| |
Pyongyang: Koizumi needs
more than handshakes
By Victor D Cha
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's trip
to North Korea on Tuesday appears to be a positive
development in reducing tensions on the Korean
Peninsula. In line with the George W Bush
administration's desire for a beefed-up alliance with
Tokyo, Koizumi's decision to visit Pyongyang also
reflects positively on Japan's attempts to play a
leadership role in the region.
Koizumi appears
to be taking on the thorny problem of North Korea at a
time when the fate of South Korean President Kim
Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy remains uncertain at the end
of his presidency. Moreover, US ambivalence about
engaging North Korea remains palpable enough that a
probe of this sort by a trusted ally may yield the
transparency needed for Washington to make the decision
to pursue engagement in earnest.
Or not? Though
Japan deserves kudos for taking this initiative, is
Koizumi being set up as the straight man for Bush hawks?
Koizumi cannot fall into the same trap that Kim Dae-jung
did of coming back from Pyongyang with handshakes and
photo ops but no substantive agreements. Indeed, smiling
faces (and nothing else) are just the proof that Bush
hawks need to validate their belief that North Korean
leader Kim Jong-il is not serious about engagement.
The most meaningful issue for Japan and the
United States relates to North Korea's Nodong missiles.
In excess of 100 of these ballistic missiles, unlike the
longer-range Taepodong missile, are actually deployed in
North Korea. Moreover, any logical extrapolation of
North Korea's strategic doctrine suggests these
missiles, which can be fitted with chemical warheads,
are targeted at Japan (in order to deter the United
States and Japan from supporting South Korea in a
military confrontation). Can Japan persuade the North to
concede on this issue? Doubtful. The North refused even
to discuss Nodong deployments in the missile
negotiations with the US at the end of the Bill Clinton
administration.
So herein lies the ruse: Koizumi
cannot come back from Pyongyang with simple handshakes.
He must deliver, especially since North Korea so badly
disrespected Tokyo in normalization talks at the end of
2000 when Japanese negotiators were led to believe that
the basic outlines of a package were in the making. At
the same time, the agreements that are meaningful (ie,
missiles) are not likely to be in the offer. Facing
pressure for results, Koizumi might therefore fall into
the trap of handing over some carrots (ie, cash) for
small incremental and symbolic concessions by North
Korea. This sort of summit might play in Seoul, but it
won't play in Washington or Tokyo. Moreover, Bush hawks
will have their proof that engagement with North Korea
is fruitless.
Behind this diplomatic theater
sits the deeper and more disturbing message. In
conjunction with Kim Jong-il's recent meeting with
Russian President Vladimir Putin and persistent
entreaties by Beijing and Seoul, Koizumi's trip could be
seen as another voice in the regional chorus for
President Bush to get on the engagement bandwagon
traversing the Korean Peninsula. But these voices also
have the unintended effect of widening a gap in beliefs
about policy toward North Korea between Washington and
its allies in Asia. For those allies, Koizumi's
impending trip validates once again the merits of
engagement and Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy. They
believe that engagement will eventually bring the North
around.
But for the Bush administration,
Koizumi's trip reinforces the efficacy of the harder
line. Calling the regime "evil" and taking the "hawk",
not Sunshine, approach to engagement have pressed North
Korea into its conciliatory mode. The further North
Korea opens up, the wider this perception gap between
the United States and its allies in Asia will grow.
Victor D Cha is associate professor
and director of the American Alliances in Asia Project,
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University,
Washington, DC.
(This
article is used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS
)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
