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US: Procuring the world's
oil
By Michael Klare
(Posted
with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus)
When first assuming office in early 2001,
President George W Bush's top foreign policy priority
was not to prevent terrorism or to curb the spread of
weapons of mass destruction - or any of the other goals
he espoused later that year following the September 11,
2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Rather, it was to increase the flow of petroleum from
suppliers abroad to US markets. In the months before he
became president, the United States had experienced
severe oil and natural gas shortages in many parts of
the country, along with periodic electrical power
blackouts in California. In addition, oil imports rose
to more than 50 percent of total consumption for the
first time in history, provoking great anxiety about the
security of the country's long-term energy supply. Bush
asserted that addressing the nation's "energy crisis"
was his most important task as president.
He and
his advisers considered the oil supply essential to the
health and profitability of leading US industries. They
reasoned that any energy shortages could have severe and
pervasive economic repercussions on businesses in
automobiles, airlines, construction, petrochemicals,
trucking and agriculture. They deemed petroleum
especially critical to the economy because it is the
source of two-fifths' of the total US energy supply -
more than any other source - and because it provides
most of the nation's transportation fuel. They also were
cognizant of petroleum's crucial national security role
as the power for the vast array of tanks, planes,
helicopters and ships that constitute the backbone of
the US war machine.
"America faces a major
energy supply crisis over the next two decades,"
Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham told a National
Energy Summit on March 19, 2001. "The failure to meet
this challenge will threaten our nation's economic
prosperity, compromise our national security, and
literally alter the way we lead our lives."
The
energy turmoil of 2000-2001 prompted Bush to establish
the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), a
task force of senior government representatives charged
with developing a long-range plan to meet US energy
requirements. To head this group, Bush picked his
closest political adviser, Vice President Dick Cheney. A
Republican stalwart and a former secretary of defense,
Cheney had served as chairman and chief executive
officer of Halliburton Co, an oilfield services firm,
before joining the Bush campaign in 2000. As such,
Cheney availed himself of top executives of energy
firms, such as Enron Corp, for advice on major issues.
As the NEPDG began its review of US energy
policy, its members saw the US was faced with a grave
choice between two widely diverging paths. It could
continue down the road it had long been traveling,
consuming increasing amounts of petroleum and - given
the irreversible decline in domestic oil production -
becoming ever more dependent on imported supplies. Or it
could choose an alternate route of reliance on renewable
sources of energy and gradually reducing petroleum use.
Clearly, the outcome of this decision would have
profound consequences for society, the economy and the
nation's security. Following the same path would bind
the US ever more tightly to Persian Gulf suppliers and
to other oil-producing countries, with a corresponding
impact on US security policy. Pursuing an alternative
strategy would require a huge investment in new
energy-generation and transportation technologies,
resulting in the rise or fall of entire industries.
Either way, the public would experience the impact of
this choice in every-day life and in the dynamics of the
economy as a whole. No one, in the US or elsewhere,
would be left entirely untouched.
The National
Energy Policy Development Group wrestled with this
dilemma and completed its report during the early months
of 2001. After a careful review, Bush anointed the
report as the National Energy Policy (NEP) and released
it on May 17. At first glance, the NEP, or the Cheney
report as it is often called, appeared to reject the
path of increased reliance on imported oil in favor of
renewable energy. The NEP "reduces demand by promoting
innovation and technology to make us the world leader in
efficiency and conservation", the president declared as
he released it. However, for all its rhetoric about
conservation, the NEP does not propose a reduction in
oil consumption. Instead, it proposes to slow the growth
in US dependence on imported petroleum by boosting
production at home through the exploitation of untapped
reserves in protected wilderness areas.
The
single most important step proposed in the NRP was
increasing domestic oil production by drilling in the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), an immense,
untouched wilderness area in northeastern Alaska. While
this proposal has generated enormous controversy in the
US because of its deleterious impact on the environment,
it also has allowed the White House to argue that the
administration is committed to a policy of energy
independence. However, careful examination of the Cheney
report leads to an entirely different conclusion. Aside
from the ANWR proposal, nothing in the NEP would
contribute to a significant decline in US dependence on
imported petroleum. In fact, the very opposite is true:
The basic goal of the Cheney plan is to find additional
external sources of oil for the US.
