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     Nov 29, 2007
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PATHOLOGY OF DEBT
Part 3: The credit guns of August
By Henry C K Liu

(PART 1: Banks as vulture investors
PART 2: Commercial paper and pesky SIVs)

Evidence of global contagion surfaced in August as a string of German banks ran into trouble with their leveraged bets on collateralized debt obligation (CDO) instruments and the even more toxic "'synthetic" CDO derivatives: securities that contain



top-rated tranches of US unbundled subprime mortgage pools. A series of emergency actions by the European Central Bank (ECB) injecting a further US$85 billion in liquidity through various mechanisms in the third week of August highlighted the seriousness of the crisis.

Germany
A Dusseldorf-based bank that focuses on small and medium-sized companies, IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, invested in structured credit portfolios and was the first German bank to crumble early in August, requiring an 8.1 billion euro (US$12 billion) state rescue just days after it denied any significant exposure to subprime debt. Fallout from the subprime mortgage rout was roiling markets around the world as rising risk premiums caused companies to face higher interest on their borrowings.

Contracts on 10 million euros of debt included in the iTraxx Crossover Series 7 Index of 50 European companies increased as much as 60,000 euros to 504,000 euros. Investor confidence in high-risk, high-yield loans fell to the lowest in nine months as the iTraxx LevX Index of credit-default swaps on loans to 35 European companies dropped 0.25 to 94.50. Credit-default swap contracts based on 10 million euros of IKB debt, which traded at 15,000 euros in early July, were at 120,000 euros on July 27.

The state-owned bank Sachsen LB in former East Germany, founded in 1992 after the fall of the Berlin Wall, reportedly accumulated $80 billion of exposure to risky assets through a set of Irish funds kept off balance sheet. Sachsen LB was rescued in August in a state-orchestrated bail-out by a consortium of banks agreeing to provide a 17.3 billion euro credit lifeline, but only on the understanding that it agreed to be sold to a stronger player.

The regional government of Saxony then agreed to sell the state-owned bank - the biggest victim up to that time in the worldwide credit rout - for a token 300 million euro to the Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg in Stuttgart (LBBW), ending a three-week saga that revealed the extent of German involvement in treacherous US subprime debt. LBBW has the right to cancel the sale if further significant exposures to subprime risk are found at Sachsen LB or in any of its off-balance sheet units.

Suddeutsche Zeitung reported that Irish "conduits"(off-balance sheet vehicles) were used by Sachsen LB to fund 65 billion euros for investing in CDOs and other high-risk structured investment vehicles (SIVs), which involve using short-term credit to buy longer-term assets, creating mismatches in maturities that were highly vulnerable in a volatile market.

Rhinebridge Plc, a fund managed by Dusseldorf-based IKB Deutsche Industriebank, sold $176 million of assets after it couldn't find buyers for its short-term debt.

Ireland-Britain
News of the unwinding of Dublin-based Cheyne Finance flashed around the globe in late August. Cheyne Finance, an SIV managed by British hedge fund Cheyne Capital Management Ltd, was forced to begin selling its $6.6 billion portfolio after a downgrade by Standard & Poor's, the ratings agency.

Cheyne Finance went into receivership (known as bankruptcy in the US) in September after exhausting bank liquidity credit lines to help repay maturing debt. The receivers had to arrange with the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) to restructure the finances of Cheyne Finance after the SIV stopped making payments on its debt in early October. S&P said the Cheyne Finance portfolio was made up of 56% of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), 6% of collateralized debt obligations of asset-backed securities (CDOs of ABS, consumer credit) and 38% of other debt, such as corporate CDOs and commercial mortgage-backed securities. Some 52% of the portfolio was rated AAA before S&P cut the ratings on Cheyne Finance eventually to D, or default, after it stopped payments.

Cheyne Capital Management, whose Queen's Walk Investment Ltd mortgage bond fund in June reported a loss of 67.7 million euros in the year ended March 31, was forced to sell assets backing a $6 billion commercial paper program amid the global credit market rout. The Cheyne Finance fund had been selling assets and had enough cash to repay commercial paper due through November. But then S&P cut Cheyne Finance ratings, citing the deteriorating market value of its assets. S&P initially lowered the credit rating on the commercial paper issued by Cheyne Finance by two levels to A-2 from the highest level of A-1+. The rating on senior debt was cut six levels to A- from AAA.

The average yield on the highest-rated asset-backed commercial paper with one-day maturity has risen 0.71 percentage point to 6.04% as investors have fled funding linked to subprime mortgages. Cheyne Finance had drawn on all three of its emergency funding facilities and would continue to sell assets to meet its liabilities. Cheyne is working on recapitalizing or restructuring the company and extending its debt maturities.

As contagion from the subprime slump drove up the cost of borrowing, HBOS Plc, the largest mortgage lender in the UK, in late August repaid about $35 billion of commercial paper owed by its Grampian Funding LLC unit.

RBS agreed to set up a new investment vehicle that would buy Cheyne's failed SIVs $7 billion portfolio, financed by new and existing investors. The new company set up by RBS would attempt to liquidate the portfolio in an orderly manner over time, with the existing senior creditors buying the senior part and new investors for the junior part. The bulk of the risk is taken by the junior investors with compensatory returns.

Mezzanine investors could get back some of their investment in the event of a sale above a certain level. Similar to the Goldman Sachs rescue of its Global Equity Opportunities fund, it is a strategy to maximize the post-restructured value of the senior tranches at the expense of the junior tranches by creating a new level of investors with increased risk appetite. It is essentially a vulture solution.

Barclays Plc was left with an exposure of hundreds of million of dollars to failed debt vehicles created by its investment banking arm amid growing scrutiny over its links to Sachsen LB, the failed German public sector bank. The UK bank provided back-up financing to one of four structured investment vehicles set up by its asset management unit, Barclays Capital, leaving it with a credit exposure. Ironically, news of Barclays' exposure eased concerns among investors about potential losses arising from the vehicles, known as SIV-lites, the Financial Times reported.

However, the bank's relationship with Sachsen faced scrutiny after it emerged that Barclays had set up a SIV-lite on the German bank's behalf less than three months before it collapsed, the

Continued 1 2 


The Complete Henry C K Liu


1. US wages covert war on Iraq-Iran border

2. 'Our' dictator gets away with it

3. Spirals of death

4. Iran the uninvited guest at peace summit

5. How the US got its Philippine bases back

6. Non compus POTUS

7. PATHOLOGY OF DEBT
PART 1: Banks as vulture investors

8. Economic hell to pay 

9. Dalai Lama cuts little ice in Japan

(24 hours to 11:59 pm ET, Nov 27, 2007)

 
 


 

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