to
raise rates, it would not permit the market to be
volatile. The banks could continue to lend as long as
they could profitably manage the gradual rise in rates.
Under the new operating method, the banks were exposed
to risks that interest rates might suddenly and
drastically go against even their short-term credit
positions. Also, banks had been expanding new loans
beyond the growth of deposits, by borrowing shorter term
funds at lower interest rates. This practice was given
the benign name of "managed liability", allowing banks
to profit from interest-rate spreads over the yield
curve, which had seldom if ever been allowed by the Fed
to get inverted, that is with short-term rates rising
higher than longer-term rates. This practice, known as
"carry trade" in bank parlance, when internationalized,
eventually led to the Asian financial crisis of 1997
when interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility became
the new paradigm.
The Fed's new operating method
would greatly increase the banks' risk exposure. On top
of it all, Volcker also set an additional 8 percent
reserve on borrowed funds for lending. The new operating
method worked against the traditional mandate of the
Fed, which, as a central bank, was supposed to be
responsible for maintaining orderly markets, which meant
smooth, gradual changes in interest rates. The new
operating method was a policy to induce the threat of
short-term pain to stabilize long-term inflation
expectations.
Every economist agrees that when
money growth slows, market interest rates go up. The
trouble with the use of the FFR target to control money
supply was that it had to be set by fiat, which exposed
the Fed to political pressure. A case could be made, and
was frequently made, that the Fed's FFR target tended to
be self-fulfilling prophecy rather than a device to
manage future trends. High FFR targets deflate while low
targets inflate, and there is little argument about that
relationship. But there is plenty of argument about the
Fed's projection ability on the economy. History has
shown that the Fed, more often than not, has made wrong
decisions based on faulty projection. The new operating
method would let the monetary aggregates set the FFR
targets scientifically and provide political cover for
the FOMC members if the FFR target needed to go to
double digits. This was monetarism through the back
door, not by intellectual commitment, but by political
cowardice.
The FOMC, as formed by the Banking
Act of 1933, did not include voting rights for the Fed
Board of Governors. This was changed in the Banking Act
of 1935 to include the Board of Governors and amended
again in 1942 to the current voting structure, which
consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors,
the president of the New York Fed and four other
district Fed presidents who serve on a rotating basis.
These legislative changes were an attempt to centralize
the Fed's policy-making while preserving input from
Federal Reserve bank presidents. While Federal Reserve
bank presidents vote on a rotating basis, they all
attend each FOMC meeting and contribute to the debate on
monetary policy. The early FOMC at first met quarterly
to consider its business; today, the FOMC meets eight
times a year, but decisions regarding monetary policy
are not limited to formal meeting dates, as the chairman
can call a teleconference of the FOMC at any time.
This
system for making monetary policy - incorporating
regional viewpoints in the making of national policy -
is one of the hallmarks of Fed structure. From the
beginning of the Fed, opinions differed on the need for,
and the location of, geographic representation on the
Board, and the debate continued with the formation of
the FOMC. In 1964, congressional hearings were held that
considered abolition of the FOMC. The importance and
dominance of national policy over regional
considerations are now generally accepted. The FOMC
would not alter monetary policy to address an economic
concern pertinent to just one district. Regional input
plays an increasingly peripheral role in the formulation
of that policy. By extension, as the Fed began to
support the Treasury's strong-dollar policy as a matter
of national security under Robert Rubin in the 1990s,
dominance of US internationalist policy over district
concerns became institutionalized. The rust belt and the
agricultural exporting states would have to restructure
the local economy to survive.
Prior to
1970 and the arrival of Arthur Burns as the chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board, the FOMC made comments in a
set pattern, known as a "go-around". Burns was not in
sympathy with this formalized process, as he was not a
consensus builder when it came to making monetary
policy, as was his long-serving predecessor, William
McChesney Martin, who listened to everyone's input
before making his decision. To save himself the
unpleasant prospect of having to ignore district views
face to face, Burns decided it would be a more efficient
use of the FOMC's time to have the reports on district
conditions prepared in advance and compiled for the
Committee's edification. Burns' directive formalized and
broadened the information-gathering process, and thus
was born the Red Book, which was the predecessor to the
Beige Book.
Aside from the color of their
covers, the Red and Beige books differed in one
important way: the Red Book was prepared for policy
makers only, and was not intended for public
consumption. The Red Book became public in 1983 after a
request by the longtime representative from the District
of Columbia, Walter Fauntroy, for public release of the
Green Book, which contains the Fed's closely held
national models and economic forecasts. The Board deemed
this unwise and the Red Book was offered in its place.
To mark the change, the color red was dropped in favor
of beige (it was for a time also called the Tan Book).
To detract from the implied importance of the document
in FOMC policy-making, the public release of the Beige
Book was timed for two weeks prior to an FOMC meeting,
so that the media and others would recognize that the
information was not timely and, therefore, did not have
a major influence on policy. So much for policy
transparency in a democratic society.
The Fed
protects itself from criticism of ideological bias in
its decision-making by depriving the public and its
critics of timely information paid for by tax money. The
Fed remains above criticism because its decisions are
always based on more recent information on the economy
than that available to the market, decisions that the
market would understand only if it had the same
information, although the rationale for depriving the
market of the latest information in the age of instant
communication has never been made clear.
The
Federal Advisory Council (FAC) of the Fed is unique in
that it is a big bank lobby that officially advises the
Fed, a government institution owned by the banks. It
meets in secrecy four times a year with Fed officials to
give the banking industry an inside track on influencing
Fed deliberation, if not decisions. The
since-declassified minutes of the FAC show that four
weeks before the Fed announced its new operating method,
the FAC had recommended to the Fed a "review" of its
traditional operating method, before the president was
even alerted of the Fed's deliberation and final
decision to adopt a new operating method. Carter was
totally in the dark about the impending
high-interest-rate policy with which the Fed was going
to hit his administration in an election year.
The Fed
program of Emergency Credit Controls announce on March
14, 1980, affected not only commercial banks, but also
money-market mutual funds and retail companies that
issue credit cards. Banks would be limited to 9 percent
credit growth instead of the 17 percent in February. By
April, the Fed was shocked by data that money was
disappearing from the financial system at an alarmingly
rapid rate. The last two weeks in March saw more than
$17 billion vanish, representing an annualized shrinkage
of 17 percent. Money was evaporating from the banking
system as credit dried up and borrowers paying off their
debts at Carter's urging: to save the nation from
hyper-inflation through personal restraint on
consumption. Another cause was the shift of bank
deposits to three-month T-bills that were paying 15
percent.
