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Power and the new world
order
By Henry C K Liu
Thomas
L Friedman, three-time Pulitzer-winning columnist for
the New York Times, is the ordained voice of US
neo-liberalism. In his February 17 column, Friedman
reported that China was described privately by an aide
of US President George W Bush as "not having a dog in
this fight" at the UN Security Council debate over Iraq.
Friedman offered a tutorial to China on the new
international order of World War III, which he saw as
having been set off by the events of September 11, 2001.
Friedman wrote: "The new world system is also
bipolar, but instead of being divided between East and
West (as in the Cold War) it is divided between the
World of Order and the World of Disorder. The World of
Order is built on four pillars: the United States,
European Union-Russia, India and China, along with all
the smaller powers around them. The World of Disorder
comprises failed states (such as Liberia), rogue states
(Iraq and North Korea), messy states - states that are
too big to fail but too messy to work (Pakistan,
Colombia, Indonesia, many Arab and African states) - and
finally the terrorist and mafia networks that feed off
the World of Disorder."
Friedman asserts that the
World of Disorder has been made more dangerous today by
globalization, a trend that he has enthusiastically
promoted for a decade since the end of the Cold War. "In
a networked universe, with widely diffused technologies,
open borders and a highly integrated global financial
and Internet system, very small groups of people can
amass huge amounts of power to disrupt the World of
Order. Individuals can become super-empowered. In many
ways, September 11 marked the first full-scale battle
between a superpower and a small band of super-empowered
angry men from the World of Disorder." Yet Friedman
leaves his Aristotelian syllogism incomplete, failing to
explain how regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq and
war against defenseless nation-states fit into "a battle
between a superpower and super-empowered individuals".
Friedman asserts that "the job of the four
pillars of the World of Order is to work together to
help stabilize and lift up the World of Disorder". He
observes that some Chinese intellectuals, not to mention
French and Russian, "wrongly believe" that they "all
have more to fear from US power than from Osama, Kim or
Saddam". He warns, "If America has to manage the World
of Disorder alone, the American people will quickly
tire." And he quotes Michael Mandelbaum, the Johns
Hopkins foreign-policy expert: "'The real threat to
world stability is not too much American power. It is
too little American power.' Too little American power
will only lead to the World of Disorder expanding."
Friedman cannot be referring to military or
financial power, of which the United States has ample
supply. He would be right if he were referring to moral
power. The US military is by far the most powerful in
the world, with more advanced technology and greater
force-projection capability than all other nations
combined. And dollar hegemony dominates the global
economy. The last Gulf War was largely paid for by Saudi
Arabia and other oil-producing Arabic states, with
substantial benefit for the defense sector of the US
economy.
The real threat to world stability is
too much military and financial power coupled with too
little moral power on the part of any nation, and such a
combination is particularly dangerous on the part of a
sole superpower. Increasingly, US values, expressed in
high-minded terms such as "democracy" and "freedom", are
sounding more like empty slogans of tiresome propaganda.
"Freedom" rings hollow to people around the world who
find themselves unable to pay for privatized water, the
basic necessity of life that used to flow clean and
free, or to those forced to buy imported packaged food
they used to grow free on their own land for themselves.
"Democracy" cannot buy medicine for children exposed to
new contagious diseases brought in by visitors arriving
on jetliners, nor can it keep drug prices from wholesale
gouging in the name of intellectual property rights.
These are the real freedoms that have been taken away
from much of the world by US-imposed globalization.
The so-called World of Disorder has been
constructed in large measure by half a century of US
foreign and economic policies. Much of this World of
Disorder lay in the US sphere of influence all through
the Cold War. The memory of US support for Osama bin
Laden against the Soviets in Afghanistan and for Saddam
Hussein's war against Iran is still fresh in the minds
of the people of the world. And US policies of sanctions
and embargoes have caused millions of deaths and
starvation. Now the world is asked to join a new US
crusade against this year's list of latest evils in the
name of order and stability.
