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Koizumi visits Pyongyang: Beginner's
luck?
By Yumiko Nakagawa
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's
visit to North Korea on September 17 yielded an
unexpected surprise: North Korea's Dear Leader Kim
Jong-il confirmed the abduction of Japanese citizens by
"elements of the military" and made the first-ever
official apology. Kim also provided information on the
abductees' whereabouts. While the number of those
accounted for has varied in different press reports, as
many as 14 may be missing (three more than the Japanese
government had confirmed): eight are dead, five
(including a descendent of one abductee) are alive, and
the condition of one is unknown.
This
announcement resulted in an increase in Koizumi's
approval rating to 61 percent virtually overnight. It
also marked a step forward for Japanese diplomacy: Tokyo
has demonstrated its ability to take a leadership role
in foreign policy without help from the United States -
Japan's big brother for the past 50 years. However,
matters are not so simple in the domestic theater, and
the trip was not a total victory in the eyes of the
Japanese people.
Koizumi's visit seems to have
resulted in increased public hostility toward North
Korea and has highlighted the government's failure to
protect its citizens at home and abroad. The wide media
coverage in Japan of the heartbreaking press conference
held by the families of the abductees focused largely on
the human tragedies brought to light by the Kim-Koizumi
meeting rather than the resulting diplomatic
breakthrough.
Consequently, the backlash against
North Korea has already begun. North Korean nationals
living in Japan have become easy targets for angry
Japanese; many have received death threats, despite the
fact that they, too, were abductees. (The majority of
North Koreans living in Japan were abducted by the
Japanese government during World War II.)
These
acts have been committed by a few individuals whose
views do not represent the general sentiment in Japan
and should not lead to further violence. That said,
according to an Asahi poll last Wednesday, 76 percent of
those polled have expressed dissatisfaction with North
Korea's handling of the abduction issue, but 81 percent
approved of the Kim-Koizumi meeting. Although diplomatic
relations might develop between North Korea and Japan,
mistrust and hostility against North Korea, at least
among the Japanese public, will likely persist.
Anger has also been directed against the
Japanese government. The deaths of five Japanese
citizens who were abducted and taken from their own
country surely damage the Japanese government's
credibility in the eyes of its people. The Foreign
Ministry (the Japanese public's favorite target of
criticism) and Koizumi and his chief cabinet secretary
Yasuo Fukuda (the favorite targets of political leaders)
have not gained credit for eliciting an apology from Kim
Jong-il. In the eyes of much of the Japanese public,
only five are alive and the other eight were neglected
for more than 20 years by successive administrations.
Whether the remaining five will return to Japan remains
uncertain, although Kim has offered to help arrange a
reunion.
It will be essential for Koizumi to
follow up on Kim's offer in order to recover his
credibility. The Japanese government has already
demanded a thorough investigation of the deaths of the
eight, and this must yield detailed information and
credible results. Most important, the government will
need to make its own apology to the families and bring
the remaining five abductees to Japan.
In the
international arena, Koizumi seems to have scored some
diplomatic points, although whether this visit to
Pyongyang will contribute to regional stability remains
to be seen. Nevertheless, Koizumi's meeting with Kim
Jong-il is considered a historic event. UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan called it a "success" and a
contribution to stability in the region. South Korean
President Kim Dae-jung "highly rates" Koizumi's
achievement and the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade released an official statement that welcomed
the outcome of the meeting and acknowledged the
"significant importance" of resuming normalization talks
between Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK). The Chinese Foreign Ministry also praised
the meeting as an "important achievement".
Washington's response, however, was rather
subdued. US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice
"welcomed and supported" Koizumi's effort. The Mainichi
newspaper reported that US Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage stated that the meeting was good "from
Prime Minister Koizumi's point of view". Ironically, the
positive outcome of Koizumi's Pyongyang meeting is that
it may deprive Washington's hardliners of another reason
to oppose an engagement policy with the DPRK, especially
the long-anticipated visit by assistant secretary of
state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly to
Pyongyang.
Washington should welcome the outcome
of Japan's initiative and cooperation, at least on the
part of a partner in what has been termed "the world's
most important bilateral relationship bar none". Tokyo
demonstrated its independence in addressing its own key
diplomatic issue of the abductees without relying on
Washington as a channel, as had previously been the
case. At the same time, Tokyo recognized the delicacy
and complexity of all concerned issues and made a
sincere effort to update Washington and Seoul on its
preparation for the September 17 meeting. As such,
Tokyo's close coordination and follow-up with Washington
and Seoul should be welcomed.
The September 17
meeting's significance lies in the fact that Japan had
previously been relatively invisible in the diplomatic
theater. The effect of Japan-DPRK normalization talks
will likely have an impact beyond the bilateral
framework and may carry the risk of upsetting the
delicate balance on the Peninsula. Japan's status as a
global economic power (though declining) and North
Korea's negative reputation make this bilateral
relationship an international concern: any warming of
relations between the two states may well indicate the
beginning of the end of the DPRK's isolation. Given
this, Tokyo should not be content with a shallow
diplomatic achievement. Normalization talks should take
international concerns, such as weapons of mass
destruction, into consideration. This requires Tokyo's
continued coordination with Washington and Seoul.
The reality is that Koizumi's success is no
guarantee of a significant change in Kim Jong-il's
attitude. Many might suggest that Koizumi was lucky that
his gamble did not end disastrously, but the prime
minister does deserve more credit. Koizumi spoke not
only for Japan, but also for the rest of the world,
including the United States. In addition to abduction
issues, Koizumi addressed international concerns
regarding the moratorium on missile-testing (as outlined
in the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework) and its extension
beyond the 2003 deadline, as well as issues surrounding
the resumption of dialogue between the DPRK and both the
US and South Korea. Whether he made any firm promises or
not, Kim Jong-il expressed his interest in extending the
moratorium and sent a message via Koizumi to US
President George W Bush to resume dialogue.
Handling North Korea will be not easy business.
Given the regime's behavior in the past, it would be
wise for Japan to proceed extremely cautiously. Now that
Tokyo has announced its plan to resume normalization
talks in October, Japan will now become a larger player
in this tricky game. In addition, the unresolved issues
in the domestic arena (the abductees, the spy boat, and
public hostility toward the DPRK) may become obstacles
to normalization talks.
The real test for
Japan's diplomatic ability will come once the abduction
issues are off the table: how many more concessions will
Tokyo be able to draw from North Korea? Closer
coordination and discussion among Japan, the US, and
South Korea across the Track 1 and Track 2 levels are
needed more than ever.
Koizumi has enjoyed
beginner's luck so far, but there are no guarantees for
the next time.
Yumiko Nakagawa is
Vasey Fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS. Used by
permission.
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