Volcker's new operating method
adopted six months earlier now faced a critical test.
According to monetarist theory, the Fed now must pump up
bank reserves to stimulate money growth. But in
practice, Volcker and the FOMC were to apply monetarism,
which by definition must be a long-term proposition, to
short-term turbulence, and in the process undermined
their own earlier efforts to fight hyper-inflation and,
worse, destabilized the economy unnecessarily. When
mortals play god, other mortals die unnecessarily.
On May 6,
1980, with the New York Fed's Open Market Desk furiously
trying to brake the money-supply shrinkage now in raging
progress, pumping more bank reserves by buying
government securities and creating new "high power"
money by increasing bank reserves, interest rates fell
abruptly. The FFR dropped 500 basis points in two weeks,
from 18 to 13 percent, the bottom of the FOMC range, and
was actually trading below the FOMC target.
The Fed
was in danger of losing control of its FFR target and
jeopardizing its credibility. The New York Fed notified
the FOMC that it could continued to follow the new
operating method by injecting more reserves or to
tighten up the supply of bank reserves to get the FFR
back up to 13 percent, but it could not do both, any
more than a train could go in opposite directions
simultaneously. Volcker opted for continuing the new
operating method and staged an emergency telephone
conference of the FOMC to authorize a new low FFR target
of 10.5 percent, down from 13 percent.
Market
conditions were such that the interest rate falling
below 10 percent would mean negative interest adjusted
for inflation, which would start another borrowing
binge. The fundamental fault of monetarism was being
exposed by real life. The claim that stabilizing the
money supply would also stabilize interest rates was
inoperative. In reality, stabilizing one destabilized
the other in a fast-reacting dynamic market.
Desperate,
the Fed, with concurrence from an even more
panic-stricken Carter White House, started to dismantle
Emergency Credit Controls as fast as administratively
possible, so that demand for credit would not be
artificially hampered, in hope of making market interest
rates rise from more borrowing. Still it took until July
1980 before the last of the controls were lifted. In
April, the New York Fed injected additional reserves
into the banking system at an annualized rate of 14
percent, and in May at 48 percent annualized rate in
non-borrowed reserves.
It was obvious Volcker panicked,
spooked by the sudden economic collapse touched off by
his own credit-control program. By the last week of
July, the FFR fell below the discount rate and hit 8.5
percent. For one trading day, it dipped to 7.5 percent
and for a time the Fed lost control. The short-term rate
that monetary policy regulates most directly was
free-floating on its own. With the FFR below the
discount rate, the FFR could fall to zero by banks
responding to market forces. So the pressure to lower
the discount rate was overwhelming. The financial
markets had never seen anything like it. The FFR dropped
from 20 percent in April to 8.5 percent in 10 weeks. In
the autumn of 1979, the Fed had seized the initiative to
push the price of money up 100 percent to fight
inflation. Now, barely seven months later, the Fed
allowed the price of money to fall even more rapidly to
reverse a money-supply shrinkage. The recession abruptly
ended by the Fed's overreaction and Volcker was facing a
worse inflation problem than when he first became
chairman in July 1979. Many businesses went under during
this brief period of illiquidity, but the banks were
dancing in the streets with windfall profits.
The
experience put the Fed back on its old path: focusing on
interest rates and not money-supply numbers and vowing
again to focus only on the long term. Yet for the long
term, money supply was the correct barometer, while for
the short term, interest rate was the appropriate tool.
The Fed did not seem to have learned anything, despite
having made the nation pay a very costly tuition.
In 2000,
when the Humphrey-Hawkins legislation requiring the Fed
to set target ranges for money-supply growth expired,
the Fed announced that it was no longer setting such
targets, because money-supply growth did not provide a
useful benchmark for the conduct of monetary policy.
However, the Fed said, too, that "... the FOMC believes
that the behavior of money and credit will continue to
have value for gauging economic and financial
conditions". Moreover, M2, adjusted for changes in the
price level, remains a component of the Index of Leading
Indicators, which many private-sector market analysts
use to forecast economic recessions and recoveries.
To make
the case that money supply, rather than interest rates,
moves the economy, one would have to assert that the
money supply affects the economy with zero lag. Such a
claim can only be validated from the long-term
perspective. For the long term, six months may appear as
near zero, just as macro-economists may consider the
bankruptcy of a few hundred companies mere creative
destruction, until they find out some of their own
relatives own now worthless shares in some of the
bankrupt companies. Targeting the money supply produces
large sudden swings in interest rates that produce
unintended shifts in the real economy that then feed
back into demand for money. The process has been
described as the Fed acting as a monetarist dog chasing
its own tail.
By September 1980, data on August
money supply revealed that it had grown by 23 percent.
Monetarists, backed by the banks, clamored for
interest-rate hikes dictated by money-supply data.
Having been burned a few months earlier, the Fed was not
again going to abandon its traditional interest-rate
gradualism focus and again let the money-supply tail wag
the interest-rate dog. Nevertheless, the Fed raised the
discount rate from 10 to 11 percent on September 25,
still way behind both monetary aggregate needs and the
inflation rate.
Carter, falling behind in the
polls, attacked the Fed for its high-interest-rate
policy in the final weeks of his reelection campaign in
October. Reagan opportunistically and disingenuously
defended the Fed's unfair scapegoating by Carter. After
the election, the Fed continued its high-interest-rate
policy while Reaganites were preoccupied with transition
matters. By Christmas, prime rate for some banks reached
21.5 percent.
The monetary disorder that elected
Reagan followed him into office. Carter blamed inflation
on prodigal popular demand and promised government
action to halt hyper-inflation. Reagan reversed the
blame for inflation and put it on the government. Yet
Reagan's economic agenda of tax cuts, defense spending
and supply-side economic growth was in conflict with the
Fed's anti-inflation tight-money policy. The monetarists
in the Reagan administration were all longtime
right-wing critics of the Fed, which they condemned as
being infected with a Keynesian virus. Yet the
self-contradicting fiscal policies of the Reagan
administration (balanced budget despite massive tax cuts
and increased defense spending) overshadowed its
fundamental monetary-policy inconsistency. Economic
growth with shrinking money supply is simply not
internally consistent, monetarism or no monetarism.
