SPEAKING
FREELY The
Pacific 'pivot' gamble By Brett
Daniel Shehadey
Speaking Freely is
an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
writers to have their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
In recent months,
there have been increasing media reports of
United States-led war games, mutual-defense
treaties and troop movements in the Pacific. The
US is hoping that an increase of its military
presence in key locations like Japan, Australia,
and the Philippines will prevent an immediate
conflict between the China and the other parties
involved in territorial disputes. The "Asia
pivot", as the strategy has been dubbed, entails
moving forces away from Central Asia and
reestablishing a priority in the Pacific and the
China Seas.
China, members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, South
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, all have stakes in disputed
territorial claims, and
there has been much news coverage and analysis
over the nature of the tensions, often focusing on
fisheries and national pride. But the real issue
is the new US military's Pacific policy.
We assume that the US government
ultimately wants China to reform and become a
responsible international player subject to
liberal international laws. In other words, the US
wants China to reform like itself and play by the
same rules of human progress and peace.
However, the US has a schizophrenic take
on political reform. Economically and militarily,
the US does not want China to be as successful as
itself. One reason for this is because China has
not reformed democratically, or not at a pace on
par with its economic progress, which is
worrisome. The US feels wounded in that the
Chinese have deceived its good democratic trade
intentions but to the Chinese, there were no
expectations other than trade. So no real
commitment to democracy has yet been established
by that country.
A second reason for the
US not to want China to be like itself is because
it is a military and commercial "competitor". Such
is the dilemma of the US, being "the" declining
hyperpower and also the leader of democracy
building. Such a position and attitude make it a
difficult institution for democracy promotion in
China, especially when you have Western oil
companies pitching tent in the area for the
Philippines and neighbors.
How does the
'Asia pivot' policy change the game? First,
the US needs to prioritize whether it wants a
democratic China or a commercial China. So far, it
has thought erroneously that economic reform will
automatically be met by political liberal reform.
Now that we know that this is not the case, the
US, the United Nations, the European Union and
other liberal institutions should work together to
help China politically - not by force but through
concerted incentives and opportunities to the
advantage of China and the rest of the world.
Small steps by China and a strong vocal
commitment forward of democratic reform would go a
long way, and the island territorial disputes in
the region could be one of the greatest bargaining
chips of the 21st century, if orchestrated
correctly.
It might be possible, for
example, to convince the nations in question to
sell or lease the lands involved to China at a
fair and refereed price by UN and or the
Association of Southeast Nations if China ensures
major reform, like a legitimate two-party system
or independent judiciary. Islands and ocean
shelves offered up on a platter for political
concessions should have a positive long-term
impact for peace in the region. The more China
improves internally, the more it will improve
externally. Whatever is negotiated, it must be a
lasting win-win for all parties concerned and
compensated.
Second, the US has already
begun a policy of containment around the China
Seas. This will be seen diplomatically as an act
of aggression, mistrust, and bullying. The US
military must also realize that they are currently
flanking China by land in Afghanistan and by sea
in the Pacific - a geo-political no no, in terms
of good international relations. Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan was tolerated.
Now, coupled with the "Asia pivot", China is no
longer comfortable with its security and resource
limitations.
The reaction of China can be
seen in the increasingly harmful security
relations between them and the US. The Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, where China and Russia
and several of the steppes countries have become
regional economic and security partners, is
directly linked with the future of Central Asia
and the ousting of the US and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization from their sphere of
influence. This can be seen in the grouping's
increasingly bold rhetoric and subtle military
build-ups. Expect a possible similar scenario of
SCO security collaboration involvement in the
future China Seas disputes.
Lastly, the
Pacific policy of containment must be understood
as an outstanding failure of diplomacy in
prevention and not a strengthening of diplomacy as
a foreign policy option. Security and reform
dialogue with China have gone virtually nowhere
where there are many opportunities for them to
achieve large-scale results for both states, if
the US is willing to initiate the process. Sending
in warships and troops around a state and then
telling them, "It's okay," and that, "We are not
trying to encroach," is an impossible diplomatic
tale to swallow.
What are the outcomes?
Greater Chinese resentment and greater allocation
of resources for the creation of a strong Chinese
navy.
It is uncertain "when" China will
have the capability to inflict more harm on the US
Navy than the other way around and when they could
do so by crippling the fleet with ease as a
deterrent, but the time is within sight. In any
case, their's is an automatic response which is
almost a natural law of the universe.
The
US is not stupid but still sees the use of force
as its first option. This is at the cost of
long-term regional peace and security. Now is the
time to really work with the Chinese. Inviting the
nation to participate in this or that
international club has done little in the way of
true democratic reform.
The point is that
if China really wants to be like the US, or
better, and it does, then it knows that it needs
the respect of the international community. It
needs a positive image and one can argue the 2008
Beijing Olympic Games as a great example. It must
at the very least "appear" respectable to others.
Yet, if everyone is focuses on profits and not
reform, containment and not engagement, then China
has no reason to act any different and I would
argue they will act even worse when pressured.
The Chinese should be handled more
delicately and through political means with
genuine incentives that benefit them. In the case
of the China Seas claims, they should be allowed a
graceful way out, like purchasing leasing
territories with the help of third party
arbitration and democratic reform. If they can
reform and gain by it financially, making their
country become great, why would they not do so?
We need something big - really big - like
a political version of Richard Nixon's visit to
China. This would set off the next few decades of
China's political transformation. The only thing
that is missing are the right words from
Washington to Beijing.
Brett Daniel
Shehadey is a writer, commentator and holds an
MA in Strategic Intelligence from AMU and a BS in
Political Science from UCLA.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing. Articles submitted for this section
allow our readers to express their opinions and do
not necessarily meet the same editorial standards
of Asia Times Online's regular contributors.
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