In the end,
Bush made a clear decision regarding future US energy
behavior. Knowing that nothing can reverse the long-term
decline in domestic oil production, and unwilling to
curb the country's ever-growing thirst for petroleum
products, he elected to continue down the existing path
of ever-increasing dependence on foreign oil.
Conservation initiative: Fact or
fiction?
The fact that the Bush energy plan
envisions increased rather than diminished reliance on
imported petroleum is not immediately apparent from the
president's public comments on the NEP, or from the
first seven chapters of the Cheney report itself. It is
only in the eighth and final chapter, "Strengthening
Global Alliances", that the true intent of the
administration's policy becomes fully apparent. Here,
the tone of the report changes markedly from a professed
concern with conservation and energy efficiency to an
explicit emphasis on securing more oil from foreign
sources. The chapter begins, "US national energy
security depends on sufficient energy supplies to
support US and global economic growth." The report
further states, "We can strengthen our own energy
security and the shared prosperity of the global
economy," by working with other countries to increase
the global production of energy. It is a mandate to
"make energy security a priority of our trade and
foreign policy".
The Cheney report is very
guarded about the amount of foreign oil that will be
required. The only clue provided by the report is a
chart of net US oil consumption and production over
time. According to this illustration, domestic oil field
production will decline from about 8.5 million barrels
per day (mbd) in 2002 to 7 mbd in 2020, while
consumption will jump from 19.5 mbd to 25.5 mbd. That
suggests imports or other sources of petroleum, such as
natural gas liquids, will have to rise from 11 mbd to
18.5 mbd. Most of the recommendations in Chapter 8 of
the NEP are aimed at procuring this 7.5 mbd increment,
equivalent to the total oil consumed by China and India.
One-third of all the recommendations in the
report are for ways to obtain access to petroleum
sources abroad. Many of the 35 proposals are region or
country-specific, with emphasis on removing political,
economic, legal and logistical obstacles. For example,
the NEP calls on the secretaries of energy, commerce and
state "to deepen their commercial dialogue with
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and other Caspian states to
provide a strong, transparent and stable business
climate for energy and related infrastructure projects".
The Cheney report will have a profound impact on
future US foreign and military policy. Officials will
have to negotiate for these overseas supplies and
arrange for investments that will increase production
and exports. They must also take steps to ensure that
wars, revolutions or civil disorder do not impede
foreign deliveries to the US. These imperatives will be
especially significant for policy toward the Persian
Gulf area, the Caspian Sea basin, Africa and Latin
America.
Applying the Cheney energy plan will
have major implications for US security and military
policy. Countries expected to supply petroleum in the
years ahead are torn by internal conflicts, harbor
strong anti-American sentiments, or both. Efforts to
procure additional oil from foreign sources are almost
certain to lead to violent disorder and resistance in
many key producing areas. While US officials might
prefer to avoid the use of force in such situations,
they may conclude that the only way to guarantee the
continued flow of energy is to guard the oil fields and
pipelines with soldiers.
To add to Washington's
dilemma, troop deployments in the oil-producing areas
are likely to cause resentment from inhabitants who fear
the revival of colonialism or who object to particular
US political positions, such as US support for Israel.
Efforts to safeguard the flow of oil could be
counter-productive, intensifying rather than diminishing
local disorder and violence.
Persian
Gulf
The United States currently obtains only
about 18 percent of its imported petroleum from the
Persian Gulf area. But Washington perceives a strategic
interest in the stability of energy production there
because its major allies, including Japan and Western
Europe, rely on imports from the region. Also, the
gulf's high export volume has helped to keep world oil
prices relatively low, benefiting the US economy. With
domestic production in decline, the NEP observes, the
Persian Gulf "will remain vital to US interests".