The Reagan
presidency marked the rehabilitation of classical
economic doctrines that had been in eclipse for half a
century. Economics students since World War II had been
taught classical economics as a historical relic, like
creationism in biology. They viewed its theories as
negative examples of intellectual underdevelopment
attendant with a lower stage of civilization. Three
strands of classical economics theory were evident in
the Reagan program: monetarism, supply-side theory, and
phobia against deficit financing (but not deficit
itself). Yet these three strands are mutually
contradictory if pursued equally with vigor, what
Volcker gently warned about in his esoteric speeches as
a "collision of purposes". Supply-side tax cuts and
investment-led economic growth conflict with monetarist
money-supply deceleration, while massive military
spending with tax cuts means budgetary deficits. Voodoo
economics was in full swing, with the politician who
coined the term during the primary, George Bush, now
serving as the administration's vice president. Reagan,
the shining white knight of small-government
conservatism, left the US economy with the biggest
national debt in history.
Volcker was a man of far superior
intellect to most at the Reagan White House except
Martin Feldstein, chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors, whose incisive warnings against budget
deficits were ignored by the White House. Volcker began
to gain control over the administration on monetary
policy through his rationality and adherence to reality,
which allowed him to dominate events over the White
House's doctrinaire "rational expectation": the theory
that rational market participants always anticipate
government policy and adjust their actions accordingly.
By
March 1981, the FFR, which reached a historic high of 20
percent in January, had been pushed below 16 percent by
the FOMC. The bond market refused to go along. Long-term
rates went up. Henry Kaufman, a highly respected Wall
Street guru, blamed it squarely on Reagan's expansionary
tax cuts. The money-supply component M1 started to
expand rapidly in April. Bond traders feared a Fed
tightening with interest rate hikes, thus depressing the
price of outstanding bonds with lower rates. Traders,
many of whom have been exposed to simplified summaries
of Milton Friedman's monetary theory in the trade press,
began bidding up rates in anticipation. "Rational
expectation" was working against the Reagan economic
plan instead of with it. The Fed pleaded with market
specialists not to jump to extreme conclusions based on
a two-week change in the supply of money, that the Fed
was no longer using the new operating method. But the
bond market, having simplistically embraced Friedman's
monetarist views to the point of conditional reflex,
reacted nervously to M1 data and the Fed reacted
nervously to the bond market. Monetarism was made real
not by theoretical logic but by market herd instinct.
The
daily column "Credit Markets" in the Wall Street Journal
is a gossip page on the private world of bond traders
that lets the reader eavesdrop on a no-nonsense summary
of Fed-watcher analysis. Fed economists also read the
column religiously just as Broadway stars read
opening-night reviews or socialites read society pages.
It is the trade's main source of information on market
sentiment and it legitimizes an arcane abstraction as
reality to the participants. To participate in this
esoteric media dialogue, one must subscribe to certain
basic assumptions, lest the material sound
incomprehensible. The assumptions are that the Fed's
first priority is to maintain interest-rate stability,
orderly markets and "hard money", above economic growth
or full employment or any such socialist claptrap.
When bond
prices fell in April 1981, the Fed discreetly yielded to
the judgment of the bond market, instead of guiding it.
Though economic recovery was nowhere in sight, the Fed
again changed direction in its interest-rate policy and
moved rates upward. The Fed was once more forced to
follow the market instead of leading it, thus merely
reinforcing market trends instead of preventing market
excesses, as it has always done throughout its history
and continues to do today. As the Reagan program moved
through Congress, gathering popular enthusiasm and
legislative momentum, the bond market went into seizure.
The Fed was faced with the option of losing control of
the FFR or cutting more drastically the money supply and
push up interest rates.
A tightening of money supply
alongside a budget deficit is a sure recipe for a
recession. Long-term high-grade corporate and government
bonds were seeing their market rates jump 100 basis
points in one month. New issues had difficulty selling
at any price. The possibility of a "double dip"
recession was bandied about by commentators, as it is
now. The Fed was attacked from all sides, including the
commercial banks, which held substantial bond
portfolios, and White House supply-siders, despite the
fact that everyone knew the trouble originated with the
Reagan economic agenda. The Democrats were attacking the
Fed for raising interest rates, which was at least
conceptually consistent.
The White House accused the Fed of
targeting interest rates again instead of focusing on
controlling monetary aggregates, and Volcker himself was
accused of undermining the president. Reagan publicly
discussed "abolishing" the Fed, notwithstanding his
disingenuous defense of the Fed from attacks by Carter
during the election campaign. Earlier, back in
mid-April, Volcker had publicly committed himself to
gradualism in reining in the money supply and avoiding
shock therapy, to give the economy time to adjust. But
he changed his promise by May, and decided to tighten on
an economy already weakened by high rates imposed six
months earlier, yielding to the White House and the bond
market. Gradualism was permanently discarded. Volcker's
justification was amazing, in fact farcical. He told a
group of Wall Street finance experts in a two-day
invited seminar that since policy mistakes in the past
had been on the side of excessive ease, in the future it
made sense to err on the side of restraint. Feast and
famine was now not only a policy effect but a policy
rationale as well. Compound errors, like compound
interest, were selected as the magical cure for the
nation's sick economy.
Financial markets are not the real
economy. They are shadows of the real economy. The shape
and fidelity of the shadows are affected by the position
and intensity of the light source that comes from market
sentiments on the future performance of the economy. The
institutional character of the Fed over the decades has
since developed more allegiance to the soundness of the
financial market system than to the health of the real
economy, let alone the welfare of all the people.
Granted, conservative economists argue that a sound
financial market system ultimately serves the interest
of all. But the economy is not homogenous throughout. In
reality, some sectors of the economy and segments of the
population, through no fault of their own, may not, and
often do not, survive the down cycles to enjoy the
long-term benefits, and even if they survive are
permanently put in the bottom heap of perpetual
depression. Periodically, the Fed has failed to
distinguish a healthy growth in the financial markets
from a speculative debt bubble.
The Reagan
administration by its second term discovered an escape
valve from Volcker's independent domestic policy of
stable-valued money. In an era of growing international
trade among Western allies, with the mini-globalization
to include the developing countries before the final
collapse of the Soviet Bloc, a booming market for
foreign exchange had been developing since Nixon's
abandonment of the gold standard and the Bretton Woods
regime of fixed exchange rates in 1971. The exchange
value of the dollar thus became a matter of national
security and as such fell within the authority of the
president that required the Fed's patriotic support.
