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Koizumi's
'bold gamble' in Pyongyang
By Ralph A
Cossa
I'm not sure whether to be cautiously
optimistic or cautiously pessimistic about Japanese
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's visit to North Korea
on Tuesday, but either way, "caution" is the watchword.
I am strongly in favor of increased dialogue
with North Korea, by South Korea and the United States
as well as by Japan. The fact that Pyongyang suddenly
seems serious about engaging in high-level discussions
with all three simultaneously presents an opportunity
that should not be missed or squandered, even if it must
be approached carefully.
Some may question
Pyongyang's motives and such questioning appears
appropriate, given North Korea's previous track record
of on-again, off-again negotiations and broken promises.
But more important than guessing what Pyongyang expects
to get from its current round of "smile diplomacy" is a
clear understanding and articulation by Tokyo of what it
hopes to achieve, both individually and cooperatively
with Seoul and Washington, as a result of this bold
diplomatic initiative.
Tokyo has been careful
not to set expectations too high. Koizumi acknowledged
that he was "anticipating no settlement of all the
issues" that currently separate the two countries, but
that this was "the only way to break the ice" and get
the normalization process back on track. He also
acknowledged the risks involved: "I will stake my
political life," Koizumi reportedly asserted, on what he
himself described as a "bold gamble". This has led some
pundits to speculate that Koizumi might be so eager for
a successful visit that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il
would somehow be able to leverage this against the
Japanese leader, to Japan's (and America's) detriment. I
think not!
The risk for Koizumi is not in
accomplishing too little but in giving away too much.
This should put a natural brake on how much he will be
willing to offer. North Korea's heavily criticized
failure to practice even asymmetrical reciprocity in its
dealings with South Korea should also cause Tokyo to
insist on some deliverables in advance of (or at least
simultaneous with) any aid or development assistance
that may be forthcoming as a result of the visit.
One such deliverable is some forward progress on
determining the status of the dozen or more missing
Japanese citizens suspected of having been kidnapped by
North Korea. The failure of at least a few of these
individuals suddenly to surface (or at least for their
fates to become known) during or shortly after the visit
will cause many to proclaim the visit a failure,
regardless of whatever else is accomplished.
What will increase the Japanese prime minister's
flagging popularity at home and abroad will be the
opportunity the trip provides for Koizumi to express
Tokyo's concerns about North Korean activities directly,
even while expressing his nation's regrets for its own
past misdeeds. Koizumi's anticipated apology, along the
lines of similar statements made to the South, can help
begin what is sure to be a long-drawn-out (and, for
Japan, ultimately expensive) healing process.
While it is probably too much to hope for, some
acknowledgment in return by the North's Dear Leader that
the unresolved state of hostility between Japan and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) since the
end of Japanese occupation has resulted in occasional
unfriendly acts by the North toward Japan as well could
help create some Japanese goodwill, which will sorely be
needed once the subject of compensation packages is
negotiated. Such a comment by the North could also help
to defuse the lingering "spy boat" controversy, which
will likely resurface along with the suspected North
Korean ship shortly after Koizumi's visit.
While
some have argued that the visit could undercut
Washington's security objectives on the Korean
Peninsula, the reverse is also true. North Korea might
find it easier (not to mention potentially more
rewarding) to make a pledge to continue its current
missile test moratorium beyond the January 1, 2003,
scheduled end date to Japan (over whose territory the
missiles fly) than to an American interlocutor. The
result would be the same: the elimination of a potential
crisis point in US-DPRK relations that all concerned
parties would just as soon avoid. This would be a
relatively low-cost diplomatic gift to Koizumi, since it
is clearly in Pyongyang's interest to avoid the
political and economic consequences a resumption in
missile testing would most certainly bring.
A
Koizumi call for a greater effort by Pyongyang to come
into full compliance with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) - a future stumbling block in the
implementation of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework - would
no doubt also be welcomed by Washington and would
certainly be appropriate, given that Japan (with its
robust civilian nuclear energy program) is the most
closely monitored of all the IAEA member states.
Reports that the US was "blind-sided" by the
visit also appear overstated. While great (if only
partially successful) effort was expended to keep the
deliberations secret, all evidence points to careful
coordination between Tokyo and both Washington and
Seoul. Koizumi neither sought nor required "permission"
from either nation, but the close coordination among the
three, originally instituted as part of the "Perry
process" (initiated by former US defense secretary
William Perry), remains alive and well.
Finally,
some have argued that Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang and
the possible resumption of normalization talks will put
additional pressure on Washington to finally send its
own high-level delegation to Pyongyang, especially when
combined with the parallel resumption of high-level
dialogue and prospects for some actual real movement on
North-South initiatives such as the road and rail link
across the DMZ. One hopes that this is true. At this
month's Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group
(TCOG) meeting in Seoul, senior representatives from
Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul all endorsed the Koizumi
visit. US assistant secretary of state James Kelly -
previously earmarked to lead the George W Bush
administration's first senior delegation to Pyongyang -
also reaffirmed Washington's "readiness to hold
comprehensive and unconditional talks with North Korea"
... but no date has yet been set.
Even
Washington's hardliners would have difficulty arguing
against a Kelly visit if genuine progress is made during
Koizumi's historic diplomatic mission. Of course, the
reverse could also be true, if sensitive issues are
completely avoided and Koizumi returns empty-handed.
Ralph A Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS
(e-mail pacforum@hawaii.rr.com ). Used by
permission.
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