The US has played a significant role in Persian
Gulf affairs for a very long time. During World War II,
president Franklin D Roosevelt forged an agreement with
Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud, the founder of the modern Saudi
dynasty, to protect the royal family against its
internal and external enemies in return for privileged
access to Saudi oil. In subsequent years, the US also
agreed to provide security assistance to the shah of
Iran and to the leaders of Kuwait, Bahrain and the
United Arab Emirates. These agreements have led to the
delivery of vast quantities of US arms and, in some
cases, the deployment of combat forces to these
countries. (The US security link with Iran was severed
in January 1980, soon after the shah was overthrown by
militant Islamic forces.)
US policy with regard
to the protection of Persian Gulf energy supplies is
unambiguous: When a threat arises, the US will use
whatever means are necessary to ensure the continued
flow of oil. This principle, known as the Carter
Doctrine, was first articulated by president Jimmy
Carter in January 1980, following the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the fall of the shah of Iran. It has
remained part of US policy ever since. In accordance
with the principle, the US used force in 1987 and 1988
to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers from Iranian missile and
gunboat attacks, and then in 1990 and 1991 to drive
Iraqi forces out of Kuwait.
In explaining the
need to use force on these occasions, US officials have
stressed the importance of Persian Gulf oil to domestic
economic stability and prosperity. "Our strategic
interests in the Persian Gulf region, I think, are well
known, but bear repeating," then-secretary of defense
Cheney told the Senate Armed Services Committee on
September 11, 1990, five weeks after the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait. In addition to other security ties to Saudi
Arabia and its neighbors, he said, "We obviously also
have a significant interest because of the energy that
is at stake in the gulf." Iraq possessed 10 percent of
the world's oil reserves and acquired another 10 percent
by seizing Kuwait, he explained. The occupation of
Kuwait also placed Iraqi forces within a few hundred
miles of another 25 percent located in eastern Saudi
Arabia. "Once [former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein]
acquired Kuwait and deployed an army as large as the one
he possesses, he was clearly in a position to be able to
dictate the future of worldwide energy policy, and that
gave him a stranglehold on our economy and on that of
most of the other nations of the world as well," he
noted. Cheney insisted that the US had no choice but to
employ military force in the defense of Saudi Arabia and
other friendly states in the area.
Once Iraqi
forces were driven from Kuwait, the US adopted a policy
of containment of Iraq, enforcing severe economic
sanctions and "no-fly" zones over northern and southern
Iraq to weaken the Saddam regime and to prevent any new
attacks on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. At the same time,
Washington substantially expanded its military presence
and bases in the Persian Gulf area in order to
facilitate future US military operations in the region.
Most importantly, the Department of Defense sent vast
quantities of munitions to Kuwait and Qatar so that
troops could be rushed into combat without waiting weeks
or months for the arrival of their heavy equipment.
By early spring of 2002, the Bush administration
concluded that the policy of containment was not
sufficient to eliminate the threat Saddam posed to US
interests and that more aggressive action was required.
Although Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass
destruction was cited as the main reason for acting in
this manner, Cheney gave equal importance to US energy
security in his much-quoted speech of August 26, 2002.
"Should [Saddam's] ambitions [to acquire weapons of mass
destruction] be realized, the implications would be
enormous for the Middle East and the United States," he
told the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign
Wars. "Armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror
and a seat at the top of 10 percent of the world's oil
reserves, Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek
domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a
great portion of the world's energy supplies, [and]
directly threaten America's friends throughout the
region."
Officials told the public that oil had
nothing to do with the motives for the March 2003 US-led
invasion of Iraq. "The only interest the United States
has in the region is furthering the cause of peace and
stability, not in [Iraq's] ability to generate oil,"
White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer said in late
2002. But a closer look at the administration's planning
for the war reveals a very different picture. In a
January briefing by an unnamed "senior defense official"
on US plans for protecting Iraqi oil fields in the event
of war, the Pentagon leadership revealed that General
Tommy Franks and his staff "have crafted strategies that
will allow us to secure and protect those fields as
rapidly as possible in order to preserve those prior to
destruction".
The senior official, who
presumably was Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz,
indicated that the Bush administration sought to capture
Iraq's oilfields intact to provide a source of revenue
for the reconstruction of the country. Under the Saddam
regime, Iraq was a major oil supplier to the US. It
provided an average of 566,000 barrels per day in 2002,
or 5 percent of total imports. Many in Washington hope
to obtain far more oil from Iraq in the future.
