Page 2 of 4 Monetarism enters bankruptcy
By Henry C K Liu
monetarism when he wrote in the September/October 2000 Issue of Foreign Policy
an article entitled "A Crash Course for Central Bankers":
A collapse in
US stock prices certainly would cause a lot of white knuckles on Wall Street.
But what effect would it have on the broader US economy? If Wall Street
crashes, does Main Street follow? Not necessarily. Consider three famous
episodes: the US stock market crash of 1929, Japan's crash of 1990-1991, and
the US crash of 1987.
The 1929 US crash and the sharp decline in
Japanese stock prices were both followed by decade-long economic slumps in each
country. (The Japanese depression, despite much whistling in the dark by the
country's policymakers, still lingers.) By contrast, the macroeconomic fallout
from the 1987 tumble on Wall Street was minimal. Why the difference?
A closer look reveals that the economic repercussions of a stock market crash
depend less on the severity of the crash itself than on the response of
economic policymakers, particularly central bankers. After the 1929 crash, the
Federal Reserve mistakenly focused its policies on preserving the gold value of
the dollar rather than on stabilizing the domestic economy. By raising interest
rates to protect the dollar, policymakers contributed to soaring unemployment
and severe price deflation. The US central bank only compounded its mistake by
failing to counter the collapse of the country's banking system in the early
1930s; bank failures both intensified the monetary squeeze (since bank deposits
were liquidated) and sparked a credit crunch that hurt consumers and small
firms in particular. Without these policy blunders by the Federal Reserve,
there is little reason to believe that the 1929 crash would have been followed
by more than a moderate dip in US economic activity.
The downturn following the collapse of Japan's so-called bubble economy of the
1980s was not as severe as the Great Depression. However, in some crucial
aspects, Japan in the 1990s was a slow-motion replay of the US experience 60
years earlier. After effectively precipitating the crash in stock and real
estate prices through sharp increases in interest rates (in much the same way
that the Fed triggered the crash of 1929), the Bank of Japan seemed in no hurry
to ease monetary policy and did not cut rates significantly until 1994. As a
result, prices in Japan have fallen about 1% annually since 1992.
And much like US officials during the 1930s, Japanese policymakers were
unconscionably slow in tackling the severe banking crisis that impaired the
economy's ability to function normally.
Central bankers got it right in the United States in 1987 when they avoided
deflationary pressures as well as serious trouble in the banking system. In the
days immediately following the October 19th crash, Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan - in office a mere two months - focused his efforts on
maintaining financial stability. For instance, he persuaded banks to extend
credit to struggling brokerage houses, thus ensuring that the stock exchanges
and futures markets would continue operating normally. (US banks, which unlike
their Japanese counterparts do not own stock, were never in any serious danger
from the crash.) Subsequently, the Fed's attention shifted from financial to
macroeconomic stability, with the central bank cutting interest rates to offset
any deflationary effects of declining stock prices. Reassured by policymakers'
determination to protect the economy, the markets calmed and economic growth
resumed with barely a blip.
There's no denying that a collapse in stock prices today would pose serious
macroeconomic challenges for the United States. Consumer spending would slow,
and the US economy would become less of a magnet for foreign investors.
Economic growth, which in any case has recently been at unsustainable levels,
would decline somewhat. History proves, however, that a smart central bank can
protect the economy and the financial sector from the nastier side effects of a
stock market collapse.
Bernanke follows old route
In his 2000 article of faith, Bernanke was openly endorsing the "Greenspan
put", the monetary stance from late 1980s on during which, whenever the economy
slowed, the Fed would come to its rescue by radically lowering the Fed funds
rate target even to the point of negative real yields as measured against
inflation, and kept it there until a new boom bubble was solidly formed. The
Greenspan put repeatedly pumped liquidity into the market to avert the price
correction consequences of speculative excesses that caused the 1987 crash,
then the geo-economic consequences of the First Gulf War in 1991, then the
contagion effects from the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, then the Asian
financial crisis of 1997 and the Russian default that caused the collapse of
Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, then the phantom Y2K digital threat, then
the bursting of the Internet dot.com bubble in 2000 and then the market panic
from the 2001 9/11 terrorist attacks to launch the subprime housing bubble that
burst in July 2007.
Accordingly, Bernanke was complacently confident that another application of
the Greenspan put could again handle the housing bubble burst in July 2007. He
appeared to have no inkling that the economy had been drawn closer each time
since 1978 into a perfect storm of structured finance run amok.
On May 17, 2007, three months before the credit crisis broke out, Bernanke said
in a speech on the subprime mortgage market at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago's 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition:
...
given the fundamental factors in place that should support the demand for
housing, we believe the effect of the troubles in the subprime sector on the
broader housing market will likely be limited, and we do not expect significant
spillovers from the subprime market to the rest of the economy or to the
financial system. The vast majority of mortgages, including even subprime
mortgages, continue to perform well. Past gains in house prices have left most
homeowners with significant amounts of home equity, and growth in jobs and
incomes should help keep the financial obligations of most households
manageable.
The top US central banker did not see what
Greenspan later called "the crisis of a century" coming at him at full speed to
hit him in the face in four weeks. Even on August 31, 2007, six weeks after the
credit crisis broke out in mid July, Bernake still spoke with surprising calm
confidence in a speech on "Housing, Housing Finance, and Monetary Policy",
delivered at the Federal
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