A stable world
order cannot be constructed out of fear of precision
bombs or tactical nuclear weapons, or with economic
sanctions. It can only be constructed out of equality,
equity and non-exploitative development - elements in
short supply in globalization. The world is not just a
marketplace; it is an organism in which disease and
poverty in any of its parts adversely affect the health
of the whole organism. It I hard to visualize how
another war can put things right.
The Bush
administration's policy toward China had been
aggressively antagonistic prior to September 11, fanning
public paranoia against the world's most populous nation
in the early phases of legitimate self-renewal as a
potential competitor against US global hegemony.
Friedman now beseeches China to help keep alive "the
open society in America" and to help save globalization,
"because we Americans will tighten our borders,
triple-check every ship that comes into port and
restrict civil liberties as never before, and this will
slow the whole global economy". He argues: "One more
September 11 and your [China's] growth strategy will be
in real trouble [unless you plan on only exporting duct
tape], which means that the Chinese leadership will be
in real trouble." He maintains that China cannot be a
"free rider on an Iraq war" or "leave America to carry
the burden of North Korea". Yet up until September 11,
the United States actively supported separatist
terrorism against China. The nuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula is mostly a result of US policy.
Friedman allows that it is quite legitimate for
China to oppose the US waging war on Iraq or North
Korea. But he asks in exasperation: "Why isn't China's
foreign minister going to Baghdad and Pyongyang,
slamming his fist on tables and demanding that their
leaders start complying with the United Nations to avoid
war?"
Notwithstanding that most households in
the United States are now looking to return the
oversupply of duct tape they bought a few days ago, it
would really be a page out of a Wag the Dog
screenplay for the Chinese foreign minister to suggest,
let alone demand, that Iraq or North Korea, both
longtime targets of US sanction and other warlike
hostile actions, is morally obligated to save the US
from unilaterally dismantling its domestic civil liberty
or to save US-imposed globalization that has
impoverished much of the world. It would be a more
credible scenario if the US secretary of state would go
to Taipei to slam his fist on tables to demand that its
leaders stop flirting with Taiwan independence to avoid
war.
Friedman warns: "One more September 11, one
bad Iraq war that ties America down alone in the Middle
East and saps its strength, well, that may go over well
with the Cold Warriors in the People's Liberation Army,
but in the real world - in the world where the real
threat you face is not American troops crossing your
borders but American dollars fleeing from them - you
will be out of business."
Friedman is right to
be concerned about the adverse effects of terrorism and
the uncertainty of another Iraqi war on the slowing US
economy. And it is likely that one outcome of current US
foreign policy of preemptive military attacks on less
than clearly imminent threats will be further reversal
of globalization trends. Globalization had already
stalled since the Asian financial crises of 1997, long
before the war on terrorism was launched, because the
globalized game of transferring wealth from the poor to
the rich is not sustainable. But Friedman must be astute
enough to realize that China is at best a reluctant
participant in the globalization game and not a zealous
advocate. He is well enough informed not to be oblivious
to the fact that serious debate is openly being held
among Chinese planners about the proper policy response
to stalled globalization. Many in China are openly
questioning the wisdom of relying on export, within the
context of dollar hegemony, as the sole engine of
growth, or on market fundamentalism as a development
principle, with visible effects of failed markets all
over the world. The argument for a shift from export for
dollars toward national domestic development is fast
gaining acceptance among Chinese policymakers.
Earlier, on January 6, Friedman wrote: "I have
no problem with a war for oil - provided that it is to
fuel the first progressive Arab regime, and not just our
SUVs [sport-utility vehicles], and provided we behave in
a way that makes clear to the world we are protecting
everyone's access to oil at reasonable prices - not
simply our right to binge on it." While the path to hell
may be paved with good intentions, the path to nirvana
is never paved with devious justification. Friedman's
idea of a postwar "progressive" Iraq is definitely not a
Venezuela of the Middle East, with a democratically
elected president that the Bush White House tried to
topple with a coup. Or is Kuwait or Saudi Arabia
Friedman's idea of a "progressive" regime? He must
realize that his "open door" policy on access to Mideast
oil is incompatible with a truly progressive Iraqi
regime, and that "reasonable" oil prices are
incompatible with conservation.