According to the US Department of Energy, Iraq possesses
proven reserves of 112.5 billion barrels, more than any
other country except Saudi Arabia, and it is thought to
possess another 200 billion barrels in undeveloped
fields. Iraq could become a leading oil supplier in the
decades ahead, if a stable government is established
that opens territory to exploitation by US firms.
Such an outcome is far from assured. Policy
makers face the challenge of ensuring that Saudi Arabia
and other gulf producers increase oil supplies enough to
meet growing US and international demand. Another
challenge will be protecting the Saudi regime against
internal unrest and insurrection.
The need to
increase Saudi production is particularly pressing. With
one-fourth of the world's known oil reserves, an
estimated 262 billion barrels, Saudi Arabia is the only
country other than Iraq capable of satisfying
ever-increasing petroleum demands. According to the
Department of Energy, Saudi Arabia's net petroleum
output must grow by 133 percent over the next 25 years,
from 10.2 mbd in 2001 to 23.8 mbd in 2025, in order to
meet anticipated world requirements at the end of that
period. Expanding Saudi capacity by 13.6 mbd, which is
the equivalent of total current production by the US and
Mexico, will cost hundreds of billions of dollars. It
also will create enormous technical and logistical
challenges. Western analysts believe the best way to
achieve this increase is to persuade the Saudis to allow
substantial US oil-company investment. The Cheney report
calls for exactly that. However, any effort by
Washington to apply pressure on Riyadh is likely to meet
with significant resistance from the royal family, which
nationalized oil holdings in the 1970s and is fearful of
being seen as overly subservient to the US.
The
strong US ties to the Saudi royal family are unpopular
with the regime's many opponents. Additionally, growing
numbers of young Saudis have turned against the US
because of its close ties to Israel and what is seen as
Washington's anti-Islamic bias. It was from this milieu
that Osama bin Laden recruited many of his followers in
the late 1990s and obtained much of his financial
support. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the
Saudi government cracked down on some of these forces,
but underground opposition to the regime's military and
economic cooperation with Washington persists. Finding a
way to eradicate this opposition while persuading Riyadh
to increase its oil deliveries will be one of the most
difficult challenges facing US policy makers in the
years ahead.
Caspian Sea
basin
Although the US will remain dependent on
oil from the Persian Gulf area for a long time to come,
officials seek to minimize this dependency to the
greatest degree possible by diversifying the nation's
sources of imported energy. "Diversity is important, not
only for energy security but also for national
security," Bush declared on May 17, 2001.
"Over-dependence on any one source of energy, especially
a foreign source, leaves us vulnerable to price shocks,
supply interruptions, and in the worst case, blackmail."
To prevent this, the administration's energy plan calls
for a substantial US effort to boost production in a
number of non-gulf areas, including the Caspian Sea
basin, the West Coast of Africa and Latin America.
The one that is likely to receive greatest
attention from policy makers is the Caspian Sea basin,
consisting of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and
adjacent parts of Iran and Russia. According to the
Department of Energy, this area houses proven reserves
(defined as 90 percent probable) of 17 to 33 billion
barrels of oil, and possible reserves (defined as 50
percent probable) of 233 billion barrels. If the amounts
were confirmed, they would constitute the second largest
untapped reserves after the Persian Gulf area.
To ensure that much of this oil will eventually
flow to consumers in the West, the US government has
made strenuous efforts to develop the area's petroleum
infrastructure and distribution system. The US first
sought access to the Caspian's oil supplies during the
Bill Clinton administration. Because the Caspian Sea is
landlocked, its oil and natural gas must travel by
pipeline to other areas. Tapping the resources requires
the construction of long-distance export lines.
The administration was reluctant to see Caspian
oil flow through Russia on its way to Western Europe,
since that would allow Moscow a degree of control over
Western energy supplies. Transport through Iran was
prohibited by US law because of that country's pursuit
of weapons of mass destruction. So Clinton threw his
support behind a plan to transport oil and gas from Baku
in Azerbaijan to Ceyhan in Turkey via Tbilisi in the
former Soviet republic of Georgia. Before leaving
office, he flew to Turkey to preside at the signing
ceremony for a regional agreement permitting
construction of the $3 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline.
