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     Nov 30, 2007
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PATHOLOGY OF DEBT
PART 4: Lessons unlearned
By Henry C K Liu

(PART 1: Banks as vulture investors
PART 2: Commercial paper and pesky SIVs
PART 3: The credit guns of August)

Moody's' bullish 2005 report
Moody’s Investors Service has developed a rating methodology for structured financial operating companies (SFOCs). The ratings agency has recognized the similarities by which various forms of



vehicle operate and has developed a new classification and ratings process for this group of structured finance entities. SFOCs are operating companies that apply detailed, pre-determined parameters to define and restrict their business activities and operations. The SFOC designation applies to a number of different structures including:
  • Derivative product companies (DPCs)
  • Collateralized swap programs (CSPs)
  • Credit derivative vehicles (CDVs)
  • Structured investment vehicles (SIVs)
  • Structured lending vehicles (SLVs)
  • Interest rate arbitrage vehicles (IRAVs)
  • Issuers of guaranteed investment contracts (GIC Issuers).

    Moody's Special Report, issued on April 14, 2005 states: "Under this classification Moody's has assigned ratings to more than 50 of these vehicles. To date, there have been no rating downgrades on any of their publicly-rated issued debt, which testifies to the resilience and strength of the structures of these vehicles and how robust they are to market disruptions. This view on the unification of the general rating approach for these vehicle types provides a basis for the continual growth within this market as the markets evolve and converge as well as providing a basis for the introduction of new or hybrid vehicle types."

    Optimism turned to panic
    By August 2007, this optimistic statement was rendered inoperative by events. Fed data show that the US$1.1 trillion market for commercial paper (CP) used to buy mortgages on homes, aircraft, and cars seized up in August just as more than half of that amount was to come due in the next 90 days. Unless new buyers could be fund to buy new debt to replace the old, hundreds of hedge funds and companies would be forced to sell $75 billion of assets at prices that reflected sharp losses.

    Such distressed sales would further drive down prices in a market where investors have already lost $57 billion as estimated by the Merrill Lynch broadest index of floating-rate securities backed by home- equity loans. That would adversely affect the position held by 38.4 million individual and institutional investors in money market funds, the biggest holder class of commercial paper. Top-rated commercial paper is one of the safest assets in normal times. But these are not normal times.

    The major players in the SIV market by the end of 2005 were:
    - Beta Finance Corp was sponsored by Citibank International Plc (commercial bank) in 1989 with asset under management (AUM) of $15.3 billion.
    - Sigma Finance Corp was sponsored by Gordion Knot Ltd (investment manager) in 1995 with $34 billion of AUM.
    - Centauri Corp was sponsored by Citibank in 1996 with $16.1 billion of AUM.
    - Dorada Corp was sponsored by Citibank in 1998 with $10.5 billion of AUM.
    - K2 Corp was sponsored by Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein (investment bank) in 1999 with $20.6 billion of AUM.
    - Links Finance Corp was sponsored by Bank of Montreal (commercial bank) in 1999 with $13.5 billion in AUM.
    - Cheyne Finance was sponsored by Cheyne Capital Management Ltd (investment manager) in 2005 with $7 billion in AUM.
    - Cullinan Finance Corp sponsored by HSBC Holdings (commercial bank) in 2005 with $27 billion in AUM.

    As of March 2007, every one of the above SIVs was in distress, plus a few more:
  • Eiger Capital (Orion Finance)
  • III Offshore Advisors (Abacas Investments)
  • West LB (Harrier Finance Funding Ltd., Kestrel Funding
  • Standard Chartered Bank (White Pine, Whistlejacket Capital)
  • Societe Generale (Premier Asset Collateralized Entity)
  • Stanfield Global Strategies (Stanfield Victoria Finance)
  • Rabobank International (Tango Finance)
  • Eaton Vance (EV Variable Leveraged Fund)
  • HSH Nordbank (Carrera Capital Finance)
  • MBIA (Hudson-Thames Capital)
  • IXIS/Ontario Teachers (Cortland Capital)
  • Axon Financial (Axon)
  • IKB KG (Rhinebridge)

    Worldwide investors with complex holdings
    By any measure, this is a small number of issuers. But the problem is that the ABCP they issued is bought by large number of investors worldwide in patterns that are difficult to sort out because of the complexity of the collateralized debt obligations (CDO) tranches and the variety of hedges employed by investors.

    On the liability side, some SIVs experimented with the capital structure in order to meet the risk/reward requirements for a broader scope of new and traditional capital note investors. This has been mainly through the adoption of a three-tier structure similar to that of CDOs - with senior, mezzanine and equity levels of issuance - and some of the established SIVs have been restructured to take advantage of this new market trend. The issuance of junior tranches by SIVs is not a new practice, but it has not been widely adopted until recently. Asset Backed Capital (ABC), one of the oldest SIVs, has long achieved a Moody's A1 rating for its senior subordinated notes, with a tranching ratio of approximately 60 junior notes to 40 mezzanine capital.

    One new SIV trend has been the rapidly growing demand for rated capital notes. As the first loss piece of the SIV capital structure (subordinate to medium-term notes and CP), capital notes typically expose holders to first gains and losses in the asset portfolio. According to rating agency Standard & Poor's, over $11 billion in capital notes have been rated to date, pointing to the transparency and disclosure required by investors as well as the expected impact of Basel II on institutions holding unrated notes. Basel II is second of the Basel Accords, recommendations by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision intended to create an international standard on how much capital banks need to put aside to guard against financial and operational risks.

    Shrinking spreads had led to innovations to the traditional SIV structure. On the asset side, some SIVs trended away from the absolute practice of investing in high grade and liquid asset-backed securities (ABS). They explored less-liquid products such as CDOs and mezzanine ABS (these are usually harder to get marked-to-market prices and have larger bid/offer spreads). Several existing and new SIVs received approval from rating agencies to synthetically purchase assets in lieu of highly-rated ABS/mortgage-backed securities (MBS) by selling credit default swap (CDS) protection on corporate assets. As with conventional SIV portfolio management, the vehicle would profit from the credit arbitrage between long-maturity assets on a leveraged basis and short-maturity liabilities. Additionally, the ability to use repurchase agreements (repos) as alternative asset-purchase funding was incorporated into SIV mandates, as they were within other structured finance operations.

    In 2004, Citigroup introduced a new vehicle that takes this to a whole new level. Sedna Finance incorporates a three-tier liability structure, with AAA-rated first priority senior notes (FPS), A-rated second priority senior notes (SPS) and an unrated first loss piece. Citibank raised 90% of the $1 billion capital through its SPS notes with 150 times leverage, exponentially greater than the 15 times industry average leverage. In addition to funding the purchase of various assets, proceeds from the issuance of bonds and paper may also be used for single-name CDS as either protection buyer or seller. Sedna was approved to take up to 20% of its total portfolio risk in synthetic instruments.

    As the industry grew more adept with the application of single-name corporate CDS, credit-linked notes (CLNs) took on a more significant role on the funding side as they could be used to achieve lower funding costs. For example, an SIV can issue a euro-denominated CLN synthetically linked to the credit risk of a BBB-rated entity, swap the euro to US dollar and use the proceeds to acquire AAA-rated securities. In effect, it has hedged out currency risks while potentially improving net yield, at least in theory.

    The impact of the new Basel Capital Accord
    The new Basel Capital Accord will make the back-up liquidity

  • Continued 1 2 3 4 


    The Complete Henry C K Liu

     

     
     


     

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