WRITE for ATol ADVERTISE MEDIA KIT GET ATol BY EMAIL ABOUT ATol CONTACT US
Asia Time Online - Daily News
             
Asia Times Chinese
AT Chinese



     
     Mar 26, 2008
Page 1 of 5
CREDIT BUBBLE BULLETIN
Nationalization and dislocation
Commentary and weekly watch by Doug Noland

As long-time readers are all too familiar, I have been a persistent critic of government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs - notably mortgage finance agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These behemoths of historic credit excess - instigators of the mortgage finance and housing bubbles - liquidity backstops for the ballooning leveraged speculating community - and instrumental agents for an unparalleled misallocation of financial and economic resources - are proving themselves the Freddie Krueger of systemic distortions and policy failures.

Two recent comments, the first from Friday's Washington Post,

 

paint part of the picture:
To understand Wednesday's decision by federal regulators to let Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac set aside less cash to protect against losses, imagine a family that keeps its precious antique silver in a strongbox on a high shelf, beyond easy reach. The regulators have essentially authorized Fannie and Freddie to pawn some of their family silver.

Currently, the two firms, known as government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs, have combined reserves of US$82 billion. This includes an extra amount that the regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), required them to hold while they got their books in order after accounting scandals. Now it is reducing that extra cushion by $5.8 billion. The newly freed-up money will leverage the purchase and securitization of up to $200 billion in home loans.

The point, however, is not to save Fannie and Freddie themselves but to use the two firms, which buy mortgages and resell bunches of them to investors in the form of bonds, to ease the difficulties of borrowers more generally. It’s as if our hypothetical family pawned its silver to help the neighbors out of a financial jam … This is risky. If all goes well, freeing up the GSEs will buoy mortgage lending, thus slowing or reversing the slide in housing prices … But if housing continues to tank, and the GSEs rack up new multibillion-dollar losses on top of those they have already incurred in recent months, they will have that much less in reserve to fall back on. The GSEs enjoy an implicit federal guarantee, but reducing their capital for a purpose such as this, at a time such as this, goes a fair way toward making that bailout promise an explicit one. (Washington Post, March 21)
I found OFHEO director James Lockhart's interview late Wednesday afternoon on CNBC also worthy of documentation:
CNBC's Maria Bartiromo: Some have been arguing that the blowup in Bear Stearns caused the Administration to reconsider policy responses to this crisis. The deal announced today is basically telling them that that is a fact - that it really was Bear Stearns that pushed the government’s hand. Is that true - was it Bear?

OFHEO director James Lockhart: Not really. We’ve been talking about this for a long time. I’ve been talking for many months about the need for these two companies to raise additional capital. And I’ve talked for over the last year that once they got remediated and fixed their books and got them on a timely basis, we would start looking at removing that 30% excess capital charge we had on.

Bartiromo: It seems to have taken a long time. A lot of people - from hedge fund companies to certainly the lenders - have wanted the restrictions eased for some time. What was the biggest barrier and what went away over the last several weeks in order to push your hand?

Lockhart: I think the key thing was three weeks ago they did actually produce their '07 financial accounts on a timely basis. And we’ve gone through all the consent agreement issues and they’re virtually finished on them as well. We thought it really was the appropriate time. They now have the proper systems and controls - proper risk management. And we think it really is a time they can help the mortgage market in a big way.

Bartiromo: We’re talking about a big number, too. Some $200 billion in the market. What’s the best case scenario, sir - what would you like to see - what specific mortgages do you want these two guys to buy?

Lockhart: Well, I think they should be a player in many segments of the market. I think certainly, as [Fannie chief executive] Dan Mudd just said, the conventional mortgage market has really weathered this storm pretty well because Fannie and Freddie have been there for the last year. But they could do more there. They’re just getting into the 'jumbo' market next month, and certainly they’ll need capital to do that. [A jumbo mortgage has a loan amount above the industry-standard definition of conventional conforming loan limits.] And there’s a lot more that could be done in the subprime - refinancing some of these people into safer mortgages. And, also, just loan modifications. So there are a lot of ways that this capital can be used to improve the mortgage market.

