Diplomats tested as East Asia
tensions rise By Jeffrey
Robertson
Add anger, a dash of injustice,
shame, frustration, distrust, determination and
pride. Stick in a historical reference and stir in
any one of the currently disputed islands in East
Asia. Blend thoroughly and bring to the boil.
Regional politicians may have cooked and served it
to a willing public, but how will diplomats handle
this bubbling emotional cauldron?
Western
diplomatic tradition, from which modern diplomatic
practice derives, holds that emotion is anathema
to diplomatic practice. Diplomats should be the
epitome of calmness, detachment and rationality.
In the classic and authoritative text
Diplomacy, famed British diplomat and later
Member of Parliament, Sir Harold Nicolson, goes so
far as to state the ability to remain calm and
maintain a good temper as one of three central
qualities essential to good diplomacy. Nicolson's advice
on avoiding the
expression of emotion is all the more salient,
written as Europe tumbled towards the opening of
World War II.
Bernard Du Rosier, a much
earlier writer on the subject of diplomacy -
indeed, at a time when the term "diplomacy" was
yet to come into usage in either French or English
- wrote that the negotiator must "not show
personal feelings" either positive or negative.
Negotiators must let "outrage yield to
friendliness, impetuosity to wisdom, rigidity to
adaptability and curtness to approachability".
What makes Du Rosier's advice even more
significant is the fact that, as a representative
of Pope Eugene IV in the mid-15th century, he was
witness to negotiating behavior that far exceeded
contemporary expectations. Negotiators would sob,
groan, lament, wail, curse, wring their hands and
draw weapons.
Three hundred years later,
Frenchman Francois De Callieres, a diplomat under
famed French statesman Cardinal de Richelieu,
noted that negotiators depended upon the shared
values of stability and calm characteristic of the
emerging diplomatic profession. De Callieres' work
is an early example of the body of diplomatic
literature which sought to advise would-be
diplomats in the skills and qualities required to
succeed in the profession. Of these skills and
qualities, De Callieres is adamant that arrogance,
contempt, anger, hostility, rage and pride have no
place. Basically, avoiding the expression of
emotion is essential.
Yet, it is in the
works of Sir Ernest Mason Satow, a British
diplomat at the height of the imperial age, that
this aversion to emotion is most distinct. In
structure, content and form, his classic text
The Guide to Diplomatic Practice
demonstrates a degree of emotional constraint that
supersedes all that went before and after.
Satow began his work in the diplomatic
profession as a member of the British Consular
service. Here he witnessed the height of British
imperialism and Western gunboat diplomacy. After a
short language sojourn in China, he moved on to
Japan in 1862. He undertook subsequent postings in
Siam, Uruguay and Morocco, but it was China, and
in particular, Japan, where his heart and mind
stayed.
His arrival in Japan placed him at
a distinct point in history. He was a member of
the diplomatic service of a country at the height
of its power, posted to a country of stark social,
cultural and political contrasts between those
that sought to cling to the past (and reject
Western culture and thought) and those that sought
to modernize (and learn from and emulate Western
culture and thought). He would see Japan forced
out of self-imposed isolation, the emperor
restored, and its society, political system and
military radically modernized.
He would
see Japan shake of its isolation and engage with
its neighbors and the world. He would ultimately
see Japan emerge as a rival to Western power in
the Far East. Perhaps significantly, Japan is also
a country in which cultural mores dictate an
aversion to outward displays of emotion. It is
this attitude that pervades Satow's professional
academic work.
Satow's contribution to
diplomacy was substantial. According to diplomatic
historian G R Berridge, Satow was "an outstanding
figure in the diplomatic service of his time" as
well as a prolific scholar with an oeuvre
consisting of "historical, cultural, philological
studies, as well as writings on the nature of
diplomacy".
In authoring The Guide to
Diplomatic Practice, Satow, as De Callieres,
followed that same long tradition of
scholar-diplomats who in the later stages of their
career or in retirement sought to impart their
accumulated wisdom to future generations of
diplomats. The guide, with its most recent sixth
edition published in 2009, still serves as
reference for diplomats. Like other writers of the
genre, Satow is crystal clear on the role of
emotion - a diplomat must above all be of "good
temper".
At the 1908 Rede Lecture,
delivered at Cambridge University, Satow
elaborated on the need for an ideal diplomat to be
removed from all expressions of emotion, both good
and bad. In discussing the Austrian diplomat Count
Von Hubner, Satow notes that an ambassador should
fulfill the duties of office without demonstration
of fatigue, boredom or disgust. The ambassador
must hide the emotions experienced and "remain
silent regarding the bitter disappointments to
which he is subjected, as well as the unexpected
successes which sometimes, but rarely bestows on
him".
However, perhaps the most famous
writer on diplomacy in the twentieth century
demonstrates a different side to the tradition.
Although very different in scope and intent from
Sir Harold Nicolson's original, Henry Kissinger's
similarly named Diplomacy has become an
equally important diplomatic text. First published
in 1994, Kissinger's text predominantly concerns
"foreign policy" or "statecraft" rather than
diplomatic practice as other texts in the genre.
Yet, its relevance to the modern diplomatic
practitioner remains unquestionable.
Importantly, Kissinger's works also
reiterates the need to avoid emotionalism in
diplomatic decision-making. According to
Kissinger, decisions in diplomacy are to be
calculated, in an almost scientific manner,
totally devoid of emotion. Ideology and sentiment
have no place in the rational, scientific
calculation of diplomatic decision-making.
The avoidance of emotionalism seemed a
feature of Cold war politics. At the height of
Cold War tensions, long-held historical grievances
were pushed aside for rational calculation of
national interests. South Korea's decision to
normalize relations with Japan is a case in point.
The 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between the
Republic of Korea and Japan was extremely
controversial, resulting in demonstrations and
riots in Seoul. Yet, diplomatic decision-makers
managed to handle the process. Ideology and
sentiment had no place in the rational, scientific
calculation of diplomatic decision-making.
But more recent studies of Kissinger and
his works show his dedication to rationalism was a
facade, which hid deeper and more powerful
emotional tendencies. Diplomatic historian Barbara
Key explored Kissinger's emotional side. Her work
demonstrates the contrast between the Kissinger
portrayed in his academic and public persona and
the Kissinger portrayed in his relations with
colleagues.
She draws a picture of an
individual whose actions, including highly
significant actions having a major diplomatic
import, were dictated by emotions of jealousy,
anger, betrayal and fear. Key goes so far as to
state that Kissinger's decision to put United
States forces on the DEFCON III alert on October
24, 1973, during the Yom Kippur War was "an angry
move triggered in part by a sense of outrage at
what seemed like a Soviet betrayal of the
cooperative relationship he had worked so hard to
build".
The long history of diplomatic
tradition that holds that emotion is anathema to
diplomatic practice. Yet, even the most rational
and calculated decision-makers have an emotional
side, which influences their decision-making. As
diplomats today face the bubbling cauldron of
emotional soup in regional territorial disputes,
their ability to suppress emotion is coming under
strain. There is no longer any Cold War facade,
hiding these emotions. All that is left is
diplomatic tradition.
Jeffrey
Robertson is a visiting professor at the KDI
School of Public Policy and Management.
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