Council of
Economic Advisors chairman Martin Feldstein, a highly
respected conservative economist from Harvard with a
reputation for intellectual honesty, had advocated a
strong dollar in Reagan's first term, arguing that the
loss suffered by US manufacturing was a fair cost for
national financial strength. But such views were not
music to the Reagan White House's ears and the Treasury
under Donald Regan, former head of Merrill Lynch, whose
roster of clients included all major manufacturing
giants. Feldstein, given the brushoff by the White
House, went back to Harvard to continue his quest for
truth in economics after serving two years in the Reagan
White House, where voodoo economics reigned. Feldstein
went on to train many influential economists who later
would hold key positions in government, including
Lawrence Summers, Treasury secretary under president
Bill Clinton and now president of Harvard University,
and Lawrence Lindsey, presidential economic assistant to
George W Bush (just dismissed along with Treasury
secretary Paul O'Neill in a Bush shake-up of his
economic team).
By Reagan's second term, it became
undeniable that the United States' policy of a strong
dollar was doing much damage to the manufacturing sector
of the US economy and threatening the Republicans with
the loss of political support from key industrial
states, not to mention the unions, which the Republican
party was trying to woo with a theme of Cold War
patriotism. Treasury secretary James Baker and his
deputy Richard Darman, with the support of manufacturing
corporate interest, then adopted an interventionist
exchange-rate policy to push the overvalued dollar down.
A truce was called between the Fed and the Treasury,
though each quietly worked toward opposite policy aims,
much like the situation in 2000 on interest rates, with
the Fed raising short-term FFR while the Treasury pushed
down long-term rates by buying back 30-year bonds,
resulting in an inverted rate curve, a classical signal
for recession down the road.
Thus a
deal was struck to allow Volcker to continue his battle
against domestic inflation with high interest rates
while the overvalued dollar would be pushed down by the
Treasury through the Plaza Accord of 1985 with a global
backing-off of high interest rates. Not withstanding the
Louvre Accord of 1987 to halt the continued decline of
the dollar started by the Plaza Accord two years
earlier, the cheap-dollar trend did not reverse until
1997, when the Asian financial crisis brought about a
rise of the dollar by default, through the panic
devaluation of Asian currencies. The paradox is that in
order to have a stable-valued dollar domestically, the
Fed had to permit a destabilizing appreciation of the
foreign-exchange value of the dollar internationally.
For the first time since end of World War II,
foreign-exchange consideration dominated the Fed's
monetary-policy deliberations, as the Fed did under
Benjamin Strong after World War I. The net result was
the dilution of the Fed's power to dictate to the
globalized domestic economy and a blurring of monetary
and fiscal policy distinctions. The high
foreign-exchange value of the dollar had to be
maintained because too many dollar-denominated assets
were held by foreigners. A fall in the dollar would
trigger a selloff as it did after the Plaza Accord of
1985, which contributed to the 1987 crash.
It was not
until Robert Rubin became special economic assistant to
president Clinton that the United States would figure
out its strategy of dollar hegemony through the
promotion of unregulated globalization of financial
markets. Rubin, a consummate international bond trader
at Goldman Sachs who earned $60 million the year he left
to join the White House, figured out how the US was able
to have its cake and eat it too, by controlling domestic
inflation with cheap imports bought with a strong
dollar, and having its trade deficit financed by a
capital account surplus made possible by the same strong
dollar. Thus dollar hegemony was born.
The US
economy grew at an unprecedented rate with the wholesale
and permanent export of US manufacturing jobs from the
rust belt, with the added bonus of reining in the unruly
domestic labor unions. The Japanese and the German
manufacturers, later joined by their counterparts in the
Asian tigers and Mexico, were delirious about the United
States' willingness to open its domestic market for
invasion by foreign products, not realizing until too
late that their national wealth was in fact being
steadily transferred to the US through their exports,
for which they got only dollars that the US could print
at will but that foreigners could not spend in their own
countries. By then, the entire structure of their
economies was enslaved to export, condemning them to
permanent economic servitude to the dollar. The central
banks of these countries competed to keep the exchange
values of their currencies low in relation to the dollar
and to each other so that they can transfer more wealth
to the United States, while the dollars they earned from
export had no choice but to go back to the US to finance
the restructuring of the US economy toward new modes of
finance capitalism and new generations of high-tech
research and development through US defense spending.
Constrained by residual limitation
on rearmament resulting from their defeat in World War
II, both Germany and Japan were unable to absorb
significant high-tech research funds in their own
defense sectors and had to buy weapon systems from the
US. By continuing to provide a defense umbrella over
Japan and Germany after the Cold War, the US preserved
its leadership in science and technology, with financing
coming mostly from the exporting nations' trade
surpluses. The more the export economies earned in their
trade surpluses, the poorer these exporting nations
became. Neo-liberal market fundamentalism is not the
same as 19th-century mercantilism in that trade
surpluses in the form of gold would flow back to the
exporting economy - trade surpluses denominated in
dollars merely expand the US economy globally. The
sucking sound that Ross Perot warned of regarding the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) during his
1992 presidential campaign turned out not to be the
sound of US jobs migrating to Mexico, but the sound of
foreign-held dollars rushing into US equity and debt
markets.
The Plaza Accord of 1985 produced
an agreement among the Group of Five (United States,
Britain, France, Germany, and Japan) calling for
coordinated and concerted effort to lower the value of
the dollar. In September 1985, the G-5 met at the Plaza
Hotel in New York City to ratify an initiative to use
exchange rates and other macro policy adjustments as the
preferred and necessary means to bring about an orderly
decline in the value of the dollar. The agreement,
intended to curb increasing US trade imbalances and
protectionist sentiment and action, supported orderly
appreciation of the main non-dollar currencies against
the dollar.
Two years after the Plaza Accord,
the Louvre Accord of 1987 reached by the G-7 (G-5 plus
Canada and Italy) called for a halt in the dollar's
decline, re-establishment of balanced trade, and
non-inflationary growth by introducing reference ranges
among the G-7 currencies. In February 1987, the G-7 met
at the Louvre in France and announced that the dollar
had reached a level consistent with the underlying
economic conditions, and that they would intervene only
as needed to insure stability. Under the Louvre Accord,
nations would intervene on behalf of their currencies as
needed, unannounced.