In his book
The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Friedman wrote that
"the globalization system, unlike the Cold War system,
is not static, but a dynamic ongoing process:
globalization involves the inexorable integration of
markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree
never witnessed before - in a way that is enabling
individuals, corporations, and nation-states to reach
around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper
than ever before, and in a way that is also producing a
powerful backlash from those brutalized or left behind
by this new system.
"The driving idea behind
globalization is free-market capitalism - the more you
let market forces rule and the more you open your
economy to free trade and competition, the more
efficient and flourishing your economy will be.
Globalization means the spread of free-market capitalism
to virtually every country in the world. Globalization
also has its own set of economic rules - rules that
revolve around opening, deregulating and privatizing
your economy.
"Unlike the Cold War system,
globalization has its own dominant culture, which is why
it tends to be homogenizing. Culturally speaking,
globalization is largely, though not entirely, the
spread of Americanization - from Big Macs to iMacs to
Mickey Mouse - on a global scale.
"If the
defining anxiety of the Cold War was fear of
annihilation from an enemy you knew all too well in a
world struggle that was fixed and stable, the defining
anxiety in globalization is fear of rapid change from an
enemy you can't see, touch or feel - a sense that your
job, community or workplace can be changed at any moment
by anonymous economic and technological forces that are
anything but stable.
"Last, and most important,
globalization has its own defining structure of power,
which is much more complex than the Cold War structure.
The Cold War system was built exclusively around
nation-states, and it was balanced at the center by two
superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. The
globalization system, by contrast, is built around three
balances, which overlap and affect one another. The
first is the traditional balance between nation-states.
In the globalization system, the United States is now
the sole and dominant superpower and all other nations
are subordinate to it to one degree or another. The
balance of power between the United States and the other
states still matters for the stability of this system.
And it can still explain a lot of the news you read on
the front page of the papers, whether it is the
containment of Iraq in the Middle East or the expansion
of NATO against Russia in Central Europe.
"The
second balance in the globalization system is between
nation-states and global markets. These global markets
are made up of millions of investors moving money around
the world with the click of a mouse. The United States
can destroy you by dropping bombs and the Supermarkets
can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. The United
States is the dominant player in maintaining the
globalization gameboard, but it is not alone in
influencing the moves on that gameboard. This
globalization gameboard today is a lot like a Ouija
board - sometimes pieces are moved around by the obvious
hand of the superpower, and sometimes they are moved
around by hidden hands of the Supermarkets.
"The
third balance that you have to pay attention to in the
globalization system - the one that is really the newest
of all - is the balance between individuals and
nation-states. Because globalization has brought down
many of the walls that limited the movement and reach of
people, and because it has simultaneously wired the
world into networks, it gives more power to individuals
to influence both markets and nation-states than at any
time in history. So you have today not only a
superpower, not only Supermarkets, but, as I will also
demonstrate later in the book, you have Super-empowered
individuals. Some of these Super-empowered individuals
are quite angry, some of them quite wonderful - but all
of them are now able to act directly on the world stage
without the traditional mediation of governments,
corporations or any other public or private
institutions."
Friedman went on: "Osama bin
Laden, a Saudi millionaire with his own global network,
declared war on the United States in the late 1990s, and
the US Air Force had to launch a cruise-missile attack
on him as though he were another nation-state. We fired
cruise missiles at an individual!"
So, assuming
the September 11 attacks were indeed masterminded by
Osama bin Laden, the attacks were, by Friedman's
account, merely retaliatory strikes.
But
Friedman's mentality transcends his personal insights.