Bartiromo: Are you expecting the capital at all to be earmarked for some of the passthrough CMOs [collateralized mortgage obligation] - I mean the really troublesome securities that really did in Thornburg or Carlyle Capital or Bear Stearns, among others?

Lockhart: Carlyle Capital was actually holding Fannie and Freddie’s securities and the spreads widened dramatically - which they’ve probably come back this week. But I think they will be looking at buying their own mortgage-backed securities. They may look at some other mortgage-backed securities as well. I think we need to increase the trading. And as both of them said this morning, they need to be a bid in the marketplace to buy those securities.

Bartiromo: And just the idea that they are a bid in the marketplace to buy those securities obviously was really celebrated in terms of investors and the idea that now there is a buyer there. How long do you expect this process to take? And how long do you think it will take to actually get this moving - liquidity back into the market and a feeling of stability?

Lockhart: Well, it may take awhile. The mortgage market is one issue, but there are some other markets out there as well. I think this is going to be a major step forward. As you said, they can do $200 billion in purchases immediately. And to the extent they’re guaranteeing mortgage-backed securities - that could almost get into the trillions. We’re looking at that they would have the capacity - between what we did today and the significant capital raising that they committed to - they could do over $2 trillion in business this year if the market needs that money.
It would be an outright crime if thinly capitalized Fannie and Freddie were allowed to increase their Books of Business (mortgages retained on their balance sheets and MBS guaranteed in the marketplace) by $2 trillion this year - "if the market needs that money".

I was shocked when Mr Lockhart imparted that they were now in a position to accomplish such a feat. It is certainly a terrible idea to put Fannie and Freddie guarantees on millions of new mortgages created from restructuring loans of troubled borrowers. This would amount to nothing less than a despicable transfer of massive prospective credit losses directly to the American taxpayer (current owners of this paper should not be bailed out).

Wishful thinking
I have fully expected the GSEs, at some point, to be taken over by the federal government. It may have been orchestrated subtly, but I can only presume that such a historic endeavor was accepted last week as the only means of averting financial dislocation. And for their regulator to suggest that the GSEs today have any handle whatsoever over their unfolding "risk management" challenge is wishful thinking - at best.

As far as I’m concerned, much of the US mortgage market was this week essentially nationalized. I’ll take the dramatic narrowing in agency debt and MBS (mortgage-backed securities) spreads as support for this view. Additional support arrived from comments from Mr Lockhart, US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, and actions by the Federal Reserve. Having lived contently for years with the markets’ interpretation of the (grey-area) "implied" government backing of the GSEs, our policymakers are surely today satisfied with the inferred market acceptance of mortgage industry nationalization. To be sure, the Fed’s splashy "Sunday Night Special" bailout of Bear Stearns is rather trivial in both its implications and consequences when compared to Thursday’s quiet coup.

I have my own hunches about the rise and inevitable fall of the GSEs. I’ve always assumed that the Greenspan Fed was pleased (relieved?) to watch Fannie and Freddie morph in the early '90s from conservative mortgage insurance providers to aggressive bank-like lending institutions and market operators. GSE credit creation (and timely market interventions) worked greatly to alleviate the forceful economic headwinds created by an impaired banking system.

I also (admittedly, rather cynically) pictured President Clinton, his then Treasury Secretary (and former Goldman chairman) Robert Rubin, and Budget Director (and former Fannie vice chairman and so-to-be chief executive) Franklin Raines behind the closed doors of the Oval Office plotting the exploitation of the GSEs, Wall Street finance, system mortgage credit, and housing inflation for 

Continued 1 2 3 4 5 


Bernanke running out of bliss space (Mar 20, '08)


1. Why Spitzer was Bushwhacked

2. The peculiar theology of black liberation

3. My short time with Tito

4. Obama's women reveal his secret 

5. Same game, new rules in Afghanistan

6. What goes up must come down

7. Pyongyang cashes in on US row

8. Why markets love dictators

9. Bernanke running out of bliss room

10. A bunch of government gobbledy-gook

(Mar 20-24, 2008)

 
 


 

All material on this website is copyright and may not be republished in any form without written permission.
© Copyright 1999 - 2008 Asia Times Online (Holdings), Ltd.
Head Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East, Central, Hong Kong
Thailand Bureau: 11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110