These two elaborate arrangements
set up by the major industrial countries to stabilize
their exchange rates had a mixed record. Developments
since then have shown that it would be futile for
governments to waste scarce financial resources
intervening in unregulated foreign exchange markets, as
the Bank of England discovered in 1992. Another reason
exchange-rate instability will continue to increase in
the near term is that the euro-dollar exchange rate will
be of less concern to the European Central Bank (ECB)
than it was to the national central banks of Europe
because the economy of the euro zone as a whole will be
more closed and inward looking than the individual
members' economies. The euro zone's openness rate
(measured by the ratio of trade in goods and services to
GDP) is about 14 percent, compared with 25 percent for
France and Germany individually. Euroland has discovered
the indispensability of domestic development and the
disadvantage of excessive reliance on exports.
International commitment to the
Louvre Accord eventually waned. Germany raised interest
rates in 1990 to combat inflation after reunification,
while the United States eased monetary policy to
counteract a decline in economic activity after the 1987
crash. Although the interest-rate differentials between
the US and Europe caused several European currencies to
appreciate, the G-7 did not react. Nor did it try to
halt depreciation of the yen in 1990. By 1993, the
Louvre Accord was virtually dead, as domestic policy
objectives took priority over internationally agreed
targets. Political shocks (such as German reunification
and the invasion of Kuwait) and economic facts (such as
the persistence of Japan's current account surplus in
spite of a strong yen) also weakened commitment to the
accord. The G-7's approach changed from "high-frequency"
to "low-frequency" activism, with ad hoc interventions
only in cases of extreme misalignment, and the focus
shifted from exchange rate levels to exchange rate
volatility.
Reagan replaced Volcker with Alan
Greenspan as Fed chairman in the summer of 1987, over
the objection of supply-side partisans, most vocally
represented by Wall Street Journal assistant editor Jude
Wanniski, a close associate of former football star and
presidential potential Jack Kemp of New York. Wanniski
derived many of his economics ideas from Robert Mundell,
who was to be the recipient of the Nobel Prize for
economics in 1999 on his theory on exchange rates.
Wanniski accused Greenspan of having caused the 1987
crash, with Greenspan, in his new role as Fed chairman,
telling Fortune magazine in the summer of 1987 that the
dollar was overvalued. Wanniski also maintained that
there was no liquidity problem in the banking system in
the 1987 crash, and "all the liquidity Greenspan
provided after the crash simply piled up on the bank
ledgers and sat there for a few days until the Fed
called it back". Wanniski blamed the 1986 Tax Act, which
while sharply lowering marginal tax rates nevertheless
raised the capital gains tax to 28 percent from 20
percent and left capital gains without the protection
against inflated gains that indexing would have
provided. This caused investors to sell equities to
avoid negative net after-tax returns, according to
Winniski.
On Monday, October 19, 1987, the
value of stocks plummeted on markets around the world,
with the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA, the main
index measuring market activity in the United States)
falling 508.32 points to close at 1738.42, a 22.6
percent fall, the largest one-day decline since 1914.
The magnitude of the 1987 stock-market crash was much
more severe than the 1929 crash of 12.8 percent. The
loss to investors amounted to $500 billion. Over the
four-day period leading up to the October 19 crash the
market fell by over 30 percent. By peak value in January
2000, this would translate into the equivalent of an
almost 4,000-point drop in the Dow. However, while the
1929 crash is commonly believed to have led to the Great
Depression, the 1987 crash only caused pain to the real
economy but not its collapse. It is widely accepted that
Greenspan's timely and massive injection of liquidity
into the banking system saved the day. The events
launched the super-central banker cult of Greenspan,
notwithstanding Winniski's criticism.
The 1987
market crested on August 25 with the DJIA at 2,747. It
is hard to relate to the fact that the same DJIA peaked
in January 2000 near 12,000 without thinking of bubble
inflation. The United States' 1987 GDP was $4.7 trillion
and 2000 GDP was $9.8 trillion. The GDP doubled in this
period while the DJIA quadrupled. After reaching the top
in 1987, the market fell off to 2,500, rallied back to
2,640 then fell back to a slightly lower level around
2,465. Another longer rally started that took the Dow to
around 2,660. Technical analysis shows that in 55-day
declines, the market's rallies tend to end around the
40th day. It was almost as if investors gave up hoping
things would turn back to the upside and decided to take
some money off the table. Some 50 percent or more of the
total market decline was in the last three or four days.
In 1987, the market fell from 2,747 to 1,600, a total of
1,147 points. The last three days ranged from 2,400 to
1,600, a total of 800 points or 69.7 percent of the
total range of 1,147 points. Yet the 1988 GDP grew to
$5.1 trillion, up $360 billion over 1987, while it took
until 1941 and a war economy for the GDP to recover to
the level before the 1929 crash.
Panic-driven trading on the New
York Stock Exchange on October 19, 1987, reached 604.3
million shares, nearly double the prior record volume of
338.5 million shares set the previous Friday, when the
Dow lunged a then-record 108.35 points. Nowadays, a
routine daily volume would be 1.6 billion shares and the
system is supposed to handle 3 billion shares with ease.
But the ability to handle increased volume itself
created a demand for high-volume trading. It is not
unlike the opening of new lanes of traffic in a crowded
expressway: the new lanes themselves attract more
traffic until overload occurs again.
The DJIA
was down 36.7 percent on October 19, 1987, from its
closing high less than two months earlier. The selling
started right from the opening on the day of the crash.
Some 11 of the 30 stocks in the DJIA did not open for
the first hour because of order imbalances - there were
so many sell orders they could not be matched to buy
orders. With many stocks on the NYSE not trading,
traders turned to the futures markets to cover their
positions. An eerie quiet settled over the normally
teeming stock-index futures pit at the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange early on October 19 as traders
watched the beginning of the worst washout in
stock-market history. The Wall Street Journal reported
the following day, October 20, 1987: "With trading
delayed in many major New York Stock Exchange issues
because of order imbalances, Chicago's controversial
'shadow markets' - the highly leveraged, liquid futures
on the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index - were, for
just a few minutes, the leading indicator for the
world's equity markets. And the stock-index markets were
leading the way down - fast. In a nightmarish
fulfillment of some traders' and academicians' worst
fears, the five-year-old index futures for the first
time plunged into a panicky unlimited free fall,
fostering a sense of crisis throughout the US capital
markets."