It is a mentality of arrogance of power for which the
United States has been criticized by many. US moral
imperialism demands not only quiet submissiveness from
its victims, but vocal loyal support. Not only is
globalization a game of heads I win for the US, and
tails you lose for other participants, Friedman has the
audacity to dangle globalized trade as a political favor
from the United States to be granted only to sycophant
partners. If China wants to continue to export goods
manufactured by low-paid labor in exchange for dollars
that the US can print at will, and in the process
keeping US inflation unnaturally low even in the face of
fiscal irresponsibility, to earn a trade surplus
unspendable in the Chinese domestic economy as it must
be held as foreign-exchange reserves in
dollar-denominated instruments to finance the US trade
deficit, then China had better fall in line to
unquestioningly support US political hegemony.
It is easy to act humbly when you are rich; the
trick offered by Friedman is for the United States is to
be arrogant when it is in debt up to its ears. The fact
is that the US can no more dispense with low-cost
Chinese imports than it can do without Mideast oil, both
of which it pays for with paper money it can print
without restriction. US Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick said on the same day as Friedman's article:
"China's ballooning trade surplus with the US is a boon
to global growth and therefore desirable at a time when
the economies of Japan and Europe are pretty stagnant."
So who's kidding whom?
US-China trade faces
stagnant growth anyway unless the United States abandons
its sanction on high-technology export to China. With
the US relocating all manufacturing offshore under
globalization, high tech and military systems are the
main US exports outside of agriculture and financial
services. Thus high-tech sanctions put a damper on
US-China trade growth and contribute to the growth of
the US trade deficit. Last year, China overtook the
United States as the leading exporter to Japan (US$61.7
billion, up 6.1 percent from 2001), accounting for 18.3
percent of Japanese imports, while US export to Japan
dropped 9.5 percent to $57.5 billion. The US exported
$22 billion to China, imported $125 billion (against
import of $121 billion from Japan), chalking up a
deficit to China of $103 billion in 2002. In 1985, the
US incurred a trade deficit of $6 million with China.
Friedman is not just another columnist. He is
the celebrated spokesman for US neo-liberalism and, as
such, his views are highly influential on, if not in
concert with, US policy. In fact, US officials have been
making similar noises in recent days about US
dissatisfaction on China's posture on Iraq and North
Korea. Yet the war on Iraq is not simply about oil. The
United States already controls the global oil market and
it does not need a war to consolidate its hold further.
Despite recent surges, oil prices are still low by
historical standards and as long as oil is denominated
in dollars, the rise and fall of oil prices do not
present insurmountable problems for the US economy.
Petro-dollars are in essence captured US assets.
If Friedman is really concerned about open
access to oil at reasonable prices for everybody, he
should support a progressive pricing regime for oil with
higher prices for high per-capita consumption markets.
The more you waste, the more you pay - the conservation
formula of market fundamentalism. The average
consumption in the inclusive period of 1983-2001 was
4.47 barrels per person per year for the world. A barrel
of oil contains 5.8 million British thermal units (BTU).
In 1995, US per capita usage was 327 million BTU per
year, which is equivalent to 56.38 barrels of oil, 12.6
times of world average. On a deeper level, the real
threat on long-term economic growth for the global
economy is not the price of commodities but the tyranny
of mostly Western intellectual property rights.
The war on Iraq is part of a US grand strategy
to reposition the entire post-Cold War global
geopolitical landscape to reflect a new world order with
a single superpower. The split in the European Union
into Old and New Europe over the Iraq war is part of a
US objective of establishing a new US satellite system
in Eastern European client states to fill the vacuum
left by the collapse of the Soviet satellite system. The
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is being
transformed from a defensive alliance for Europe against
the Soviet bloc to an offensive proxy war machine for US
policy of moral imperialism. France, Germany, Russia and
China are working not as allies, but as nations with
common interest in preventing the US in again turning
the UN Security Council into a lap dog of US foreign
policy, as the International Monetary Fund has been for
US financial hegemony in the past two decades.
Henry C K Liu is chairman of the New
York-based Liu Investment Group.
(©2003 Asia
Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact content@atimes.com
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