Mr Weidmann: "...Despite all our various qualifications and tasks, within the Bank, there is a shared vision and a clear commitment to monetary stability. This is unique for such an institution and has also made the Bank an attractive option for people applying to work for us. The public good of maintaining price stability and thus contributing to the common good is a major incentive for many."

Mr Weidmann, how did you yourself see the Bundesbank, say, while you were at university?

Mr Weidmann: "In 1987 I was studying in France. The Banque de France was not yet independent at the time. That is when I first clearly saw the differences in outlook concerning the role of, and oversight over, the central bank. I myself had pretty much 'inhaled' the Bundesbank's role; my French student friends, however, could not possibly imagine a government institution performing a key sovereign task and still being outside parliamentary control. Two very different world views were colliding. They have continued to do so in all political debates - essentially, up to the present day."

Where can you identify this?

Mr Weidmann: "I recently gave an interview to the French daily newspaper 'Le Monde'. Many readers responded to the substantive positioning, some positively, some negatively. However, some responded along the lines of 'Why is he meddling in the political debate? He's only a central bank governor, a 'civil servant' who actually shouldn't be saying anything on the matter."

In 1990, the Bundesbank wrote that the participants in economic and monetary union would be inextricably linked to one another 'come what may' and that such a union would be an 'irrevocable joint and several community which, in the light of past experience, requires a more far-reaching association, in the form of a comprehensive political union, if it is to remain durable'.

Mr Weidmann: "The assessment at that time merely reflected the Bank's long-held position. As early as 1963, President Karl Blessing had stated that the introduction of monetary union should be conditional on political union. The Bank's stance has not only been consistent over time but has, in fact, taken on even greater relevance in a dramatic way owing to the recent crisis in the euro area."

Political union did not feature in the Maastricht Treaty at the end of 1991. How did the Central Bank Council react to this?

Mr Schlesinger: "When I took office as President of the Deutsche Bundesbank in the summer of 1991, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was still in favor of political union. However, the decision to implement monetary union by no later than 1999 was taken just four months later. This was a clear defeat for us. There is no other way of putting it. We had assumed that the Treaty would be concluded with a definition of the entry criteria, but without a fixed date being set."

Mr Weidmann: "It is interesting that we are having a similar discussion now in connection with the banking union. Here, too, some quarters are evidently seeking a far-reaching joint solution, but without imposing stricter rules on the other policy areas that are also affected. A genuine European banking supervision can indeed form a major component of closer integration within monetary union. However, such an institutional reorganization of banking supervision also has to be integrated - into a comprehensive reform of the supervisory regulatory framework and of the respective national scope for economic and fiscal policy. Otherwise, too great a burden will be placed on banking supervision."

What is crucial for political union is the willingness to hand over national sovereignty. Does such a willingness actually exist within the EU?

Mr Schlesinger: "This question always takes me back to the start of European unification. At that time, the main objective was quite a different one - namely, to ensure that there would never again be a war in Europe. The plan for a common European army was ultimately blocked by France, even though the loss of sovereignty involved would have been easy to implement. It is actually hard to envisage how a loss of monetary sovereignty could be achieved in the absence of a unified state."

Mr Weidmann: "Seeing how reluctant some countries are to relinquish their fiscal policy autonomy - even in return for financial assistance - it is hard to imagine political union being achieved in the foreseeable future."

Mr Schlesinger, should the Bundesbank have fought more strongly against monetary union without a political counterweight in the 1990s?

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