The Fed supplied liquidity through
the open-market purchase of US government securities,
adding $2.2 billion in non-borrowed reserves between the
reserve periods ended on November 4, 1987. In addition,
the Federal Reserve provided help to commercial banks by
making the discount window available when they
encountered heavy reserve needs. Chairman Greenspan also
reassured the public that the Federal Reserve would
serve as a source of liquidity to support the economic
and financial system. Interest rates on short- and
long-term instruments fell in order to provide
liquidity. For example, the rate on three-month Treasury
bills dropped from 6.74 percent on October 13 to 5.27
percent on October 30, while the FFR declined by 179
basis points over this interval, and the rate on 30-year
Treasury bonds fell from 9.92 percent to 9.03. Further,
banks' increasing lending to securities firms during
October 19-23 enabled firms to finance the inventories
of securities accumulated by their customers' sell
orders. Partially because of the Federal Reserve's and
banks' assistance, the stock price recovery period was
much shorter than after the 1929 crash.
Initial
blame for the 1987 crash centered on the interplay
between stock markets and index options and futures
markets. In the former, people buy actual shares of
stock; in the latter they are only purchasing rights to
buy or sell stocks at particular prices. Thus options
and futures are known as derivatives, because their
value derives from changes in stock prices even though
no actual shares are owned. The Brady Commission,
officially named the Presidential Task Force on Market
Mechanisms, concluded that the failure of stock markets
and derivatives markets to operate in sync was the major
factor behind the crash. In part, investors' concern
about the US federal budget and international trade
deficits were found to be responsible. Comments made by
the US Treasury secretary, who criticized foreign
economic policies and hinted that the Reagan
administration would let the US dollar's value decline
further, also contributed. The key factor was program
trading, a recent development on Wall Street in which
computers were programmed to order the buying or selling
automatically of a large volume of shares when certain
circumstances occurred. The commission also criticized
"specialists" on the floor of the New York Stock
Exchange who neglected their duty by not becoming buyers
of last resort and by treating small investors
"capriciously". The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) joined in, faulting computerized trading and
exchange specialists as well as citing a negative turn
in investor psychology. Both the Brady Commission and
the SEC called for greater regulation to prevent a
similar occurrence in the future.
On
February 4, 1988, the New York Stock Exchange
established safeguards forbidding the use of its
electronic order system for program trading whenever the
DJIA increases or drops 50 points in a single day. The
NYSE implemented on Tuesday, February 16, 1999, new
trigger levels at which restrictions on index arbitrage
trading, or trading "collars", would track the movement
of the DJIA. The revisions to NYSE Rule 80A were
approved by the SEC. The NYSE implemented new
circuit-breaker and trading-collar trigger levels that
changed with the level of the DJIA. Circuit-breaker
points represent the thresholds at which trading is
halted marketwide for single-day declines in the DJIA.
The 10, 20 and 30 percent decline levels, respectively,
in the DJIA at its peak around the first quarter of 2000
were as follows: A 1,050-point drop in the DJIA before
2pm would halt trading for one hour; would halt trading
for 30 minutes if between 2pm and 2:30pm; and would have
no effect if at 2:30pm or later. A 2,100-point drop in
the DJIA before 1pm would halt trading for two hours;
for one hour if between 1 and 2pm; and for the remainder
of the day if at 2pm or later. A 3,150-point drop would
halt trading for the remainder of the day regardless of
when the decline occurred. Trading collars, which
restrict index-arbitrage trading, would be triggered
when the DJIA moved 180 points or more above or below
its closing value on the previous trading day and
removed when the DJIA was above or below the prior day's
close by 90 points.
Trading collars were first
implemented in July 1990 in response to concerns that
index arbitrage may have aggravated large market swings.
When implemented, the collars represented an approximate
2 percent move in the DJIA. The amendment took into
account the dramatic advances in the DJIA over the
previous few years. Widely credited with helping reduce
market volatility, trading collars were triggered 23
times on 22 days in 1990; 16 times in 1992; nine times
in 1993; 30 times in 28 days in 1994; 29 times in 28
days in 1995; 119 times in 101 days in 1996; 303 times
in 219 days in 1997; and 366 times in 227 days in 1998.
The
stock market recovered from the 1987 crash and began
another upward climb, with the DJIA topping 3,000 in the
early 1990s. While technical problems within markets may
have played a role in the magnitude of the market crash,
they could not have caused it. That would require some
action outside the market that caused traders
dramatically to lower their estimates of stock-market
values. The main culprit had been legislation that
passed the House Ways and Means Committee on October 15,
1987, eliminating the deductibility of interest on debt
used for corporate takeovers.
Two SEC
economists, Mark Mitchell and Jeffry Netter, published a
study in 1989 concluding that the anti-takeover
legislation did trigger the crash. They note that as the
legislation began to move through Congress, the market
reacted almost instantaneously to news of its progress.
Between Tuesday, October 13, 1987, when the legislation
was first introduced, and Friday, October 16, when the
market closed for the weekend, stock prices fell more
than 10 percent - the largest three-day drop in almost
50 years. In addition, those stocks that led the market
downward were precisely those most affected by the
legislation. Many pending merger and acquisition
(M&A) deals were abruptly aborted. The entire
industry that grew to support M&A activities -
investment banks, lenders, law firms, arbitrageurs,
corporate raiders and greenmailers - was faced with
imminent idleness.
Another important trigger for the
market crash was the announcement of a large US trade
deficit (3.4 percent of GDP) on October 14, 1987, which
led Treasury secretary James Baker to suggest the need
for a fall in the dollar on foreign-exchange markets.
Fears of a lower dollar led foreigners to pull out of
dollar-denominated assets, causing a sharp rise in
interest rates. The front page of the New York Times
Business Day section (June 10, 2000) ran an article
headlined "Economy may have a soft spot - swelling trade
gap worries some experts and policy makers". The US
current account deficit reached $338.9 billion in 1999,
up 53.6 percent from 1998. It amounted to 3.7 percent of
GDP in 1999 and 4.2 percent of Q4. The DJIA peaked in
January 2000 at close to 12,000, and has since lost more
than 40 percent of its peak value.
What the
1987 crash ultimately accomplished was to teach
politicians that markets heed their words and actions,
reacting immediately when threatened. Thus the crash
initiated a new era of market discipline not so much on
bad economic policy, but on policy honesty.
Greenspan
issued a statement at 8:41am on Tuesday, October 20,
1987, before the markets opened: "The Federal Reserve,
consistent with its responsibilities as the nation's
central bank, affirmed today its readiness to serve as a
source of liquidity to support the economic and
financial system." This statement was widely credited as
limited the systemic damage of the 1987 crash by
restoring market confidence.
The forces
behind the 1987 crash actually began two years earlier.