While concentrating on the legal and
logistical aspects of procuring Caspian energy, the
Clinton administration also addressed the threat to
future oil deliveries posed by instability and conflict
in the region. Since many of these states were wracked
by ethnic and separatist conflicts, the administration
initiated a number of military assistance programs aimed
at strengthening their internal security capabilities.
This entailed providing arms and training along with
conducting joint exercises.
Building on
Clinton's efforts, the Bush administration sought to
accelerate the expansion of Caspian production
facilities and pipelines. "Foreign investors and
technology are critical to rapid development of new
commercially viable export routes," the Cheney report
affirms. "Such development will ensure that rising
Caspian oil production is effectively integrated into
world oil trade." Particular emphasis is placed on
completion of the BTC pipeline and on increasing the
participation of US companies in Caspian energy
projects. The administration also sought to build an oil
and gas pipeline from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on the
east shore of the Caspian to Baku on the west shore to
channel more energy from Central Asia to the BTC system.
Until September 11, 2001 US involvement in the
Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia had been restricted
mostly to economic, diplomatic and military aid
agreements. To combat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan, however, the Department of Defense deployed
tens of thousands of combat troops in the region and
established military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
The administration recalled some of these troops, but
apparently plans to maintain bases and a permanent
military presence. This is supposedly intended to assist
in the "war against terrorism", but it is also to
safeguard the flow of petroleum. The administration
deployed military instructors to Georgia to provide
counter-insurgency training for special units that will
eventually guard the Georgian segment of the BTC
pipeline.
The White House has high hopes for the
development of Caspian Sea energy supplies, but many
obstacles remain. Some of these are logistical: until
new pipelines can be built, transport of large
quantities of oil to the West will be tough. Other
obstacles are political and legal: the authoritarian
regimes that predominate in the former Soviet republics
are riddled with corruption and reluctant to adopt the
legal or tax reforms needed to attract large-scale
Western investment. But when all is said and done, the
major problem facing the US is that the Caspian basin is
no more stable than the Persian Gulf. Any effort to
ensure the safety of energy deliveries will require the
same sort of military commitments that the US has long
made to its principal energy suppliers in the gulf.
West Africa
Another area the Bush
administration views as a promising source of oil is
West Africa. Although African states accounted for only
about 10 percent of global oil production in 2000, the
Department of Energy predicts that their share will rise
to 25 percent by 2020. That will add 8.3 mbd to global
supplies, welcome news in Washington. "West Africa is
expected to be one of the fastest-growing sources of oil
and gas for the American market," the Cheney report
observes.
The administration expects to
concentrate its efforts in Nigeria, its neighboring
states in the Gulf of Guinea, and Angola. As in the
Caspian region, however, US hopes to obtain additional
oil from Africa could be frustrated by political unrest
and ethnic warfare. Indeed, much of Nigeria's production
was shut down during the spring of 2003 because of
ethnic violence in the Delta region, the site of much of
Nigeria's onshore oil. Local activists have occupied
offshore oil facilities to bargain for community project
funding. Crime and vandalism have also hampered
Nigeria's efforts to increase oil production.
The US is not likely to respond to these
challenges by deploying troops. That undoubtedly would
conjure up images of colonialism, provoking strong
opposition at home and abroad. But Washington is willing
to step up military aid to friendly regimes in the
region. Total US assistance to Angola and Nigeria
amounted to some $300 million in fiscal years 2002
through 2004, a significant increase over the previous
three-year period. In fiscal 2004, Angola and Nigeria
also became eligible to receive surplus arms under the
Pentagon's Excess Defense Articles program. Meanwhile,
the Department of Defense has begun to secure rights for
the establishment of naval bases in the region, most
notably in Nigeria and the islands of Sao Tome Principe.
