Page 2 of
2 Clinton
brush off marks new Sino-US
rivalry By Brendan
O'Reilly
For at least several decades,
China has claimed the majority of the South China
Sea as an integral part of Chinese territory. For
China, US intervention in its disputes with
neighboring countries over this territory amounts
to a direct attack on China herself. Clearly, this
is a red line for Beijing.
It must be
noted that not only Beijing, but also the
Taiwan-based Republic of China (ROC), claim
Chinese sovereignty over the "nine-dashed line"
region in the South China Sea. Chinese
nationalists in both Taiwan and Hong Kong have
recently protested on behalf of Chinese claims of
sovereignty in the region. Of course, Beijing
could benefit on the international stage by taking
a softer line on the ongoing maritime disputes.
Chinese territorial quarrels with the Philippines
and Vietnam offer an
opening for the US
military to increase its presence in the region.
However, a more forceful Chinese stance is
imperative for domestic political reasons. Recent
spontaneous protests against Japanese claims to
the Diaoyu (Senkaku in Japanese) Islands have
spiraled out of control, with Japanese products,
including police vehicles, targeted by angry mobs.
As Beijing prepares for a handoff of political
power to a new generation, a tough position on
protecting perceived Chinese sovereignty in the
maritime regions is essential.
Meanwhile,
strong US involvement in the South China Sea
dispute has offered the Chinese leadership a
golden propaganda opportunity. It may have been
difficult for the Chinese government to play up
the Philippines or Vietnam as dire threats to
Chinese sovereignty, but as soon as Uncle Sam
entered the stage with the "pivot" towards Asia,
the psychological dynamic of the standoff changed
completely. Further pressure was added by US-ally
Japan's ratcheting up of territorial tensions on
China's Eastern flank. Now the Chinese government
can shift the domestic (and so some degree
international) narrative of the South China Sea
standoff: instead of pushing around smaller
powers, it is China herself who is under threat
from a hegemonic bully.
Of course, despite
these political narratives, China is by no means
powerless to counter US encroachment into the
region.
A MAD world Last month,
Chinese station television announced the
successful test of China's latest intercontinental
missile, the Dongfeng 41. This latest series in
the Dongfeng ("Eastern Wind") line has a maximum
range of 14,000 kilometers, and is capable of
carrying multiple warheads. [5] China's
longstanding policy of strategically concealing
and underreporting military capabilities implies
that the published range specifications could be
conservative estimates. Meanwhile, reports have
surfaced of Chinese advances in deploying nuclear
missile-equipped submarines.
This
upgrading of China's strategic missile
capabilities is a potentially stabilizing factor
in Sino-American relations. The entirety of the
continental US is now well within the reach of
China's nuclear weaponry. Furthermore, the ability
to deploy multiple warheads on a single missile
effectively trumps any modern missile-defense
system. China has achieved Mutually-Assured
Destruction (MAD) status with the US in the event
of a full-scale nuclear war. The stakes are much
too high now for either power to seek military
conflict.
Neither the US nor China could
guarantee that a small clash in the Asia-Pacific
would not escalate into a shooting war, which in
turn could escalate into an extinction-level event
for the human race. This dangerous dynamic is why
the US "pivot" towards Asia, and Chinese fears of
the aggressive capabilities of the conventional
forces of the US military, are based on an
extremely outdated worldview. The US military, for
all its might, has been rendered useless by
China's strategic nuclear arsenal. The American
naval buildup off of China's shores amounts to
little more than a "paper tiger".
What
will take place is a much more subtle
confrontation, with each country staking out areas
of influence, primarily for economic resources. On
this level, China has played a much smarter game
than the US in the last decade. While Beijing has
largely focused on economic ties with other
nations, Washington has been busy establishing and
maintaining costly military bases around the
globe.
The return on investments for each
strategy has been obvious. The US will receive
very little strategic leverage against China by
positioning conventional military forces in the
region. The costly deployment of several hundred
marines in Australia, for example, has virtually
no effect on the security equation between two
powers capable of completely destroying each
other's major cities in a matter of a few hours.
The question naturally arises: why is the
US intent on a costly strategic encirclement of
China if conventional military forces must never
be used? Part of the answer lies in an outdated
worldview, but the larger motivating factor is
domestic politics.
Much like that the
Chinese position in the South China Sea is largely
constrained by China's domestic politics, the US
leadership is similarly compelled to take a hard
line against Beijing. Neither of the two major
American political parties can afford to look weak
in front of China. America's economic woes, and
China's rapid economic rise, make China an easy
scapegoat for America's ongoing unemployment
crisis, and the largely self-wrought global
decline of American influence.
Simply put,
the American political class is afraid. After
dominating the globe for over 60 years, America is
likely to get replaced as the world's pre-eminent
superpower within two or three decades. The Middle
Kingdom already challenges US economic supremacy
throughout the world. Even the lynchpins of the US
"pivot" towards Asia - Japan, India, South Korea,
Indonesia, and Australia - do far more trade with
China than they do with the United States.
Although the Sino-American rivalry will
remain a serious matter, the areas of contention
will be confined to economic, political, and
cultural realms. The military stakes are simply
too high. Martial posturing on both sides is meant
primarily for domestic consumption.
There
are hopeful signs for the development of a
friendly rivalry. Firstly, with the exception of
the Korean War (1950-1953), there is no strong
history of mutual political animosity between the
two powers. Indeed, there is quite a long history
of cooperation against external threats, such as
the Empire of Japan and the Soviet Union.
Secondly, the people on both sides are generally
mutually amicable.
On the more concrete
side, both China and the US need each other
economically. China's economic miracle would sour
overnight without access to American markets. For
the foreseeable future, China will need to
continue exporting consumer goods and importing
crops such as wheat and soybeans. On the other
hand, America will remain dependent on Chinese
trade and loans to forestall an even deeper
economic crisis.
Finally, and most
importantly, both powers have achieved a rough
nuclear balance. America may have many more
nuclear warheads than China, but China's arsenal
is more than sufficient to act as a credible
deterrent. Military threats and posturing on both
sides are produced primarily for domestic
consumption. For the time being, there will remain
stability in the Sino-American rivalry. Neither
power can directly threaten the other through
coercive military or economic means.
Washington's pivot towards Asia is an
overly militarized, regionalized effort at
containing China. It is doomed to failure because
China's growing influence is not confined to the
Asia-Pacific, but rather spans the entire globe.
Furthermore, the existence of advanced nuclear
weaponry means that the Sino-American struggle for
dominance will likely remain confined to the
economic, cultural, and political realms. If
Washington wants to compete in the 21st century,
the American leadership must take off its outdated
military blinders. America's pivot towards Asia
serves little purpose besides angering an
increasingly powerful China and uniting China's
people against a perceived outside threat.
Secretary Clinton's less-than-friendly
reception in Beijing serves a notice to the United
States. An amicable rivalry is possible only when
both powers fear and respect each other. No longer
will China listen to American denunciations
regarding China's foreign or domestic policies
without responding in kind. China now has the
economic clout and long-range military
capabilities to interact with the United States on
a fully equal basis.
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