In January 1985, the value of the dollar peaked and
began to weaken. But its decline was nominal and nine
months later there was no discernible improvement in the
trade deficit. In fact, by September 1985, the US trade
deficit had worsened substantially, just as the J-curve
theory predicts. The J-curve is the illustration of the
performance of a country's balance of payments after its
currency has been devalued. The immediate effect of a
devaluation is to raise the cost of imports and reduce
the value of exports, so that the current account
deteriorates. Gradually, however, the volume of exports
increases because their price is down and the volume of
imports declines because they have become more
expensive. This should rectify the current account
balance, turning deficit to surplus. Like much in
economics, this is a persuasive theory that appears to
straddle the line between natural law and wishful
thinking. The adjustment period, which was expected to
be six to 12 months (nine-month average), should have
been over. But in 1985, the dollar fell for nine months
with no discernible improvement in the trade deficit.
The
Brady Commission concluded that the failure of stock
markets and derivatives markets to operate in sync was
the major factor behind the crash. The crash is now part
of a pantheon of financial market "problems" that
included Barings, Daiwa, Metallgesellschaft, Orange
County, Sumitomo, LTCM, Quantum Funds, Tiger Funds,
Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom, etc. It was also a
forerunner of the 1997 financial crises that started in
Thailand.
The investing public has been
assured that the lessons of the 1987 crash have been
learned and that changes have been installed to prevent
a recurrence. Among the key changes in the US financial
market after the 1987 crash are "circuit breakers"
restricting program trading. Some believe that the halts
they cause will provide time for brokers and dealers to
contact their clients when there are large price
movements and to get new instructions or additional
margin. Others argue that trading halts can increase
risk by inducing trading in anticipation of a trading
halt.
Circuit breakers were triggered for
the first and only time on October 27, 1997, when the
second wave of the Asian financial crisis that had begun
on July 2 in Thailand hit New York markets, and the DJIA
fell 350 points at 2:35pm and 550 points at 3:30. That
reflected an approximate 7 percent overall decline and
shut the market for the remainder of the day.
The
circuit breakers were installed primarily to prevent
extreme changes in the stock market. Their usefulness is
often in doubt because in order to prevent extreme
shifts in the market the causes of values change must be
revealed. There are several suggestions as to what can
cause these changes. A primary cause is fundamental
changes in the economy, including the availability of
money or changes in interest rates. Here restrictions on
trading are detrimental because they can decrease the
effectiveness of the pricing in the stock market. The
advocates of circuit breakers insist that periods of
suspension of the market will allow time for the
investors to consider what their next move will be and
how to overcome this large price move. Yet it is
unlikely that investors will sit and contemplate the
reasoning behind the drop in points. Most are apt to
become nervous and anxious as they consider what the
market will do when it resumes, at which time they will
be poised to sell.
Circuit breakers are widely cited
today as one of the successes of the crash post-mortems.
Yet circuit breakers have only been triggered once, in
contrast to some of the so-called "speed bumps" that
affect particular trading strategies and are now tripped
routinely. (In contrast to circuit breakers, which are
coordinated across the equity and derivative markets,
speed bumps are trading restrictions that have been put
in place by individual marketplaces.) If circuit
breakers have been used to halt trading only once, it
follows that we have never had sufficient experience of
trying to restart trading either. The scariest times
during the market crash were those in which trading was
not occurring. The tendency to worry more about stopping
trading than restarting it is mystifying. Recent
reassessments of circuit breakers have focused on
increasing the magnitude of price declines necessary to
trigger coordinated trading halts. It is not clear that
circuit breakers continue to be the best public-policy
response to market volatility.
Many
features of financial markets have changed over the past
decade and are still changing rapidly, not least of
which is the continuing growth in international
activity. Circuit breakers are much more difficult to
impose when trading activity can move to markets that do
not participate in the trading halt. The main concerns
is the restarting of trading following a halt. If
liquidity has moved to over-the-counter markets or
foreign venues, that liquidity may not return to the
domestic, exchange-traded market when the trading halt
ends. Domestic specialists and market makers may have
problem in restarting if the market has moved away from
them during the halt. Recent changes to shorten the
duration of the circuit breakers may ameliorate these
concerns somewhat, but these changes also reduces the
effectiveness of the circuit breakers in achieving their
intended goals.
After the crash of 1987, federal
regulators were pressured to prevent any sort of crash
again from market manipulation. But no one knows the
best way to prevent a crash from occurring. In order to
design "preventive measures" that would "protect" the
market from dangerous speculative declines, the
regulators imposed the circuit breakers that would act
as weak restraints and would probably do no harm.
Circuit breakers have little to do with the stock market
but demonstrate more about the use of regulation.
Because of the very weak restraints provided by these
circuit breakers, it does seem that their purpose is to
cover the backs of the stock-market regulators. Despite
the empirical evidence on the futility of throwing sand
in the gears of the market, mechanisms like circuit
breakers are attractive to policy makers because they
offer a relatively low-cost way for regulators to say to
the public that they are doing something to try and
prevent another crash. If they did nothing to try to
prevent another crash, the public would not question the
necessity. If nothing was done after the crash, the
public would distrust the market and its high
volatility. Because of this distrust, investors would be
reluctant to put their money in the market and might
instead deposit it in banks and the market would
decline.
Uniform margin requirements are
another change introduced after the 1987 crash. They aim
to reduce volatility for stocks, index futures, and
stock options. An April 1997 study by Paul H Kupiec,
senior economist, Trading Risk Analysis Section,
Division of Research and Statistics, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, assesses the state of the
policy debate that surrounds the federal regulation of
margin requirements. It found no undisputed evidence
that supports the hypothesis that margin requirements
can be used to control stock return volatility and
correspondingly little evidence that suggests that
margin-related leverage is an important underlying
source of "excess" volatility. The evidence does not
support the hypothesis that there is a stable inverse
relationship between the level of Regulation T margin
requirements and stock returns volatility, nor does it
support the hypothesis that the leverage advantage in
equity derivative products is a source of additional
returns volatility in the stock market. So the question
of margins appears to be a red herring.
After the
crash, some stock exchanges upgraded their computer
systems to improve data-management effectiveness and
increase speed, accuracy, efficiency, and productivity.
