SPEAKING FREELY
Why nukes aren't on Japan's agenda
By Jeff Thompson

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.

Speculation continues to be rife in US and several Asian policy communities about whether North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons could drive Japan to develop a nuclear arsenal. US opinion leaders even suggested this year that the United States exploit this prospect to scare China into resolving the North Korea nuclear crisis. However, the reality is that Japan will not go nuclear any time soon - even with a nuclear North Korea in the region - because it is simply not in its own national interests to do so.

Statements by several high-profile Japanese political figures in 2002 about Japan's ability to go nuclear drew widespread attention as possible indicators that Japan was actively considering a nuclear option. This is a misreading. Rather than reflecting any heated debate among policymakers in Japan, they represent isolated comments about Japan's capability - not intention - to respond to future regional security threats. Unfortunately, these remarks have been incorrectly linked to the escalating North Korea crisis, recent changes in Japan's defense policy, and Japan's nuclear technology as evidence of the imminence of Japan's arrival as a nuclear-weapons state.

A close look at Japan's position on the Korea crisis clearly shows that it does not view military escalation - nuclear or conventional - as an option. Japanese leaders, including Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, have made clear that they will strive for a diplomatic and peaceful solution. While agreeing with the United States to use "tough measures" if North Korea continues to escalate tensions, Japan remains extremely cautious about supporting any use of military force. Even Defense Agency director general Shigeru Ishiba, viewed by some as a defense hawk, has clarified that no outcome of the crisis will lead Japan to enter a nuclear-arms race in Northeast Asia.

To be sure, if North Korea chose to point nuclear-tipped Nodong missiles toward Tokyo in an escalation of the crisis, Japan would not remain idle. Rather than pursue a nuclear deterrent, Japan would likely bolster its regional ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities and cooperation with the United States, as it has already begun to do. Further, recently passed legislation allowing Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF) to prepare for imminent attacks permits greater flexibility to plan in advance for a North Korean attack. Ultimately, continued protection provided by the US nuclear umbrella and the robust US-Japan alliance relationship should foreclose any serious consideration of Japan's own nuclear deterrent.

To many observers of the East Asia security environment, a nuclear Japan fits in neatly to the continuum of change in Japan's defense policy over the last decade that has expanded the SDF's missions far beyond its borders through United Nations peacekeeping, the "war against terrorism" and, maybe soon, the reconstruction of Iraq. Acquisition of nuclear weapons is not a natural "next step" because such a decision would undermine the key elements of Japan's policies in the areas of defense, nuclear energy, and non-proliferation/arms control that affirm the peaceful use of nuclear and rocket technologies, forbid the development or possession of nuclear weapons, and advocate reducing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction worldwide. If this approach were abandoned, the international community would lose confidence in Japan's ability to abide by its treaty obligations and bilateral agreements as well as to make a positive contribution to international security. Regional tensions are also certain to escalate, possibly into an arms race.

Many point to Japan's advanced nuclear-energy and space programs, and stockpiles of plutonium, as signs of Japan's capability to develop nuclear weapons in short order if it chose to do so. The foundation for a weapons program certainly exists, but technological, institutional, and political constraints are overwhelming. Time would be needed for Japanese nuclear and rocket engineers to reorient their work and programs for weapons production and delivery. Domestic institutions that oversee Japan's nuclear energy and space issues would require considerable reorganization to be configured for the management of a weapons program. And perhaps most important, gaining political approval in the Diet (Japanese parliament) to move forward with such an endeavor - requiring widespread public approval - is certain to prove an extraordinary challenge.

Some state that the significance of the current discussions about the potential for a nuclear Japan is not whether Japan will actually go nuclear in the near future, but that discourse on the issue has reached a new level of toleration within Japanese society that could lead to an ultimate change in direction. While this is an important observation, it is crucial that a greater acceptance to openly discussing Japan's nuclear future not be mistaken as growing support for the idea. As discussions of Japan's nuclear future continue inside and outside Japan, and as events in North Korea unfold, observers must take time to understand the larger picture of why a majority of Japanese leadership and the public view it not to be in Japan's interests to go nuclear.

Jeff Thompson is a research associate with the Henry L Stimson Center.

(Copyright 2003 Jeff Thompson)

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.