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Kim and Koizumi: Underestimated
leaders
By Ralph A Cossa
SEOUL - The success of the September 17
Japan-DPRK summit in Pyongyang demonstrates just how
much critics underestimated both Japanese Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.
Both demonstrated a considerable amount of diplomatic
skill, and courage, during this historic one-day
meeting, which appears to have accomplished Tokyo's
stated objective of getting the normalization process
back on track.
Most pundits agreed that the
meeting would be considered a failure if Koizumi did not
achieve at least a partial accounting of the missing
Japanese citizens believed to have been abducted by
North Korea several decades ago. I had even suggested
that the North Korean leader, in response to Koizumi's
expected apology for Japan's colonial transgressions,
acknowledge in return that the unresolved state of
hostility had resulted in occasional unfriendly acts by
the North against Japan as well (see Koizumi's 'bold gamble' in
Pyongyang, September 17).
But even the
most optimistic could not have expected a full
confession and apology from Kim Jong-il for the
"regrettable" actions that had occurred against the
backdrop of "decades of hostile relations". While
attributing the kidnappings to "blind heroism" on the
part of "misguided" military intelligence officials, Kim
asserted that "after I came to know about this, the
persons responsible have been punished", promising
further that "it will never be allowed to happen again".
This issue is far from over. Tokyo will
rightfully demand more details regarding the deaths of
seven of the abductees (reportedly attributed,
unconvincingly, to "natural disasters and natural
causes"). Should the four surviving victims (and one
descendent) choose to return to Japan, one can only
imagine the horror stories they will tell. But, thanks
to Kim Jong-il's bold diplomatic stroke, this highly
emotional issue will no longer prohibit forward movement
in Japan-DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)
relations as it has in the past.
Koizumi's
perseverance on this issue should be applauded; other
Japanese leaders allegedly were prepared to sweep it
under the rug in return for forward progress. Some
accused Koizumi of being prepared to go down this same
path, while others recommended that he should. Some even
tried to make the case that the abductions never
happened at all. But Koizumi hung tough and demonstrated
that North Korea will respond positively when it
understands that core issues are at stake; a lesson
others should learn when dealing with Pyongyang.
The George W Bush administration or at
least those within it who see the wisdom of not opening
up a third front to complicate its ongoing campaigns
against international terrorism and Saddam Hussein
should be delighted with the outcome. Kim Jong-il's
indefinite continuation of the North's missile test
moratorium avoids a potential impending crisis in
US-DPRK relations, given the previous January 2003
scheduled end-date. Expressions of Pyongyang's
commitment to "abide by international agreements
regarding nuclear weapons" could also indicate a
willingness to begin the process of coming into full
compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) a future stumbling block in the implementation of
the US-DPRK 1994 Agreed Framework - although much
remains to be done here.
Those concerned that
Koizumi would engage in pre-emptive checkbook diplomacy
can also breathe a sigh of relief. While Japan still
seems prepared to provide "grants, loans, and
humanitarian assistance" in unspecified amounts
(speculation runs as high as $8 billion to $10 billion)
at the time of normalization as Tokyo did when
normalizing relations with Seoul in 1965 (to the tune of
$500 million) there is no evidence that he is
paying in advance to move the process along.
Some critics are warning that Pyongyang may be
playing its time-honored game of trying to pit
Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo against one another through
this latest overture. But, unlike past initiatives,
Pyongyang seems prepared to move forward with all three
simultaneously; its talks with Seoul continue apace and
Kim Jong-il asked Koizumi to pass a message to President
Bush that "the door is open for dialogue" with
Washington as well.
The Bush administration was
right in withholding its decision on when to send its
own high-level emissary (most likely assistant secretary
of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly)
to Pyongyang until after Koizumi's visit. But, given the
progress made on September 17, further delay is likely
to be interpreted, especially in Seoul, as more evidence
that Washington is determined to undermine the Korean
Peninsula peace process, official declarations to the
contrary notwithstanding.
Kim Jong-il also
indicated to Koizumi that the Japanese Red Army
terrorists who hijacked an aircraft to North Korea in
1970 and still remain there have "expressed their
intention to go home", and that North Korea would help
them do so soon. When and if this occurs, Washington
should be prepared to remove North Korea from its "state
sponsors of terrorism" list Pyongyang's continuing
harboring of these aging hijackers, and the need to
support Tokyo's demand for information on the kidnap
victims, have been the primary stated reasons for not
removing North Korea from the list. Again, a failure to
do so will be seen as proof that Washington seeks
confrontation rather than reconciliation on the
Peninsula.
While much remains to be done before
normalization is achieved, Koizumi and Kim Jong-il
deserve credit for taking a significant step down this
road at their historic summit. All eyes are now on
Washington to see if it is prepared to travel down the
same path.
Ralph A Cossa is president
of the Pacific Forum
CSIS (e-mail pacforum@hawaii.rr.com
). Used by permission.
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