Latin America
Finally, the Cheney plan
calls for a significant increase in US oil imports from
Latin America. The US already obtains a large share of
its imported oil from the region. Venezuela is now the
third largest supplier of oil to the US, after Canada
and Saudi Arabia; Mexico is the fourth largest, and
Columbia is the seventh. As indicated by the secretary
of energy, "President Bush recognizes not only the need
for an increased supply of energy, but also the critical
role the hemisphere will play in the administration's
energy policy."
In presenting these aspirations
to governments in the region, US officials highlight
their desire to establish a common framework for energy
development. "We intend to stress the enormous potential
of greater regional energy cooperation as we look to the
future," Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham told the
Fifth Hemispheric Energy Initiative Ministerial
Conference in Mexico City on March 8, 2001. "Our goal
[is] to build relationships among our neighbors that
will contribute to our shared energy security; to an
adequate, reliable, environmentally sound, and
affordable access to energy." However sincere, these
comments mask the fact that the "cooperation" is
essentially aimed at channeling more and more of the
region's oil supplies to the US.
The energy plan
emphasizes acquisition of additional oil from Mexico and
Venezuela. "Mexico is a leading and reliable source of
imported oil," the Cheney report observes. "Its large
reserve base, approximately 25 percent larger than our
own proven reserves, makes Mexico a likely source of
increased oil production over the next decade."
Venezuela is considered vital because it possesses large
reserves of conventional oil and houses vast supplies of
so-called heavy oil, a sludge-like material that can be
converted to conventional oil through a costly refining
process. According to the NEP, "Venezuelan success in
making heavy oil deposits commercially viable suggests
that they will contribute substantially to the diversity
of global energy supply and to our own energy supply mix
over the medium to long term."
But US efforts to
tap into abundant Mexican and Venezuelan energy supplies
will hit a major snag. Because of a long history of
colonial and imperial predation, these two countries
have placed their energy reserves under state control,
establishing strong legal barriers to foreign
involvement in domestic oil production. While they may
want to capitalize on the benefits of higher volume
exports to the US, Latin American countries are likely
to resist more US participation in their energy
industries and any significant increase in oil
extraction.
The NEP calls on the secretaries of
commerce, energy, and state to lobby their Latin
American counterparts to eliminate or soften barriers.
However, in Mexico, reform bills to ease entry of
private oil companies have encountered stiff resistance
in Congress. In Venezuela, a new constitution adopted in
1999 bans foreign investment in the oil sector, and in
2003, President Hugo Chavez fired managers of the
state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA who
favored links with foreign firms.
Bush
energy, military plans linked
In its pursuit of
petroleum, the US is intruding in the affairs of the
oil-supplying nations. In the process, it exposes itself
to increased risk of involvement in local and regional
conflicts. This reality has already influenced US
relations with the major oil-producing nations and is
sure to have an even greater impact in the future.
At no point does the NEP acknowledge this.
Instead, it focuses on the economic and diplomatic
dimensions of the energy policy. However, the architects
of the Bush-Cheney policy know that ensuring access to
some oil sources may prove impossible without the use of
military force. The administration's military strategy
takes up the slack with heavy emphasis on bolstering
capacity to project firepower to key battlefields
abroad. "The United States must retain the capability to
send well-armed and logistically supported forces to
critical points around the globe, even in the face of
enemy opposition," states its Quadrennial Defense
Review.
These critical points would necessarily
include areas that are petroleum sources. Whether or not
the administration consciously linked energy with its
security policy, Bush undeniably prioritized the
enhancement of US power projection at the same time he
endorsed increased dependence on oil from unstable
areas.
As a result, a two-pronged strategy
governs US policy toward much of the world. One arm of
this strategy is to secure more oil from the rest of the
world, and the other is to enhance the capability to
intervene. While one of these objectives arises from
energy preoccupations and the other from security
concerns, the upshot is a single direction for US
dominance in the 21st Century. It is this combination of
strategies, more than anything else, that will anchor
the US's international relations for years to come.
Michael T Klare, author of
Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict
and the forthcoming Petropolitics (Metropolis
Books, 2004) is a professor of peace and world security
studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, Mass.
(Posted with permission from Foreign
Policy in Focus)
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