Many stock-market analysts believe that the crash was
set off by a number of events that include the poor
choices of portfolio insurance professionals and program
trading, which made portfolio insurance operational. A
portfolio is a collection of stocks. Portfolio
insurance, a form of investment, is the guarding of
other stock investments against losses. This is regarded
as a highly risky way of investing in the stock market
because these portfolio insurance professionals rely on
their intuition instead of reliable information. These
risky investors sell their stocks at a high price when
they think the market is declining and their stocks are
losing value. But when they feel that the market will
increase again, they buy back their stocks at a lower
value and use the profit made by the purchase to make up
for the monetary losses within the portfolio. This type
of massive selling caused the value of the stocks used
to decrease below their true value and because of the
low value the process would be repeated.
In the
summer of 1987 the yield of a 30-year US bond increased
to almost 10 percent. Because of this, investors began
to shift from investing in stocks to putting their money
into bonds, which yielded more money. Program trading
was itself also a cause of the crash of 1987. This is
when the prices of a stock fall below a preset price,
and a programmed computer automatically sells that
stock. Within one second, a computer would finalize 60
transactions in 1987. Now it can handle 2,000. These
computers were handling trillions of dollars of
transactions per second. The market was being controlled
more by computers and set prices than by investors who
made considered deals. The rises and falls of the stock
market echoed the sounds of the computers programmed
buying and selling stocks, rather than a dependence on
sound judgments made by investors.
The
changes brought by the 1987 crash to clearing systems
have received far less attention than those to trading
systems, but their long-term consequences likely are
more profound. Such critical parts of the "plumbing" as
the agreements between the futures clearing houses and
the settlement banks have been clarified and put on
sounder footing. In addition, many clearing
organizations have established backup liquidity
facilities that will enable them to make payments to
clearing members in a timely fashion even if a clearing
member has defaulted.
There is now supposedly a better
understanding of the way these systems work, but the
understanding tended to be through the rearview mirror.
During ordinary trading days, market participants rarely
if ever question counterparties' ability and willingness
to perform on obligations. In the months following the
crash, policy makers and market participants began to
examine those payment conventions more closely. The bulk
of the changes to risk management systems that flowed
from the 1987 crash related to efforts to clarify or
make more rigorous the responsibilities and obligations
of market participants that previously had been left
ambiguous or were part of the lore of "normal" market
practice.
The options clearing house has
strengthened its liquidity reserve and taken other steps
to avoid a collapse. Just as significantly, so has the
Clearing House Inter-Payments System (CHIPS), the
large-dollar clearing and settlement system for the
largest US banks and many of their foreign counterparts.
CHIPS in 1998 could withstand the simultaneous failure
of the two largest banks on the system, a level of
safety far greater than that of a decade ago. But banks
are merging faster than the divorce rate in Hollywood.
It is unknown what a failure of a giant like JP
Morgan/Chase or Citibank would mean to the banking
system.
Another intangible legacy of the
crash is the acceptance of the need for cooperation and
coordination among commodity, securities, and banking
market authorities. The 1987 crash vividly illustrated
the extent to which markets are intertwined and the
extent to which large financial firms have lines of
business that cut across many markets. The forums for
coordination are numerous, the most high-power being the
President's Working Group on Financial Markets, which
the market has dubbed the Plunge Prevent Team. The
Working Group comprises the heads of the Treasury, SEC,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and Federal
Reserve and, in addition, other banking supervisory
agencies, the National Economic Council, and the Council
of Economic Advisors participate. Yet every new crisis
resulted in yet another Presidential Working Group, such
as after the LTCM episode. None has ben able to prevent
new unanticipated crises.
An important change in the
financial landscape in the years since the crash has
been a greater focus on risk management by both market
participants and supervisors. Developments of new
instruments, both on and off exchanges, and of new
methods for evaluating risk, have given market
participants powerful new tools to allow them to absorb
market shocks. Similarly, risk management tools have
been enhanced at clearing organizations. Yet these new
tools do not enhance systemic safety, they merely raise
the level of "acceptable" risk for individual
participants and transfer them to increase systemic
risk. The phenomenal growth of day trading since 1978
also thrived on volatility and systemic stress.
Regulators
have been slow to respond to these new tools. Seduced by
their benefits, regulators merely approach regulation
and supervision in traditional, permissive ways.
Greenspan's official approach has been timid on that
front. In essence he thinks the benefits outweigh the
risks, and that regulation will threaten US financial
hegemony. Like Winston Churchill, whose narrow vision
failed to transform the British Empire into a lasting
sphere of influence for Britain after World War II,
Greenspan is also not about to give the empire away
voluntarily. Whereas Churchill plunged the British
Empire into a sea of revolutionary wars of independence,
Greenspan, by insisting on structural advantages for US
interests in US-led finance globalization, is plunging
the world into a battlefield of economic nationalism and
protectionism.
The approach by banking supervisors
to developing a universal capital requirement for market
risk has been less than adequate. The one-size-fits-all
approach has been too lenient for big banks in the
advanced economies and too strict for those in
developing economies. After initial fits and starts, the
Basel Supervisor's Committee halfheartedly embraced the
concept of using banks' internal models as a basis for a
capital requirement for market risk. Internal models are
meaningless when the bulk of the risk facing banks lies
in counterparty credit risk. The Federal Reserve has
favored an incentive-compatible approach to regulation.
Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) obviously find such
an approach beneficial, particularly in this era in
which SROs are being asked to assume more and more
regulatory responsibilities. Incentive-compatible
regulation in essence tries to harness the self-interest
of market participants to achieve broader public-policy
goals, but often only modify those goals to fit private
special group self-interest. This approach smells of
policy abdication.
By January 1989, 15 months after
the crash, the market had fully recovered, but not the
US economy, which remained in recession for several more
years. When a recession finally hit in full force, three
years after the crash, it was blamed on excessive
financial borrowing, not the stock market,
notwithstanding the fact that excessive financial
borrowing itself was made possible by the stock market.
The Tuesday after the crash on Black Monday, Alan
Greenspan issued a one-sentence assurance that the
Federal Reserve would provide the system with necessary
credit. John D Rockefeller had made a somewhat similar
declaration in 1929 - but failed to buoy the market.
Rockefeller was rich, but his funds were finite.
Greenspan succeeded because he controlled unlimited
funds with the full faith and credit of the nation. The
1987 crash marked the hour of his arrival as central
banker par excellence, the beginning of his status as a
near-deity on Wall Street. All the world now hums the
mantra: In Alan We Trust (an
update of the slogan "In God We Trust" printed on every
Federal Reserve note, known as the dollar bill). It was
the main reason for his third-term reappointment by
president Clinton. He is the man who will show up with
more liquor when the partying hits a low point.
At a
macroeconomic level, public policies are supposed to
ensure that markets and the economy itself can withstand
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